THE Particle for leads us to the consideration of the Con­text and Occasion of these words, which in short is this. The design of this Epistle is to direct Timothy, to whom St. Paul had commit­ted the Government of the Church of Ephesus, how he ought to demean himself in that great and weighty Charge. And at the beginning of this Chapter he gives direction concerning Publick Prayers in the Church; that Prayers and Thanks­giving be made for all men, and for all Ranks and Orders of men; especially for Kings and all that are in Authority, that under them Christians might lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty.

[Page 2] And this he tells us was very suitable to the Christian Religion, by which God designed the Salvation of Mankind; and therefore it must needs be very acceptable to him that we should offer up Prayers and Thanksgivings to him in be­half of all men: For this, saith the Apostle, is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the Truth.

And then it follows in the next words, For there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the Man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a Ran­some for all: As if he had said, this universal Charity of Christians, in praying for all men, must needs be very acceptable to Him to whom we put up our Prayers, God the Father, who sent his Son for the Salvation of all men: And to Him likewise by whom we offer up our Prayers to God, and is among us Christians the only Media­tor between God and Men, in virtue of that Price and Ransome which he paid for the Redemption of all Mankind: I say, for this reason it must needs be very acceptable to Him that we should pray for all men, because he dyed for all men, and now that He is in Heaven at the right hand of God intercedes with him for the Salvation of those for whom he dyed: There is One God, and one Mediator between God and Men, the Man [Page 3] Christ Jesus, who gave himself a Ransome for all.

Which words, though they be brought in to prove more immediately that it is acceptable to God our Saviour, that we should put up Prayers to Him for all men, because he desires the Salvation of all men, and hath sent his Son to purchase the Salvation of all men, by the Sacrifice of himself; and in virtue of that Sacrifice to be the only Mediator between God and us: I say, though this be the immediate scope and design of these words, yet they are likewise a direction to us, un­to whom we ought to address our Prayers, namely, to God; and by whose mediation and in­tercession we ought to put up our Prayers to God the Father, namely, by his Son Jesus Christ, who is constituted the only Mediator between God and Men.

There are several Propositions contained in this and the following verse; but I shall at present confine my self to the first, namely, That there is One God, that is, but One, as St. Paul elsewhere expresseth it, 1 Cor. 8. 4. There is none other God but One. And Moses lays this as the Foundation of the Natural Law, Deut. 4. 35. as well as of the Jewish Religion, The Lord he is One God, and there is none besides him, that is, besides Jehovah, whom the People of Israel did worship as the only true God. And this the Prophet Isaiah perpetually declares in opposition [Page 4] to the Polytheism and variety of Gods among the Heathen. Isai. 44. 6. I am the first, and I am the last, and be­sides me there is no God. And again, Is there any God besides me? v. 8. there is no God, I know not any: He, who hath an infinite knowledge and knows all things, knows no other God. And our B. Sa­viour makes this the Fundamental Article of all Re­ligion, and the knowledge of it necessary to every man's Salvation, This, says He, is life eter­nal, to know thee the only true God.

The Unity of the Divine Nature is a Notion where­in the greatest and the wisest part of Mankind did always agree, and therefore may reasonably be presumed to be either natural, or to have sprung from some Original Tradition delivered down to us from the first Parents of Mankind: I mean, that there is One Supreme Being, the Author and Cause of all things, whom the most ancient of the Heathen Poets commonly called the Father of Gods and men. And thus Aristotle in his Meta­physicks defines God, the eternal and most excellent, or best of all Living Beings. And this Notion, of One Supreme Being, agrees very well with that exact Harmony which appears in the Frame and Go­vernment of the World, in which we see all things conspiring to one End, and continuing in one uniform Order and Course; which cannot reasonably be ascribed to any other but a con­stant [Page 5] and uniform Cause; and which to a consi­dering man does plainly shew that all things are made and governed by that One powerful Prin­ciple, and great and wise Mind which we call God.

But although the generality of Mankind had a Notion of One Supreme God, yet the Idolatry of the Heathen plainly shews that this Notion, in pro­cess of Time, was greatly degenerated, and cor­rupted into an apprehension of a Plurality of Gods; though in Reason it is evident enough, that there can be no more Gods than One; and that One, who is of infinite Perfection, is as suf­ficient to all purposes whatsoever, as ten thou­sand Deities, if they were possible, could possi­bly be; as I shall shew in the following Di­scourse.

Now this multitude of Deities, which the fond Superstition and vain Imagination of Men had formed to themselves, were by the Wiser sort, who being forced to comply with the Fol­lies of the People endeavoured to make the best of them, supposed to be either Parts of the Uni­verse which the Egyptians, as Plutarch tells us, thought to be the same with God; but then the more considerable Parts of the Universe they par­celled out into several Deities; and as the Ocean hath several Names, according to the several Coasts [Page 6] and Countries by which it passeth; so they gave several Names to this One Deity according to the several Parts of the World which several Nati­ons made the Objects of their Worship.

Or else, they adored the several Perfections and Powers of the One Supreme God under several Names and Titles, with regard to the various Blessings and Benefits which they thought they re­ceived from them.

Thus the Indian Philosophers, the Brachmans, are said to have worshipped the Sun as the Su­preme Deity; and he certainly is the most Wor­shipful of all sensible Beings, and bids fair­est for a Deity; especially if he was, as they supposed, animated by a Spirit endued with knowledg and understanding. And if a man, who had been bred in a dark Cave, should all on the sudden be brought out at Noon-day to be­hold this visible World; after he had viewed and consider'd it awhile, he would in all probability pitch upon the Sun as the most likely, of all the things he had seen, to be a Deity. For if such a man had any Notion of a God, and were to chuse one upon sight, he would without dispute fix upon the Sun, and fall down before Him and worship Him.

And Macrobius manageth this as his main Plea for the Idolatry of the Heathen; that under all [Page 7] the several Names of their Gods they Worship­ped the Sun: And this diversity of Names was but a more distinct conception and acknowledg­ment of the many Blessings and advantages which Mankind received from Him, and a more particular and express Adoration of the several Powers and Perfections which were in Him. And this was the very best defence, and all the tole­rable sense which the Wisest among the Heathen could make of the multitude of their Deities.

And yet whilst they generally owned One Su­preme Being that was the Principle and Original of all things, they worshipped several subordinate Deities as really distinct from one another. Some of these they fancied to be superior to the rest and to have their residence in Heaven; by which Marsilius Ficinus supposes Plato to mean no more but the Chief of the Angels. These were cal­led [...], Dij Superi and Dij Caelestes, superior and heavenly Gods: The Scripture terms them the Host of Heaven, meaning the Sun, Moon and Stars, which they supposed to be animated, or at least to be inhabited by Angels, or glorious Spirits, whom they called Gods.

Other of their Deities were accounted much inferior to these, being supposed to be the Souls of their deceased Heroes; who for their great and worthy Deeds, when they lived upon Earth, [Page 8] were supposed after Death to be translated into the number of their Gods. And these were cal­led Semidei and Deastri, that is, half Gods and a sort of Gods: And as the other were Celestial, so these were [...] a kind of Terrestrial Spirits that were Presidents and Procurators of Hu­man affairs here below, that is, a middle sort of Divine Powers that were Mediators and Agents be­tween God and Men, and did carry the Prayers and Supplications of Men to God, and bring down the Commands and Blessings of God to Men.

But in the midst of all this Crowd and confu­sion of Deities, and the various Superstitions about them, the Wiser Heathen, as Thales, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Tully, Plutarch and others, preserved a true Notion of One Supreme God, whom they defined an infinite Spirit, pure from all Matter and free from all imperfection: And all the variety of their Worship was, as they pretended in excuse of it, but a more particular owning of the various representations of the Divine Power and Excellencies which manifested them­selves in the World, and of the several commu­nications of Blessings and Favours by them im­parted to Men: Adversus Marcio­nem, l. 1. c. 10. Nay, Tertullian tells us, that even when Idolatry had very much obscured the Glory of the Sovereign Deity, yet the greater part of [Page 9] Mankind did still in their common Forms of Speech appropriate the Name of God in a more especial and peculiar manner to One, saying, If God grant, If God please, and the like.

So that there is sufficient ground to believe that the Unity of the Divine Nature, or the No­tion of One Supreme God, Creator and Governor of the World, was the Primitive and general be­lief of Mankind: And that Polytheism and Ido­latry were a corruption and degeneracy from the Original Notion which Mankind had concerning God; as the Scripture-History doth declare and testify.

And this account which I have given of the Heathen Idolatry doth by no means excuse it. For whatever may be said by way of extenuation in behalf of the wiser and more devout among them, the generality were grossly guilty both of be­lieving more Gods, and of worshipping false Gods.

And this must needs be a very great Crime, since the Scripture every where declares God to be particularly jealous in this Case, and that he will not give his glory to another, nor his praise to gra­ven Images. Nay, we may not so much as make use of sensible Images to put us in mind of God, lest devout Ignorance, seeing the Worship which Wise men paid towards an Idol, should be drawn [Page 10] to terminate their Worship there, as being the very Deity itself; which was certainly the Case of the greatest part of the Heathen World.

And surely those Christians are in no less dan­ger of Idolatry, who pay a Veneration to Images by kneeling down and praying before them; and in this they are much more inexcusable, because they offend against a much clearer Light; and yet when they go about to justify this Practice are able to bring no other nor better Pleas for themselves than the Heathen did for their wor­shiping of Images, and for praying to their infe­rior Deities, whom they looked upon as Mediators between the Gods in Heaven and Men upon Earth.

There is but one Objection, that I know of, against the general Consent of Mankind concern­ing the Unity of God; and it is this, That there was an ancient Doctrine of some of the most ancient Nations, that there were two First Causes or Prin­ciples of all things; the one the Cause of all Good, and the other of all the Evil that is in the World: The reason whereof seems to have been, that they could not apprehend how things of so con­trary a nature, as Good and Evil, could proceed from one and the same Cause.

And these two Principles in several Nations were called by several Names. Plutarch says that among the Greeks the Good Principle was called [Page 11] God, and the Evil Principle [...] or the Devil. In conformity to which ancient Tradition the Ma­nichees, a Sect which called themselves Christians, did advance two Principles, the one infinitely Good, which they supposed to be the Original Cause of all the good which is in the World; the other infi­nitely Evil, to which they ascribed all the evils that are in the World.

But all this is very plainly a corruption of a much more ancient Tradition concerning that old Serpent the Devil, the Head of the fallen Angels, who by tempting our First Parents to transgress a positive and express Law of God brought Sin first into the World and all the Evils consequent upon it; of which the Scripture gives us a most express and particular account.

And as to the Notion of a Being infinitely Evil, into which this Tradition was corrupted, after Ido­latry had prevailed in the World, besides that it is a Contradiction, it would likewise be to no pur­pose to assert two opposite Principles of infinite, that is of equal force and Power, for two Infinites must of necessity be equal to one another; because no­thing can be more or greater than infinite, and therefore if two infinite Beings were possible they would certainly be equal, and could not be otherwise.

[Page 12] Now that the Notion of a Principle infinitely Evil is a Contradiction will be very plain, if we consider that what is infinitely Evil must in strict Reasoning, and by necessary consequence, be infinitely imperfect; and therefore infinitely weak, and for that reason, though never so ma­licious and mischievous, yet being infinitely weak and foolish, could never be in a capacity either to contrive mischief or to execute it.

But if it should be admitted that a Being in­finitely mischievous could be infinitely knowing and powerful, yet it could effect no Evil; be­cause the opposite Principle of infinite Goodness, be­ing also infinitely Wife and Powerful, they would tye up one anothers hands. So that up­on this supposition the Notion of a Deity must sig­nify just nothing, because by virtue of the eter­nal opposition and equal conflict of these two Principles they would keep one another at a per­petual Baye; and being just an equal Match to one another, the one having as much mind and power to do good as the other to do evil, instead of being two Deities they would be but two Idols, able to do neither good nor evil.

And having, I hope, now sufficiently cleared this Objection, I shall proceed to shew how agree­able this Principle, that there is but one God, is to the common Reason of Mankind, and to the [Page 13] clearest and most essential Notions which we have of God: And this will appear these two ways.

First, by considering the most essential Per­fections of the Divine Nature.

Secondly, from the repugnancy and impossibi­lity, the great absurdity and inconvenience of supposing more Gods than One.

First, by considering the most essential Perfe­ctions of the Divine Nature. Absolute Perfection which we ascribe to God, as the most essential Notion which Mankind hath always had con­cerning Him, does necessarily suppose Unity; be­cause this is essential to the Notion of a Being that is absolutely perfect, that all Perfection meets and is united in such a Being: But to imagine more Gods, and some Perfections to be in one and some in another, does destroy the most essen­tial Notion which men have of God, namely, that He is a Being absolutely perfect, that is, as per­fect as is possible: Now to suppose some Per­fections in one God which are not in another, is to suppose some possible Perfection to be want­ing in God, which is a Contradiction to the most natural and the most easie Notion which all men have of God, that He is a Being in whom all Perfections do meet and are united: But if we suppose more Gods, each of which hath all Per­fections [Page 14] united in Him, then all but One would be superfluous and needless; and therefore by just and necessary consequence not only may, but of necessity must be supposed not to be; since necessary existence is essential to the Deity; and therefore if but One God be necessary, there can be no more.

Secondly, from the repugnancy and impossibility, the great absurdity and inconvenience of the contra­ry. For suppose there were more Gods, two for example; and if there may be two there may be a Million, for we can stop no where: I say, sup­pose two Gods; either these two would be in all Perfections equal and alike, or unequal and un­like: If equal and alike in all things then, as I said before, one of them would be needless and superfluous, and if one why not as well the other? they being supposed to be in all things per­fectly alike; and then there would be no ne­cessity at all of the being of a God; and yet it is granted on all hands that necessary existence is essential to the Notion of a God: But if they be unequal, that is, one of them inferior to and less perfect than the other, that which is inferior and less perfect could not be God, because he would not have all perfection. So that which way so­ever we turn the thing and look upon it, the No­tion of more Gods than One is by its own re­pugnancy [Page 15] and self-contradiction destructive of it self.

Before I come to apply this Doctrine of the Unity of God, I must not pass by a very considerable Difficulty, which will most certainly arise in every mans mind; without taking parti­cular notice of it, and endeavouring to remove it, if I can. And it is the Doctrine of the B. Tri­nity, or of three real Differences or distinct Persons in One and the same Divine Nature.

And though this be not a Difficulty peculiar on­ly to the Christian Religion, as by the generality of those who urge this Objection against Christians hath been inconsiderately thought; for it is cer­tain, that long before Christianity appeared in the world, there was a very ancient Tradition, both among Jews and Heathen, concerning three real Differences or Distinctions in the Divine Nature, very nearly resembling the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity, as I shall have occasion more fully to shew by and by: Yet it cannot be denied, but that this Difficulty doth in a more especial man­ner affect the Christian Religion; the generality of Christians, who do most firmly believe the Trinity, believing likewise at the same time, more sted­fastly if it be possible, that there is but One God. To us, 1 Cor. 8. 6. saith St. Paul, that is, to us Christians, there [Page 16] is but One God. But how can this possibly consist with the common Doctrine of Christians concern­ing the Trinity, God the Father, Son, and H. Ghost, to each of whom they Attribute, as they verily believe the Scripture does, the most incommuni­cable Properties and Perfections of the Divine Na­ture? And what is this less in effect than to say, That there are three Gods?

For the clearing of this Difficulty I shall, with all the brevity I can, offer these following Consi­derations; which I hope, to an impartial and un­prejudiced Judgment, will be sufficient to re­move it, or at least to break the main force and strength of it.

I I. I desire it may be well considered, that there is a wide difference between the nice Specu­lations of the Schools, beyond what is revealed in Scripture, concerning the Doctrine of the Trini­ty, and what the Scripture only teaches and asserts concerning this Mystery. For it is not to be deni­ed but that the Schoolmen, who abounded in wit and leisure, though very few among them had either exact skill in the H. Scriptures, or in Eccle­siastical Antiquity and the Writings of the ancient Fathers of the Christian Church: I say, it cannot be denied but that these Speculative and very acute men, who wrought a great part of their [Page 17] Divinity out of their own Brains as Spiders do Cobwebs out of their own bowels, have started a thousand subtleties about this Mystery, such as no Christian is bound to trouble his head withal; much less is it necessary for him to understand those niceties which we may reasonably presume that they who talk of them did themselves never thoroughly understand; and least of all is it ne­cessary to believe them. The modesty of Chri­stians is contented in Divine Mysteries to know what God hath thought fit to reveal concerning them, and hath no curiosity to be wise above that which is written. It is enough to believe what God says concerning these matters; and if any man will venture to say more, every other man surely is at his liberty to believe as he sees reason.

II. I desire it may in the next place be consi­dered, II that the Doctrine of the Trinity, even as it is asserted in Scripture, is acknowledged by us to be still a great Mystery, and so imperfectly reveal­ed as to be in a great measure incomprehensible by Human Reason. And therefore though some learned and judicious Men may have very com­mendably attempted a more particular explica­tion of this great Mystery by the strength of Reason, yet I dare not pretend to that, knowing both the difficulty and danger of such an At­tempt, [Page 18] and mine own insufficiency for it.

All that I ever designed upon this Argument was to make out the credibility of the thing from the Authority of the H. Scriptures, without descending to a more particular explication of it than the Scripture hath given us; lest by endea­vouring to lay the Difficulties which are already started about it new ones should be raised, and such as may perhaps be much harder to be remo­ved than those which we have now to grapple withal. And this I hope I have in some mea­sure done in one of the former Discourses. Serm. II. Nor indeed do I see that it is any ways necessary to do more; it being sufficient that God hath declared what he thought fit in this matter, and that we do firmly believe what he says concerning it to be true, though we do not perfectly comprehend the meaning of all that he hath said about it.

For in this and the like Cases I take an impli­cite Faith to be very commendable, that is, to be­lieve whatever we are sufficiently assured God hath revealed, though we do not fully under­stand his meaning in such a Revelation. And thus every man who believes the H. Scriptures to be a truly Divine Revelation does implicitely be­lieve a great part of the Prophetical Books of Scripture and several obscure expressions in those Books, though he do not particularly understand [Page 19] the meaning of all the Predictions and expressi­ons contained in them. In like manner, there are certainly a great many very good Christians who do not believe and comprehend the Myste­ries of Faith nicely enough to approve them­selves to a Scholastical and Magisterial Judge of Controversies, who yet if they do heartily embrace the Doctrines which are clearly revealed in Scri­pture and live up to the plain Precepts of the Chri­stian Religion, will I doubt not be very well ap­proved by the Great and Just, and by the infalli­bly Infallible Judge of the World.

III. Let it be further considered, That though III neither the word Trinity, nor perhaps Person, in the sense in which it is used by Divines when they treat of this Mystery, be any where to be met with in Scripture; yet it cannot be denied but that Three are there spoken of by the Names of Father, Son, and H. Ghost, in whose Name every Christian is baptized, and to each of whom the highest Titles and Properties of God are in Scripture attributed: And these Three are spoken of with as much distinction from one another as we use to speak of three several Persons.

So that though the word Trinity be not found in Scripture, yet these Three are there expresly and frequently mentioned; and Trinity is nothing [Page 20] but three of any thing. And so likewise though the word Person be not there expresly applied to Father, Son, and H. Ghost; yet it will be very hard to find a more convenient word whereby to express the distinction of these Three▪ For which reason I could never yet see any just cause to quarrel at this term. For since the H. Spirit of God in Scripture hath thought fit in speaking of these Three to distin­guish them from one another, as we use in com­mon speech to distinguish three several Persons, I cannot see any reason why, in the explication of this Mystery which purely depends upon Divine Revelation, we should not speak of it in the same manner as the Scripture doth: And though the word Person is now become a Term of Art, I see no cause why we should decline it, so long as we mean by it neither more nor less than what the Scripture says in other words.

IV IV. It deserves further to be considered, That there hath been a very ancient Tradition concerning three real Differences or Distinctions in the Divine Nature; and these, as I said before, very nearly resembling the Christian Doctrine of the Trinity.

Whence this Tradition had its original is not easie upon good and certain grounds to say; but certain it is that the Jews anciently had this Notion: [Page 21] And that they did distinguish the Word of God, and the H. Spirit of God, from Him who was absolutely called God, and whom they looked upon as the First Principle of all things; as is plain from Philo Judaeus, and Moses Nachmanides, L. 5. and others cited by the Learned Grotius in his incomparable Book of the Truth of the Christian Religion.

And among the Heathen, Plato; who probably enough might have this Notion from the Jews, did make three Distinctions in the Deity by the Names of essential Goodness, and Mind, and Spirit.

So that whatever Objections this matter may be liable to, it is not so peculiar a Doctrine of the Christian Religion as many have imagined, though it is revealed by it with much more clearness and certainty: And consequently, neither the Jews nor Plato have any reason to object it to us Christians; especially since they pretend no other ground for it but either their own Reason, or an ancient Tradi­tion from their Fathers: whereas we Christians do appeal to express Divine Revelation for what we believe in this matter, and do believe it singly upon that account.

V. It is besides very considerable, That the V Scriptures do deliver this Doctrine of the Trinity without any manner of doubt or question con­cerning the Unity of the Divine Nature: And not [Page 22] only so, but do most stedfastly and constantly assert that there is but One God: And in those ve­ry Texts, in which these three Differences are men­tioned, the Unity of the Divine Nature is expresly asserted; and where St. John makes mention of the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, the Unity of these Three is likewise affirmed, There are Three that bear record in Heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit; and these Three are One.

VI VI. It is yet further considerable, That from this Mystery, as delivered in Scripture, a Plurality of Gods cannot be inferred without making the Scripture grosly to contradict it self; which I cha­ritably suppose the Socinians would be as loth to admit as we our selves are. And if either Coun­cils, or Fathers, or Schoolmen, have so explained this Mystery as to give any just ground, or so much as a plausible colour for such an Inference, let the blame fall where it is due, and let it not be charged on the H. Scriptures; but rather, as the Apostle says in another Case, Let God be true, and every Man a liar.

VII VIIthly and Lastly, I desire it may be consider­ed, That it is not repugnant to Reason to believe some things which are incomprehensible by our Reason; provided that we have sufficient ground [Page 23] and reason for the belief of them: Especially if they be concerning God, who is in his Nature In­comprehensible; and we be well assured that he hath revealed them. And therefore it ought not to offend us that these Differences in the Deity are in­comprehensible by our finite understandings; be­cause the Divine Nature it self is so, and yet the belief of that is the Foundation of all Religion.

There are a great many things in Nature which we cannot comprehend how they either are, or can be: As the Continuity of Matter, that is, how the parts of it do hang so fast together that they are many times very hard to be parted; and yet we are sure that it is so, because we see it every day. So likewise how the small Seeds of things contain the whole Form and Nature of the things from which they proceed and into which by de­grees they grow; and yet we plainly see this every year.

There are many things likewise in our Selves, which no man is able in any measure to compre­hend, as to the manner how they are done and performed: As the vital union of Soul and Body: Who can imagine by what device or means a Spi­rit comes to be so closely united and so firmly link'd to a material Body, that they are not to be parted without great force and violence offer'd to Nature? The like may be said of the opera­tions [Page 24] of our several Faculties of Sense and Imagina­tion, of Memory and Reason, and especially of the Liberty of our Wills: And yet we certainly find all these Faculties in our selves, though we cannot either comprehend or explain the particu­lar manner in which the several Operations of them are performed.

And if we cannot comprehend the manner of those Operations which we plainly perceive and feel to be be in our Selves, much less can we ex­pect to comprehend things without us; and least of all can we pretend to comprehend the infi­nite Nature and Perfections of God, and every thing belonging to Him. For God himself is certainly the greatest Mystery of all other, and acknowledged by Mankind to be in his Nature, and in the particular manner of his Existence, incomprehensible by Human Understanding. And the reason of this is very evident, because God is infinite, and our knowledge and under­standing is but finite; and yet no sober man ever thought this a good reason to call the Being of God in question.

The same may be said of God's certain fore­knowledge of future Contingencies which de­pend upon the uncertain Wills of free Agents: It being utterly inconceivable how any Under­standing, how large and perfect soever, can cer­tainly [Page 25] know beforehand that which depends up­on the free Will of another, which is an arbitrary and uncertain Cause.

And yet the Scripture doth not only attribute this Foreknowledg to God, but gives us also plain Instances of Gods foretelling such things, many Ages before they happen'd, as could not come to pass but by the Sins of Men, in which we are sure that God can have no hand; though nothing can happen without his permission: Such was that most memorable Event of the Death of Christ who, as the Scripture tells us, was by wicked hands crucified and slain; and yet even this is said to have happened according to the deter­minate foreknowledg of God, and was punctually foretold by Him some hundreds of years before. Nay, the Scripture doth not only ascribe this pow­er and perfection to the Divine Knowledge, but natural Reason hath been forced to acknowledg it, as we may see in some of the wisest of the Phi­losophers. And yet it would puzzle the greatest Philosopher that ever was, to give any tolerable account how any Knowledg whatsoever can cer­tainly and infallibly foresee an Event through un­certain and contingent Causes. All the reasona­ble satisfaction that can be had in this matter is this, that it is not at all unreasonable to suppose that infinite Knowledg may have ways of knowing [Page 26] things which our finite Understandings can by no means comprehend how they can possibly be known.

Again, there is hardly any thing more incon­ceivable than how a thing should be of it self, and without any Cause of its Being; and yet our Reason compels us to acknowledge this: Because we certainly see that something is, which must either have been of it self and without a Cause, or else something that we do not see must have been of it self and have made all other things: And by this reasoning we are forced to acknowledg a Deity, the mind of Man being able to find no rest but in the acknowledgment of one eternal and wise Mind as the Principle and first Cause of all other things; and this Principle is that which Mankind do by general consent call God. So that God hath laid a sure foundation of our acknowledgment of his Being in the Reason of our own Minds: And though it be one of the hardest things in the world to conceive how any thing can be of it self, yet necessity drives us to acknowledge it whether we will or no: And this being once granted, our Reason, being tired in trying all other ways, will for its own quiet and ease force us at last to fall in with the general apprehension and belief of Mankind concerning a Deity.

[Page 27] To give but one Instance more; There is the like Difficulty in conceiving how any thing can be made out of nothing; and yet our Reason doth oblige us to believe it: Because Matter, which is a very imperfect Being and merely passive, must either always have been of it self; or else, by the infinite Power of a most perfect and active Being, must have been made out of nothing: Which is much more credible, than that any thing so im­perfect as Matter is should be of it self: Because that which is of it self cannot be conceived to have any bounds and limits of its Being and Per­fection; for by the same reason that it necessari­ly is and of it self, it must necessarily have all per­fection, which it is certain Matter hath not; and yet necessary Existence is so great a Perfection, that we cannot reasonably suppose any thing that hath this Perfection to want any other.

Thus you see, by these Instances, that it is not repugnant to Reason to believe a great many things to be, of the manner of whose Existence we are not able to give a particular and distinct account. And much less is it repugnant to Rea­son to believe those things concerning God which we are very well assured he hath declared concerning Himself, though these things by our Reason should be incomprehensible.

[Page 28] And this is truly the Case as to the matter now under debate: We are sufficiently assured that the Scriptures are a Divine Revelation, and that this Mystery of the Trinity is therein declared to us. Now that we cannot comprehend it, is no sufficient Reason not to believe it: For if this were a good Reason for not believing it, then no man ought to believe that there is a God, because his Nature is most certainly incom­prehensible. But we are assured by many Ar­guments that there is a God; and the same natural Reason which assures us that He is, doth likewise assure us that He is incomprehensible; and there­fore our believing Him to be so doth by no means overthrow our belief of His Being.

In like manner, we are assured by Divine Re­velation of the truth of this Doctrine of the Tri­nity; and being once assured of that, our not being able fully to comprehend it is not reason enough to stagger our belief of it. A man can­not deny what he sees, though the necessary con­sequence of admitting it may be something which he cannot comprehend. One cannot de­ny the Frame of this World which he sees with his eyes, though from thence it will necessarily follow that either that or something else must be of it self; which yet, as I said before, is a thing which no man can comprehend how it can be.

[Page 29] And by the same Reason a man must not deny what God says, to be true; though he cannot comprehend many things which God says: As particularly concerning this Mystery of the Trinity. It ought then to satisfy us that there is sufficient evidence that this Doctrine is delivered in Scri­pture, and that what is there declared concern­ing it doth not imply a Contradiction. For why should our finite understandings pretend to com­prehend that which is infinite, or to know all the real Differences that are consistent with the Unity of an Infinite Being; or to be able fully to explain this Mystery by any similitude or re­semblance taken from finite Beings?

But before I leave this Argument, I cannot but take notice of one thing which they of the Church of Rome are perpetually objecting to us upon this Occasion. And it is this, That by the same reason that we believe the Doctrine of the Trinity, we may and must receive that of Tran­substantiation. God forbid: Because of all the Doctrines that ever were in any Religion, this of Transubstantiation is certainly the most abominably absurd.

However, this Objection plainly shews how fondly and obstinately they are addicted to their own Errors, how mishapen and monstrous so­ever; insomuch that rather than the Dictates of [Page 30] their Church, how absurd soever, should be called in question they will question the truth even of Christianity it self; and if we will not take in Transubstantiation, and admit it to be a ne­cessary Article of the Christian Faith, they grow so sullen and desperate that they matter not what becomes of all the rest: And rather than not have their Will of us in that what is controverted, they will give up that which by their own con­fession is an undoubted Article of the Christian Faith and not controverted on either Side; except on­ly by the Socinians, who yet are hearty Enemies to Transubstantiation, and have exposed the ab­surdity of it with great advantage.

But I shall endeavour to return a more parti­cular Answer to this Objection; and such a one as I hope will satisfy every considerate and unpre­judiced mind, that after all this confidence and swaggering of theirs there is by no means equal reason either for the receiving or for the rejecting of these two Doctrines of the Trinity and Transubstan­tiation.

First, There is not equal reason for the belief of these Two Doctrines. This Objection, if it be of any force, must suppose that there is equal evidence and proof from Scripture for these two Doctrines: But this we utterly deny, and with great reason; because it is no more evident from [Page 31] the words of Scripture that the Sacramental Bread is substantially changed into Christ's natural Body by virtue of those words, This is my Body, than it is that Christ is substantially changed into a na­tural Vine by virtue of those words, Joh. 15. 1. I am the true Vine; or than that the Rock in the Wilderness, of which the Israelites drank, was substantially changed into the Person of Christ, because it is ex­presly said, That Rock was Christ; or than that the Christian Church is substantially changed into the natural Body of Christ, because it is in express terms said of the Church, Eph. 1. 23. That it is his Body.

But besides this, several of their own most learned Writers have freely acknowledged, that Transubstantiation can neither be directly proved, nor necessarily concluded from Scripture: But this the Writers of the Christian Church did never ac­knowledge concerning the Trinity, and the Divi­nity of Christ; but have always appealed to the clear and undeniable Testimonies of Scripture for the Proof of these Doctrines. And then the whole force of the Objection amounts to this, that if I am bound to believe what I am sure God says, though I cannot comprehend it; then I am bound by the same reason to believe the greatest Absurdity in the World, though I have no man­ner of assurance of any Divine Revelation concern­ing it. And if this be their meaning, though [Page 32] we understand not Transubstantiation, yet we very well understand what they would have, but cannot grant it; because there is not equal rea­son to believe two things, for one of which there is good proof, and for the other no proof at all.

Secondly, neither is there equal reason for the rejecting of these two Doctrines. This the Objecti­on supposes, which yet cannot be supposed but upon one or both of these two grounds: Either because these two Doctrines are equally incompre­hensible, or because they are equally loaded with Absurdities and Contradictions.

The First is no good ground of rejecting any Doctrine, merely because it is incomprehensible; as I have abundantly shew'd already. But besides this, there is a wide difference between plain mat­ters of Sense, and Mysteries concerning God; and it does by no means follow that, if a man do once admit any thing concerning God which he cannot comprehend, he hath no reason afterwards to believe what he himself sees. This is a most un­reasonable and destructive way of arguing, be­cause it strikes at the foundation of all Certainty, and sets every man at liberty to deny the most plain and evident Truths of Christianity, if he may not be humor'd in having the absurdest things in the World admitted for true. The next step will be to persuade us that we may as well [Page 33] deny the Being of God because his Nature is in­comprehensible by our Reason, as deny Transub­stantiation because it evidently contradicts our Senses.

2dly. Nor are these two Doctrines loaded with the like Absurdities and Contradictions: So far from this, that the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it is de­livered in the Scriptures, and hath already been explained, hath no Absurdity or Contradiction either involved in it, or necessarily consequent upon it: But the Doctrine of Transubstantiation is big with all imaginable Absurdity and Con­tradiction. And their own Schoolmen have suffi­ciently exposed it; especially Scotus, and he de­signed to do so, as any man that attentively reads him may plainly discover: For in his Di­sputation about it he treats this Doctrine with the greatest contempt, as a new Invention of the Council of Lateran under Pope Innocent III. To the Decree of which Council concerning it he seems to pay a formal submission, but really derides it as contrary to the common Sense and Reason of Mankind, and not at all supported by Scripture; as any one may easily discern that will carefully consider his manner of handling it and the result of his whole Disputation about it.

And now Suppose there were some appear­ance of Absurdity and Contradiction in the Do­ctrine of the Trinity as it is delivered in Scripture, must we therefore believe a Doctrine which is [Page 34] not at all revealed in Scripture, and which hath certainly in it all the absurdities in the World, and all the Contradictions to Sense and Reason; and which once admitted, doth at once destroy all Certainty. Yes, say they, why not? since we of the Church of Rome are satisfied that this Do­ctrine is revealed in Scripture; or, if it be not, is defined by the Church, which is every whit as good. But is this equal, to demand of us the belief of a thing which hath always been contro­verted, not only between us and them, but even among themselves, at least till the Council of Trent? And this upon such unreasonable terms, that we must either yield this Point to them or else renounce a Doctrine agreed on both Sides to be revealed in Scripture.

To shew the unreasonableness of this pro­ceeding, Let us suppose a Priest of the Church of Rome pressing a Jew or Turk to the belief of Tran­substantiation, and because one kindness deserves another, the Jew or Turk should demand of him the belief of all the Fables in the Talmud, or in the Alchoran; since none of these, nor indeed all of them together, are near so absurd as Transubstan­tiation: Would not this be much more reasona­ble and equal than what they demand of us? Since no Absurdity, how monstrous and big so­ever, can be thought of, which may not enter into an Understanding in which a Breach hath [Page 35] been already made wide enough to admit Tran­substantiation. The Priests of Baal did not half so much deserve to be exposed by the Prophet for their Superstition and folly, as the Priests of the Church of Rome do for this sensless and stupid Do­ctrine of theirs with a hard Name. I shall only add this one thing more, That if this Doctrine were possible to be true, and clearly prov'd to be so; yet it would be evidently useless and to no pur­pose. For it pretends to change the substance of one thing into the substance of another thing that is already and before this change is pretend­ed to be made. But to what purpose? Not to make the Body of Christ, for that was already in Being; and the Substance of the Bread is lost, no­thing of it remaineth but the Accidents which are good for nothing, and indeed are nothing when the Substance is destroy'd and gone.

All that now remains is to make some practical Inferences from this Doctrine of the Unity of the Divine Nature. And they shall be the same which God himself makes by Moses, Deut. 6. 4. which Text also is cited by our Saviour, Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord; Mark▪ 12. 29, 30, 31. and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: And thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. So that ac­cording to our Saviour the whole Duty of Man, the love of God and of our neighbour is founded in the Unity of the Divine Nature.

[Page 36] I. The love of God; The Lord thy God is One Lord, therefore thou shalt love Him with all thy heart, &c. this is the first and great Commandment: And it comprehends in it all the Duties of the first Table as naturally flowing from it. As that we should serve Him only, and pay no Religious Worship to any but to Him. For to pay Religious Worship to any thing is to make it a God and to acknow­ledge it for such: And therefore God being but One we can give Religious Worship to none but to Him only. And among all the parts of Religious Worship none is more peculiarly appropriated to the Deity than solemn Invocation and Prayer. For he to whom men address their Requests, at all times, and in all places, must be supposed to be always every where present, to understand all our de­sires and wants, and to be able to supply them; and this God only is, and can do.

So likewise from the Unity of the Divine Na­ture may be inferr'd, that we should not worship God by any sensible Image or Representation: Because God being a singular Being there is nothing like Him, or that can without injuring and deba­sing his most spiritual and perfect and immense Being be compared to Him: As He himself speaks in the Prophet, Isai. 46. 5. To whom will ye liken me, saith the Lord, and make me equal? And therefore with no Distincti­on whatsoever can it be lawful to give Religious Worship, or any part of it, to any but God: We [Page 37] can pray to none but to Him, because He only is every where present, 1 Kings 8. 39. and only knows the Hearts of all the children of men; which Solomon gives as the reason why we should address our Supplications to God only, who dwelleth in the Heavens.

So that the Reason of these two Precepts is founded in the Unity and Singularity of the Divine Nature, and unless there be more Gods than One, we must worship Him only, and pray to none but Him: Because we can give Invocation to none but to Him only whom we believe to be God; as St. Paul reasons, Rom. 10. 14. How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed?

II. The love likewise of our Neighbour is found­ed in the Unity of the Divine Nature, and may be inferr'd from it: Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is One Lord, therefore thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self. And the Apostle gives this reason why Christians should be at unity among themselves; There is One God and Father of all, Eph. 4. 6. and therefore we should keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of Peace, that is, live in mutual love and peace. The Prophet likewise assigns this reason why all Man­kind should be upon good terms with one ano­ther, Mal. 2. 10. and not be injurious one to another, Have we not all One Father? hath not One God created us? Why do we then deal treacherously every man against his brother.

And therefore when we see such hatred and enmity among Men, such divisions and animo­sities [Page 38] among Christians, we may not only ask St. Paul's question, Is Christ divided? that we cannot agree about serving him; either all to serve him in one way, or to bear with one ano­ther in our differences: I say we may not only ask St. Paul's question, Is Christ divided? but may ask further, Is God divided? Is there not One God, and are we not all his Offspring? Are we not all the Sons of Adam, who was the Son of God? So that if we trace our selves to our Original, we shall find a great nearness and equality among men: And this equality that we are all Gods creatures and Image, and that the One only God is the Father of us all, is a more real ground of mu­tual love, and peace, and equity in our dealings one with another, than any of those petty differen­ces and distinctions of strong and weak, of rich and poor, of wise and foolish, of base and honoura­ble, can be to encourage men to any thing of in­solence, injustice, and inequality of dealing one towards another. Because that wherein we all agree, that we are the Creatures and Children of God and have all One common Father, is essential and constant; but those things wherein we differ are accidental and mutable, and happen to one another by turns.

Thus much may suffice to have spoken concer­ning the first Proposition in the Text, There is one God: To Him, Father, Son, and H. Ghost be all Honour and Glory, Dominion and Power, now and for ever. Amen.