WHen the Roman Empire went to wrack, all the Provinces were drain'd, all the Inhabitants fit for Arms carried away for Recruits to ſupport it: By theſe means the Provinces were left expoſed to the violence and invaſion of Strangers, which gave occaſion to the many turns and changes in theſe parts of the world. Thus the Saxons or Engliſh became Maſters of Britain, and the French (another people of Germany) took that opportunity to advance beyond their borders, and puſh on their advantage till they got poſſeſſion of all the fair Territory; and the very name of Gauls was ſwallowed up by them; and henceforward Britain and Gaul began now to be called England and France.

As with us grew ſeveral diſtinctions (from our ſituation) of Northfolk, Southfolk, Eaſtſex, Southſex; ſo the French were divided into Eaſtrians and Weſtrians: The Country where the former liv'd, by ſome corruption was named Auſtraſia, and this other Newſtria; till ſuch time as the Danes growing troubleſome to their Neighbours, part of them overran England, and another Band of them that they called Northmans, ſubdued France; and after much buſtle ſeated themſelves in Newſtria, which from thence took the name of Normandy.

How long theſe French, after they were thus tranſplanted retain'd their German liberty, I ſhall not now examine; only I find ſome of their Authors look askue upon the Court of Rome on that occaſion; they had complained that their Language grew Italianiz'd, their manners Italianiz'd: But when the Pope came to keep his Court at Avignon, new Phraſes and new Forms crept alſo into their policy. Then came in faſhion thoſe Letters du propre monuement, &c. which that man of Morals, Monſieur Pi • rach could ſo ill digeſt.

The Pope firſt employed them to render the Laws of the Church of no effect.

Their Champions for Abſolute Power • cknowledge, that the King is tyed to • orms; that his Commands will not move • ut in the proper Channel; that the Kings letters have not any force or verture • nleſs they be underſign'd by a Secretary of State; nor his Letters Patents, unleſs • they be ſo ſign'd; and then ſealed by the Chancellor, who has it in his power to cancel them, & who ſeals them not without the advice of one or two Maſters of the Requeſts aſſiſting at the Seal; & who is, as it were, a ſevere Controuler of the Kings orders, edicts, wills, commands, & grants. But ſay they — ni du • Pape meſme n'ont aucune vertu ſi elles no font ſigneés par le greffier, Baracane defence de la Monarchy, Fr. p. 409. Secretaire, ou dataire ſeelées par le ſeelleur, Gardeſaux ou Chancellier, quoy pour cela? C'eſt ordre a eſté ſagement eſtabli par tous les Princes' & ſeigneurs, tant ſpirituels, que temporels, pour ſe garantir des ſurprinſes & obvier aux fauſſetez. Il eſt plus malaiſe de contrefaire deux' ſeings, & falſifier un ſeau, que d'en contrefaire un ſeulement. Le ſecretaire d'eſtat, ou de la coronne ne ſignera jamais aucunes lettres, ſi le Roy ne luy commande; & les lettres, qui ſuivant les Ordonnances du Roy, doivent eſtre ſigneés par un ſecretaire d'eſtat, ne paſſeront point au ſeau, ſi elles ne ſont munies du ſeing du Secretaire, & ſi elles ſont contraires a la • olunté du Roy, exprimeé par ſes Edicts & Ordonnances, le Chancellier ne les ſe • llera point, que premierement il n'en • ye averti le Roy, tout cela en un mot • end au ſervice du Roy: Et de le vouloir • enverſer contre le Roy, c'eſt tourner la • umiere en tenebres, convertir le feu en glance, & mettre la terre par deſſus le ciel. Neither have the Letters of the Pope himſelf any vertue, if they be not ſigned by the Clerk, Secretary, or Dators; and ſealed by the Sealer, Sealkeeper, or Chancellor: What of all this? This order has been wiſe • y ſettled by all Princes and Lords as well ſpiritual as temporal, to ſecure them againſt ſurpriſes, and to prevent forgeries; it being more difficult to counterfeit two Signings and one Seal, than if there were but one hand to be forged. The Secretary of State ſhall never ſign any Letters unleſs the King command him, and they ſhall never come to the Seal, unleſs they be fortified with the ſigning of the Secretary; and if they be contrary to the Kings Will expreſſed in his Laws, the Chancellor ſhall never ſeal them, till he has advertifed the King thereof. 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 All this, in a word, is for the Kings ſervice; and to count this a leſſening of the King, is to turn light into darkneſs, fire into ice, and to ſet earth above heaven.

Then for the power which the Parliament ſeems to exerciſe in approving or refuſing any publick Acts, Grants, Orders, Officers, &c. made by the King: This makes no Argument againſt his Abſolute Power, the ſame Doctor tells us; Qu'il eſt neceſſaire qu'elles ſoient ſolennellement reconues, enregiſtrees, & publieés, pour eviter les obreptions, ſubreptions, & ſurprinſes qui pourroient eſcheoir en l'impetration des lettres, des officés, & des autres; & meſmes pour vuider les oppoſitions qui peuuent eſtre formeés par ceux qui y pretendont quelque intereſt. Auquel le Roy n'entend deroger, ſi n'en eſt fait expreſſe mention dans icelles; & pour ces cauſes telles lettres ſont preſenteés ou Parlement, avant que les pourveus des Offices entrent en l'exerciſe ou iouiſſance d'iceux, & quant le Parlement juge, y avoir eu de la ſubreption & obreption ou de la trop grande importunité en l'impetration d'icélles, & que l'execution en ſeroit prejudiciable au ſervice du Roy & du publique, il refuſe de les enregiſtrer, & donne advis au Roy des cauſes du refus, fondeés ſur ſon ſervice, d'ont il eſt bien aiſe, encore que quelquefois il face ſemblant a l'impetrant d'icélles en eſtre marri—That it is neceſſary they be ſolemnly approved, recorded, and publiſhed, to avoid obreptions, ſurreptions, ſurpriſes, and all the fraud and foul practiſe that might have been uſed in obtaining thoſe Letters, Offices, or other Grants; as alſo to avoid the oppoſitions of thoſe who pretend ſome right or intereſt, which the King intends not to prejudice, unleſs expreſs mention be made thereof; and for theſe cauſes ſuch Letters are preſented to the Parliament, before any who have the grant of Offices, are admitted to the exerciſe or poſſeſſion of them. And when the Parliament judges that any fraud or foul means had been practis'd, or too great importunity us'd in obtaining them, and that the execution of ſuch Grants might be prejudicial to the ſervice of the King and of the Publick, then d • es the Parliament refuſe to 〈◊〉 them, and makes the King acquainted 〈◊〉 the cauſes of their refuſal founded upon his ſervice; whereat he is right glad, though ſometimes to him who had the Grant, he makes a ſhow as if he were vext.

All agree the matter of fact, but how the King is thus bound, and how this tye lyes upon him they want language ſoft enough for an occaſion ſo tender: It has always ſo been, de toute l'ancienneté, ſays one; antiquâ conſuetudine, ſays another; their Kings have always had the wiſdom to ſubmit to theſe forms, ſays Baracaue: the modeſty ſays du Tillet, the good Nature ſays P'aſquier, une debonnaireté, a goodneſs familiar to 'em, to reduce their wills under the civility of law Some call it a magnanimity Royal and becoming a King, and a glory beyond that of conquering Nations. Bodin (from the Civilians) aſcribes it to their humanity. See id tamenſenatu probante fieri humanum eſt, ſays Theod • ſius; which Baldus interprets, non tam neceſſitatis quam humanitatis: and to their Majeſty; Digna vox eſt Majeſtate regnantis legibus alligatum principem ſe • rofiteri; to do otherwiſe would be a Levi •• and Vanity, as he cites it from the Sena • or in Livy Levius eſt & vanius ſua decre • a tollere quam aliorum: Others venture to • o a little farther, they ſays Paſquire, who • nder the pretence of an Abſolute Power, • ould flatter the Kings to be above law. • n lieu de leur gratifier dirent en un ob • cur language, que les Roys n'eſtoyent • oint hommes, ains lyons, qui par le moy • n de leur force s'eſtimoyent avoir Com •• andment • ur les hommes. Inſtead of ſaying a grateful thing ſay be craft that Kings • re not men but lyons, who think by their •• ight to have the command over men. ſays •• u Tillet, Si leur puiſſance abſolue n'yeſt • egleé, elle devient diſſolüe: If it be not re • ulated, their power is not abſolute but diſſo • ute: And a Spaniſh Treatiſe • f Politicks,Iron de ſanta Maria. with twenty ap • robations before it, affirms: • i el monarca ſea quien fuere, ſe • eſoluiere por ſola ſu cabeça, ſin • cudir a ſu conſeio, o contra el parecer • e ſus conſeieros, aunque acierte en ſu • eſolution, ſale de los terminos de la mo • arquia, y ſe entra en los de la tyrannia. If a Monarch whoe're he be, ſhall 〈◊〉 his own head reſolve any thing without the advice of his Council, or contrary to the opinion of his Counſellors, though right in his reſolution; h • breaks out over the bounds of Monarch • into Tyranny.

This Spaniard took his notion from that paſſage in Livy, where he gives a • account, how the laſt Tarquin was the fir •• of their Kings that without adviſing wit • any other than a Cabal of his Domeſtick • make peace and war, made and broke League • and Alliances, and govern'd all of his own head, never conſulting the Senate and People, as the cuſtom of his Predeceſſors ha • always been, having firſt by practices leſſen' • the number of the Senators (that nothing • but the Rump of a Senate remain'd) to make them the more contemptible. Quo contemptior paucitate ipſâ ordo eſſet, minuſque per ſe nihil agi indignarentur, hi • enim Regum primus traditum a prioribus morem de omnibus ſenatum conſulendi ſolvit; domeſticis conſiliis rempublicam adminiſtravit, bellum, pacem, foedera ſocietates per ſe ipſe cum quibus voluit injuſſu populi & Senatus fecit diremitque.

But I have digreſſed from the French or rather from Bodin, who concerns us nearer; having ſet up for a new diſcoverer in Politicks: He would perſwade us that Plato, Ariſtotle, Polybius, Hali • arnaſſaus, Cicero, Sr. Tho. Moor, Cardi • al Contarini, Machiavel, and who not, were all in a wrong way — Et quoni • m haec diſciplina maximos in republica • umultus ac perturbationes ciere poteſt, • ccuratius uobis eſt ac ſubtilius explican • a. Their Doctrine tended to Sedition • nd diſturbances in the Common-wealth, • herefore he will handle it with the greater • ccuracy and ſubtlety: And what will be • he conſequences of Bodin's new learn • ng? Certainly it muſt either make Mo • archy ſhort liv'd, by debauching it into • yranny; or elſe it muſt (as Mr. Hobbs • ho ſees farther, and who writes En • liſh, clears the matter) to eſtabliſh this • yranny, baniſh all humane Learning • nd fear of God out of the world.

There have been in all Nations Pens, • s well as Voices, ſervile and mercenary; and ſuch wretches, as that by Virgil damn'd to Hell.

Who make and unmake Laws, ſhuffle and betray both their Laws and Reaſon, that they may impoſe this dominum potentem, this Lordly deſpotick power, to the enſlaving of their Country.

But whether the love of Novelty corrupted Bodin, or that he knew no better I examine not: But though our Engliſh Politicians have followed him over hedg and ditch, without ever making uſe of their own eyes or underſtanding; other people do not overmuch admire him; the Scaligerana are too ſharp upon him; but thatCharamonte. Italian does him reaſon, Il Bodino huomo di molta lectura, ma di confuſa & turbida doctrina, impugnando da per tutto quaſi la politica doctrina d'Ariſtotele: Bodin (ſays he) a man of much reading, but confounded and blunder'd in his Notions, contradicting Ariſtotle at every turn.

Now Bodin would have us believe that ••• here can be no ſuch thing as a mixt Com •• on-wealth, nor will he allow be any •• nore thann three ſorts of Common-wealths. Nam ſi rerumpublicarum for •• as bonorum ac malorum finibus, aut vir •• utibus ac vitiis metimur, infinitas eſſe com •• eriemus: And a little after he ſays, non •• uae cuique extrinſecus accidunt intueri o •• ortet.

By the way we may note, that the •• ertues have by the moſt been reckon'd •• o be four, others have reduc'd 'em all •• o Prudence, Sincerity, and Patience; ſo • hat Common-wealths might have been diſtinguiſhed by their virtues, without making ſuch an infinite number of them; and to make ſeveral forms from their ſeveral ends, will certainly prove not ſo very extrinſecal and accidental, but a real and eſſential difference. So thought the Ancients all who writ of Politicks before Bodin; therefore if a ſingle Perſon governed for the good of the Publick, that was called Monarchy; if a few governed for the Publick Good, that they called Ariſtocracy; if the People governed for the Publick Good, that was Democracy; and theſe were counted three ſorts of good Common-wealths. But if a ſingle Perſon governed for his own particular good, that they would not call Monarchy but Tyranny; if a few governed for their particular profit, that they would not call Ariſtocracy but Oligarchy; if the People governed for the advantage of the Rabble, and not for the common benefit, this they would not call Democracy, but Oclocracy, or the miſrule of the Rabble. The Greeks I ſay, who coin'd theſe words, made that the currant meaning of them.

There are Authors, who to make ſhort work, divide all Common-wealths into Monarchy and Polyarchy: Either, ſay they, one governs and that is Monarchy; or more than one (no matter whether few or many) govern, and then it is a Poliarchy. They who love the diviſion into two, might better ſay that all government is either for the Governors good, and that is Tyranny; or for the good of thoſe that are governed, and this is a Polity or Common-wealth. But theſe •• e ſick mens dreams; may ſhew however •• at the End is more material than the • umber of thoſe that govern, and con •• quently juſtifies the Ancients, who di •• nguiſhing the Common-wealths from •• eir End, reckoned ſix ſeveral kinds of ••• ple Common-wealths, as afore has •• en declared. And humane Actions are 〈◊〉 diſtinguiſhed; the ſame Action may 〈◊〉 vertuous or vitious according to the •• d: Give a Wench mony to debauch •• r, and give it her to relieve her neceſ •• ies; this is charity, this a vertue, but •• e other is a kind of a deadly ſin: 'Tis •• e End makes the difference, a differ •• ce not accidental and extrinſecal, as •• din ſuggeſts, but real and eſſential.

And as high Juſtice greates upon the •• rders of wrong and oppreſſion, high •• urage is near to raſhneſs, liberality to •• odigality, &c. ſo does Monarchy ſtand •• on the brinks of Tyranny, Ariſtocra •• eaſily ſlips into Oligarchy, and De •• ocracy into popular diſorder: There •• re the wiſer Stateſmen having obſerv'd •• is corruption ſo ordinary and familiar to the ſimple Common-wealths, have by art endeavoured of the three good Common-wealths, to compound a mixt one that might not be ſubject to the ſame frailties and decay; to temper Monarchy and give it that balance and counterpoiſe by the mixture of the other Common-wealths with it, which might keep i • ſteddy, and preſerve it from tottering into Tyranny, which is its ruin. But al • theſe matters together with the growth • the decay, and changes of Government • are deſcrib'd by that companion of th • great Scipio Polibius, ſo accurately and philoſophically, that I cannot forbear to ſet down the whole paſſage, which is t • this effect. That, Man is naturally civil and diſpoſed to love company, and not (a • they would perſwade us to believe, wh • ſay the State of Nature is a State of War • more a beaſt than thoſe that walk on fou • feet, than the Bruits themſelves that go i • Flocks and Herds; and in like manner 〈◊〉 the ſtrongeſt Bore, and the ſtrongeſt Bull 〈◊〉 always the Captain of the reſt; ſo in theſ • companies of men, he amongſt them wh • was moſt hardy to encounter dangers, an • had moſt of bodily ſtrength to overcome •• em, had the reſt for his followers: And •• ence it was that ſo many Nations had •• ch their Hercules, and that ſo many •• ne to be called by that name: And in •• oſe rude times theſe were the firſt ſort of •• ings.

But by converſing together this rudeneſs •• aring off by degrees, and men by little •• d little coming to be ſomewhat more po ••• t, to have ſomething of conſideration, •• d the uſe of their reaſon, and to under ••• nd Juſtice and honeſt dealing, and to ſee 〈◊〉 advantages that Prudence and a wiſe ••• d had over raw uncultivated ſtrength, not •• ly in deciding Controverſies and admini •• ing Juſtice, but even in providing a •• inſt and repelling of dangers. He there ••• e now, who was moſt eminent for wiſdom ••• d juſtice, drew moſt eyes upon him, and 〈◊〉 him all ran and ſubmitted their differ •• ces to his Arbitration, his advice they ••• k, and his direction they followed on all ••• aſions either of difficulty or danger; and •• eſe were called the Wiſe Men, and theſe ••• re the true and proper Kings.

Now the Son, who had his Education under ſuch a vertuous, wiſe Father, and had been preſent with him when affairs of the greateſt importance had been debated and by common preſumption better capacitated to govern, than any of a ſtranger Family: The Son, I ſay, ſucceeds his Father in this Kingly Government, no man envying him the dignity; nor did theſe King • differ from other people in their manner of living, there was no pomp or ſhew, or an • badge of the Authority Royal, but the woode • Scepter which Homer deſcribes, (which perhaps was like our Conſtables Staff • and with this the Authority was hande • down from Father to Son, till in tract o • time ſome young man came in place, wh • giving ear to ſome looſe companions abo •• him, would not longer be content with th • plainneſs and ordinary fare of his Anceſtor • but gives himſelf over to riot and exceſs ſetting his mind on gorgeous Apparel, o • Trains and Trappings, on Feaſting an • Revels: By theſe new modes he loſes th • hearts of his Subjects, draws envy upo • him; that Reverence paid to the Scepter i • the hands of his Progenitors, now turns i • to contempt, and he ſtill running headlon • after his vain pleaſures and flanting pernicious courſes, not heeding the duty of his place, grows a burthen to the people; and inſtead of being their refuge, their relief and ſupport, rides and galls their necks, and makes their lives bitter: So that how to throw off the yoak is now their only care; and matters being thus ripe, or the young Prince with his Comerades haſtening on his fate by ſome outrage or rape upon Wife or Daughter of ſome conſiderable Subject, ſome of the moſt eminent amongſt the people conſpire together and put an end to his Life and Tyranny.

And all eyes being now turn'd upon theſe as their deliverers, the Government and Conduct of all Affairs is committed to their charge and direction. Thus riſes an Ariſtocracy, and thus we ſee Monarchy firſt corrupted into Tyranny, and the next change from thence in courſe of Nature is to an Ariſtocracy.

And theſe men eminent for wiſdom and vertue ſatisfied with the honour of the charge and truſt repoſed in them, above all things ſtudied to ſerve the publick; but afterwards their Sons coming to ſucceed, who had not that ſtock of diſcretion and ſobriety; but degenerating or forgetting the vertue that preferred their Anceſtors, begin to Lord it over the people without other regard than of their particular luſt. And thus the Ariſtocracy being corrupted into an Oligarchy, the people are provoked by a general inſurrection to reſcue the Soveraignty out of their hands.

And now the people will neither truſt ſo great a charge with a ſingle Perſon, nor with any few, they come to their laſt only and yet untainted hope founded upon themſelves, and contriv'd a form of popular Common-wealth, and they themſelues took the publick affairs under their charge and protection; and thus was conſtituted a Democracy.

And becauſe all Governments are good and ſucceſsful at the beginning, ſo long as the men were alive, who had felt the oppreſſion and tyranny under the two former kinds of Governments, they were content and glad with their preſent condition, and liberty ſeem'd ſweet and precious to 'em above all treaſure. but this Generation being ſpent and their vertue with 'em, a new People ſucceeded, and the Laws are now trampled under foot: Licentiouſneſs, Faction, and Diſorder turn all things upſide down, and they claſh together ſo long till ſome one over- • opping the reſt, all are brought under the Command of one Maſter; and ſo about a • ain from Monarchy to Tyranny, from Ty • anny to Ariſtocracy, from Ariſtocracy to Oligarchy, from Oligarchy to Democracy, from Democracy to the Rule of the Rabble, • nd thence back to Monarchy. This is the • ound that all Governments run, this is the • ourſe, the order, and oeconomy of Nature; 〈◊〉 that any turns or change of Government • ay eaſily be foreſeen.

Wiſe Stateſmen obſerving theſe changes • nd corruptions in all ſimple Common-wealths to be ſo conſtant and certain, and • nding the miſchiefs that attend ſo frequent • evolutions; they ſet their brains at work 〈◊〉 contrive ſome model of Government that • ight be ſteddy and durable, which they ſaw • ould not be any ſimple and uniform Common-wealth: It remain'd therefore that they • ixed the vertues and good properties of the • hree good Common-wealths, and ſo tem • er'd them together that no room might be •• ft for thoſe vices, that, like worms, breed in the very core of all ſimple Common-wealths and deſtroy them.

They joyn'd the three States of Monarchy, Ariſtocracy, and Democracy, and wrought them together into one Body Politick.

This model of Government had the Spartans from the prudence of Lycurgus, and the Romans were brought to it, made wiſe by dear-bought Experience: And this is the Government that all civil Nations have affected, and from hence grows that notion of the three States, which we hear ſo much of in moſt Nations of Europe, though the meaning thereof is not every where underſtood.

This is the Doctrine of Polybius, and this was the general ſenſe of mankind, till Bodin comes forth with his new Hereſie in Politicks, and denies that there can be any ſuch thing as a mixt Common-wealth. To prove this, he rambles into a many ſtories to ſhew that a King cannot alien or divide his Soveraignty amongſt his Favourites: 'Tis queſtionleſs a truſt that cannot be aſſigned over, but all this relates to another point, and touches not the mixture in the Original and fundamental conſtitution of a Common-wealth, Et ut Corona, ſi in partes diſtracta, aut aperta fuerit, nomen omittit; As the Crown would loſe its name, he ſays, if pull'd • n pieces. This is common to many other things, a Roſe, a Prickle, if pull'd • n pieces, would loſe their name; and • his being no particular flower of the Crown, does not illuſtrate or make much • o the buſineſs. In another place he ſays, Monarchiam autem individuam eſſe opor • ere diximus, quia ſi dividatur, Monarchia • on ſit; ea eſt enim unitatis inviolabilis na • ura, ut omnem omnino refugiat partitio • em; ut enim Corona — Monarchy muſt • e indiviſible, ſuch is the nature of Unity • hat it cannot be by any means diſtributed; • s the Crown — which compariſon he • gain repeats. But his Argument is no • etter, than with us, ſhould we from • he nature of the number five perſwade, • here cannot be ſeven or eight Cinque Ports; or in France argue, that the Ad • ocates Cap cannot be ſquare, becauſe • tis called Bonnet round: Words are a •• rt of Cloaths that are not always exactly ſhaped to the Thoughts that wear them. Another Argument he would bring from a Saying in Ariſtotle againſt Plato, that two extremes would make no good mixture: Nam ſi nihil optimum ex duobus extremis exiſtere poſſe confiteatur, quid fert tribus inter ſe confuſis? which is as ſtrongly urged, as ſhould he ſay, if Dover and Calice cannot come together, how ſhall the Sea make any intercourſe and correſpondence betwixt them?

But becauſe theſe Reaſons ſeem a little too metaphyſical, he would make the matter plain by Examples; and with a ſtrange confidence ſuggeſts that neither the Spartan nor the Roman were mixt Common-wealths: And it is no wonder if he find ſome paſſages in Hiſtorians to prove them either Monarchies, Ariſtocracies, or Democracies, as he had a mind. Plato ſays, that he knew not by which of theſe Names to call the Spartan • And Ariſtotle to the ſame effect; and that this ſhows the mixture to be perfect and acurate: And Polybius ſpeaking o • both the Spartan and Roman, tells us •• at the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . three States had •• e Soveraignty ſo equally ſha •• d amongſt them, that even •• oſe who lived under the Government could ••• t well pronounce in the main, whether the ••• wer was in the People, in the Nobles, 〈◊〉 in the Monarchick State.

In the Spartan, the Kings, the Senate, •• d the People, by their Repreſentatives •• e Ephori; in the Roman, the Conſuls, •• e Senate, and the People, by their Re •• eſentatives the Tribunes, made the •• ree States of the Common-wealth.

But that we may return to France, •• ere Bodin ſwaggers, and would make 〈◊〉 Capital to account that of France a • ixt Monarchy as ſome had done; • ho reckon'd the Ariſtocracy to conſiſt 〈◊〉 the Peers, and the Democracy in that • hey call the Third State. Machiavel be •• ev'd it a mixt Monarchy, and to that • emper imputes all its greatneſs and du • ation. Seiſſel who writ expreſly on the Monarchy, affirms the ſame thing with •• any more that writ both before and •• nce Bodin.

He ſays there is not the leaſt ſhadow of an Ariſtocracy in the Peers,—Parium qui ſic appellantur, quod inter ſe qu • dem pares ſunt, non autem principi, ut n • mis ruſtice nonnulli opinantur. TRhey ar • one anothers Peers, he ſays, and not Peer • to their Prince as ſome too clowniſhly imagine.

Caeſar called the Army under his Command, Commilitones or Fellow-Soldiers and it would have been a little blunt i • them to have called him Fellow-Soldie • again; but whoever ſhall look back i • Hiſtory to the Original of theſe Peer • may find that they were in the beginning the Kings Peers, though at this day th • diſtance is very plain. Du Huillant ſpeaking of Hugh Capet, tells us, that he — n'eſtant ſi grand guerrier que bien entendu aux affaires, caut et adviſe, il 〈◊〉 voluit proceder par cautelles & douceurs ſi qu'ayant affaire à grand ſeigneurs • manda tous les gouuerneurs des Provin • ces de ſon royaume à ce qu'ils vinſſen • vers lui, pour le conſciller au gouuernement, regime & adminiſtration de ſo • nouueau eſtat, leur faiſant entendre qu • totalement il vouloit dependre de leu • conſcil & avis; voire les tenir pres da 〈◊〉 , come ſes amis, freres, & pareils en •• iſſance & Autorité; — not being ſo •• ch a Warrier as a wiſe and wary Perſon, 〈◊〉 would proceed ſoft and fair, ſo that ha •• ng to do with great Lords, he ſent to all •• vernors of Provinces within his King •• m, that they might come to him to adviſe •• out the Government, and Adminiſtration 〈◊〉 his new State; letting them to under ••• nd that he would wholly depend on their •• unſel and Advice; and keep them about 〈◊〉 Perſon as his Friends, Brothers, and ••• uals in Power and Authority. He tells 〈◊〉 futher, that ſome of the cunningeſt a ••• ngſt them, ſeeing Hugh, from a Mayer •• the Palace to be made King, did the ſame; •• d ſet up for themſelves within their Go •• rnments, making themſelves Lords, •• kes, and Counts Proprietors; whereas ••• re they had been only Governors, viz. ••• e Dukes governors of Provinces, and 〈◊〉 Counts Governors of Towns, and thoſe ••• les of Dukes and Counts that formerly •• re given to the Governors for the time •• ly, became now Hereditary and deſceneded 〈◊〉 Posterity. Paſquiere gives the ſame account of the Peers at large, and th • Preſident Fauchet employed by Henry th • Third to reviſe the Antiquities of Fran •• and who writ ſince Bodin, tells us: Males urays fondateurs de l'eſtat Fronca • ont eſte ceux de la maiſon de capet; le • quels de leur gré, ou contraincts par 〈◊〉 nobleſſe, de laiſſer en heritage, & ſa • l'hommage, les duchez & comtez aup • ravant tenus à vie (car on ne trouue poi • certainement quand & pourquoy ils 〈◊〉 ſont faites hereditaires) amoindrie • ceſte debordeé puiſſance des ancie • Roys, de faire toutes choſes a leur app • tit, & comme ceux de Lacedemon •• eeurent les Ephores, pour controlleu • de leur authorité, ceux-cy eſtablire • & aſſeurerent les plus grands ſeigneu • Ducs, Comtes & Pairs de la cour 〈◊〉 France, pour tenir le grand Parlemen • audience & generalle Juſtice de tout • les doleances du peuple; & les Jugemen • des Seneſchauz & Baillifz, & juges inf • rieurs donnes en grandes cauſes, car 〈◊〉 commencement de ceſte derniere fami • le, il n'y avoit comte, voire ſigneur chaſtellain dependant nüement du Roy, q •• •••• penſaſt avoir autant de puiſſance en •••• erre, que ces nouueaux Roys.

But the true Founders of the French ••••• e, were theſe of the Houſe of Capet; 〈◊〉 of their own accord, or compell'd by the ••••• ility, left them their Dutchies and •••• nties formerly held for life only in inhe •••• nce ſaving the homage, (for it is not •••• ainly known when or wherefore they were •••• e hereditary) and leſſened that unbrid •••• power of the ancient Kings to do all •••• gs according to their appetite, and as 〈◊〉 of Sparta took the Ephori for Con •••• ers of their Authority, theſe ſettled and ••••• ed the greateſt Lords, Dukes, Counts, 〈◊〉 Peers of the Court of France, to hold 〈◊〉 great Parliament, Audience, and gene ••• Juſtice of all the grievances of the Peo ••• and appeals from the Judgments of 〈◊〉 Seneſchals, Baylies, and inferior Judges •••• n in great cauſes: For at the begin •••• when this Family Reign'd, there was •••• r a Count, nor ſo much as a Lord of a •••• e depending barely on the King, who •••• ght not that he had as abſolute power 〈◊〉 in his own Land, as theſe new Kings. •••• onfirm this he adds, how the Kings Hugh and Robert, writing to Audeber •• Count of Perigueux, to raiſe the Sieg •• before Tours, and twitting him with th • Demand, who made him Count? Il 〈◊〉 fit difficulté de reſpondre, ce n'eſt vo •• Roys; ains ceux qui vous ont fait Roy •• He did not ſtick to anſwer, 'twas not y •• Kings, but thoſe who made you Kings.

And whoever conſiders the circumſtances of Hugh Capet's coming to th • Crown, and the great power the Pee •• exerciſed till upon the occaſion of th • Holy War and other practiſes they we •• reduc'd and brought to the Crown, ma • well conclude: ThatPaſquiere. 〈◊〉 toute ancienneté en for • d'Ariſtocratie conjoynte avec la Mona • chie, furent introduits les douze Poi •• ſur leſquels nos Roys ne s'eſtans reſerv •• que la Souueraineté & hommage, ſem •• que par leur conſcil (comme d'un anci •• Senate) ſe menaſſent les affaires. Fr •• all Antiquity were introduced in the form • an Ariſtocracy joyn'd to the Monarchy, 〈◊〉 twelve Peers, over whom the King reſer • ing only his Soveraignty and Homage, 〈◊〉 affairs of State ſeem (as by an ancient 〈◊〉 nate) managed by their advice.

And when ſcarce the ſhadow of the • ncient Peerage remain'd to them, they • etain'd the Precedence, and had place be • ore all Princes of the Blood, till the late Ordinance, Anno 1576. to the con • rary.

And 'tisBaracaue. ſaid there was • n Order of Parliament alſo • nno 1295. whereby it was declared • hat they were called Peers for being one • nothers Peers, and not the Kings E • uals.

What Bodin would conclude from • hoſe forms, quia ſic nobis placuit, and Rex vobis dicit, may be anſwered in the words of Dr. Baracaue, where (in another occaſion) he ſays, this is not like • he ſic volo, ſic jubeo, noted by the Saty • iſt. Qu'importe • t il de dire, ainſi nous • laiſt, & tel eſt noſtre plaiſir, ou dire & • our cauſe, ſans exprimer la cauſe? Les Cours des Parlemens diſent en leurs ar • eſts, & pour cauſe ſans en rendre la cauſe • our monſtrer la Soveranieté.

What more is it, ſays he, to ſay we are 〈◊〉 pleaſed, and ſuch is our pleaſure; than to ſay, And for a Cauſe, without expreſſing the Cauſe? The Courts of Parliament ſay in their Orders, and for a Cauſe, without rendring any cauſe; to ſhew the Soveraignty. The Parliament, it ſeems, have their forms too to ſhew their Soveraignty, nor is the Argument of Bodin from the form of directing their Letters, of more force: How ſhould they write but, Au Roy noſtre ſouuerain ſeigneur, Regi Domino noſtro ſupremo? Is not this the ordinary civility of Europe? 'Tis true that whenSuetonius. a Poet had called Auguſtus Caeſar, Dominus; he ſet out a Proclamation that none might preſume to call him any more by ſo proud a Title, nor could the modeſty of his Succeſſor Tiberius bear it.

Yet as their Majeſty and real Greatneſs declin'd, as the Empire began to ſink, the froth and flattery came above; ſo that it was lawful to call Domitian both Lord and God; and his Succeſſors were not ſatisfied till complemented in the abſtract with your Everlaſtingneſs, your Eternity, your Divinity, &c. And when the wooden Eagle was ſplit in two, that Chip of the Eaſtern Empire brake • ut into bloſſoms to a miracle, with the Porphyrogenitos and Deſpots, were blown about the Sebaſtocrators, Panhyperſebaſti, Protonobiliſſimypertati, &c.

But amongſt the Romans, theſe Titles ſo fierce and glorious after they had been worn a while at Court, deſcended to the City and Country; and even came ſo • ow, that Martial could ſay of the mighty Dominus, Quod voco te dominum, noli tibi Cinna placere, Saepe etiam ſervum ſic reſaluto meum.

The French words, Sire, Seigneur and Sieur have ran the ſame fortune; and the • alling a man Sir, or Monſieur, or Mon • eigneur, or My Lord twenty times, will • ot amount to a Recognizance of any • ubjection: nor can the Complement • aſs any Domination or Deſpotick Right • ver us.

If Seigneur and Dominus will not do, • he word Souverain will not help them; • eing commonly uſed in France for any Superior: as, Soveraign of the Accounts, Soveraign of the Treaſure, Soveraign of the Foreſts, Soveraign Judge, Soveraign Bailiff, &c.

And now having ſaid ſo much concerning the direction of theſe Letters, I ſhall add nothing in anſwer to Bodin, touching the Subſcription: all agreeing, that where the Letter begins with Seigneur, of courſe, it muſt end with Treſhumble and Treſobeiſſant Serviteur.

And that their proceedings with the King are by way of Petition, is no more than is done even in Poland: where Bodin makes the Government an Ariſtoeracy.

It is a Rule, Quae ex adulatione, vel indulgentiâ conceduntur non debent trahi • in exemplum. Beſides, of all people, this is the worſt Argument with the French; who are ſo well known to affect ſoft words, and gentle forms on all occaſions poſſible. It is not their faſhion, like the Juſtice of Aragon, to accoſt their King with a Nos qui valemos tanto como vos, y podemos mas que vos, vos elegimos rei con eſtas é y eſtas condiciones, entra vos y nos un que manda mas que vos, i. e. We who are as good men as you, and can do more than you, chuſe you King on ſuch and ſuch conditions; there is one betwixt us and you, who commands more than you.

The power of this Parliament, in allowing or refuſing the Acts of the King, is the ſame in effect as what we call the Negative Voice. And ſometimes, when the Kings would hardly be denied, the Parliament have much valued themſelves for their reſolution in oppoſing them. Thus they overcame Lewis the Eleventh,Paſquier. whoſe wilfulneſs and Opiniâtreté was particularly noted by Hiſtorians) and made him promiſe to importune them no more, nor ſend Letters to them that were not de Commandement Royal; which they interpret, Juſt Commands. As, an volunté du Roy, is meant, To the Laws. The moſt memorable inſtance that I have met with, of the Parliament's Authority in this kind, is that in Henry the Third's time; when he wrote to the Governor d'Angoulmois, to put the Town into Monſieur's hands; the Governor deſires to be excuſed: the Duke de Montpenſier is ſent, and the Gates are ſhut againſt him; then is ſent an Herald of Arms, to declare them Rebels and Enemies, unleſs they obeyed. And at the requeſt of the Attorney General, the Parliament orders the Inhabitants to appear in perſo at a day certain; they ſend their Deputies. It was inſiſted upon, that they ſhould be heard before the Privy Council: but they demanded to be heard in Parliament. Where, when they came, it was urged that they might not be allowed Council, but ſpeak for themſelves, being charged with High Treaſon. The Deputies inſiſted that, on the contrary, they had done the King good Service; and that, for their part, they had no Charge to plead otherwiſe than by the mouth of their Advocate. Which being granted, they made choice of Paſquier. And the ſum of their Plea was, Que l'ancien ordre de ceſte Monarchie portoit que iamais trefue de telle importance, iamais paix n'avoit eſté executeé, qu'au prealable elle ne fuſt verifieé & emologuee en ceſte cour avecque grande maturite de conſeil que ceſtecyne l'ayant eſté, nous avions juſte occaſion de nous excuſer, & diſpenſer de l'ouverture que l'on demandoit. Ceſte exception eſtoit elle bonne & vallable? Quant a moy ie n'en feray jamais nul doute, voz regiſtres en font foy, l'uſage eſt tel, & la loy generale de la France. i. e. That the ancient courſe of this Monarchy was ſo, that never Truce of this importance, never any Peace was executed, but that, in order thereunto, it was firſt allowed and recorded in this Court, with great maturity of Counſel. That this for the delivering up of Angouleſme, not being ſo recorded, we had juſt reaſon to excuſe our ſelves, and to diſpence with the opening of the Gates demanded of us. Is this Exception good and ſufficient? For my part, I ſhall never doubt it. This your Records can teſtifie, this is the Cuſtom and Common Law of France.

The Authors that write in Latin call their Parliaments, Sacrum & Sacroſanctum ordinem, A Sacred and Divine Conſtitution; Quid tertium & arbitrum, A third Party, and Umpire betwixt Prince and People: Si tribunitiae poteſtati, aut Ephoris Lacedemoniis compares non aberres, ſays Matherel: Their Power may be compared to that of the Tribunes, or the Lacedemonian Ephori. Du Haillan, ſays they, are truly a Roman Senate, ceſt un urai Senate Romain, repreſentant une majeſty ſecourable aux bons, & eſpouuantable aux mauuais attendu qu'elles ont cognoiſſance en derniee reſort, & ſans appel non ſeulement de toutes matieres civiles & criminelles, mais auſſi de toutes lettres royaux; entre antres des graces & remiſſions, pour juger de la civilité ou incivilité d'icelles. It is a true Roman Senate, repreſenting a Majeſty giving ſuccour to the Good, but terrible to Evil-doers; in as much as they have cognizance, and give Judgment without Appeal; not only in all Civil and Criminal Cauſes, but likewiſe of all the King's Letters: amongſt the rerſt, thoſe of Graces and Pardons; to judge whether they be lawful or unlawful. Paſquier, on this occaſion, tells us, Their Parliament is not like the Pope's Officers, to judge of the Fraud or Surpriſes only, but to determine whether the King's Grants be juſt and reaſonable, or no. and du Hallan affirms, Ceſte forme de proceder eſt ſi ancienne en ce Royaume, qu' un Prince, quelque depravé que il ſoit, auroit honté de la rompre, comme euſſi ſes fuiets & ſerviteurs craindroient a le lui conſeiller. This form of proceeding is ſo ancient, that any Prince, however depraved, would be aſhamed to break it; nor would any of his Servants or Miniſters dare to adviſe him thereto. And in another place, Sont tellement inveterees, que pas un roi n'entreprend d'y deroger, & quand il le voudroit faire, on n'obeiroit point á ſon commandement. A practice ſo ſettled that no King would undertake to derogate from it: nor if he ſhould, would any obey his Commands. But Quotations of this kind are endleſs.

The French reckon ſeveral Particulars wherein their King's Power is reſtrained; as that, He cannot alter their Coin. He cannot turn out of place the Magiſtrates of the Kingdom, till their Cauſe be heard and approved in Parliament.

He cannot pardon a Criminal without the Parliament. Regi capitatis paenae renittendae, & abolendi criminis ſine parlamenti auctoritate jus non ſit, in hoc regno. Criminoſus deferens litteras remiſſionis aut abolitionis, ſiue pardonii debet incarcerari, & ſuas literas offerre Parlamento, &c. Boerius deciſ. Burdegal. 65. Dont en y a ſouuent de condamnez & executez avec leurs graces. Le Roy, p. 376.

He cannot alien any part of his Demean, nor any part of his Kingdom.

Nor can he diſpoſe of the Succeſſion; that not being Patrimonial or Hereditary. Sed ſola lege & conſuetudine regni, as their Lawyers ſpeak. Or Lege Regiâ, according to the new Cant in Bodin.

Another of theſe they call Laws of the Kingdom, or Fundamentals, is their Salick Law, for excluding Females from the Crown.

And farther, to prove the French King a Civil King, he is not in his Great Seals repreſented as the Emperors and other Kings, in Armour, on Horſeback, or with a naked Sword in hand, like Conquerors; but he is pictured, ſitting on the Bench in a long Robe, with Juſtice in his Right Hand. En habit de Roi Juſticier.