My Adverſary here carpeth firſt at the word arrogate, as if it were evermore taken in ill part, and ſignified to aſſume proudly to a mans ſelfe.

A. Stewart. But he might know, that being a ſtranger, and having lived the moſt part of my life abroad, I am now and then conſtrained to take the words upon tru • t; yet for this word, ſince he hath put me upon the peruſall of my Dictionary, I muſt tell him I finde no ſuch thing as he ſaith; there indeed I finde the words arrogant, arrogantly, and arrogancie to be taken as he ſuch, but not the word arrogate; for it is turned in French, S'arroger S'attribuer, S'appropri • r; and in Latine arrogo; all which were taken in good part, before ever Independency was in rerum natura: but I will not let my ſelfe be caption fly drawne from the queſtion, by this mans Grammaticall ſophiſtications. If any thing were here amiſſe, as there is nothing, it will I hope be ſufficient that I here declare, that that was never my meaning: I confeſſe they have more, and better Language then I; but I am content, that my Reaſons goe as farre beyond theirs, as their Language beyond mine.

Afterwards in the ſame page, he accuſeth me of contradicting my ſelfe, in following Propoſitions.

The Parliament has no directive Power by teaching, Preaching, &c.

The Parliament is wiſe enough to know what is convenient for the Church.

I anſwer, and anſwered againe, That every young boy, that learnes his rudiments in Logick, knowes, that a Contradiction is only betwixt two Propoſitions, which have the ſame Attributes, which is not to be found here; for the Attribute in the firſt is, having no directive Power, &c. but in the ſecond, wiſe enough, &c. 2. Neither is it credible, that every man, who is wi • e enough to know what is convenient for the Church, has a Directive Power therein, in Preaching, Teaching, &c. for the Independents have many amongſt them in their Churches, who have as much Learning, three or foure daies before they be received to be members of their Church, as three or foure daies after; and yet before they were received members into their Church, howſoever they knew well enough what was convenient for the Church, had yet no Directive Power in it to teach, &c. 3. A little after, viz. p. 34. §. 2. this judicious Obſervator of Contradictions declareth ingeniouſly, that he knoweth not what I meane by a Directive Power; and yet here he telleth me, that I contradicted my ſelfe: but how is it poſſible, that he ſhould know that I contradicted my ſelfe in that, that he himſelfe underſtands not: He knoweth not what things I poſe, and yet he findeth them oppoſed one to another. I finde him here oppoſed to himſelfe, and in finding out a contradiction in my words, he contradicteth himſelfe, and ſo taketh away this pretended contradiction.

Becauſe he knoweth not what is a directive Power, wherein he founds this imaginary contradiction, he ſaith, A. S. ſhould befriend my intellect, to tell me plainly and diſtinctly, what he meaneth by a Directive Power in matters of Religion.

A. S. Wherefore if I cannot befriend your Will, I will travell to befriend your Intellect, not only in declaring you, what is a Directive Power, &c. but alſo in expounding all the termes of this queſtion; learne therefore, I pray you, 1. That the Civill Magiſtrate, qua talis, is he who governeth the State, qua talem; I ſay qua talis, and qua talem; for it may fall out, that he who is a Civill Magiſtrate to governe the State, may alſo be choſen to governe the Church in quality of a Ruling Elder, &c. but that he doth not, in quality of a Civill Magiſtrate, for then he ſhould not need to be choſen to be a Ruling Elder; for in quality of a Civill Magiſtrate already he ſhould have had that power.

2. Learne, that by the word Church I underſtand the Viſible, Militant Church, both reall, and repreſentative in Church Officers, viz. 1. In Seſſions, or Presbyteries. 2. In Claſſes. 3. In Provinciall, and 4. In Nationall, and 5. in Oecumenicall Synods; but ſo, that it muſt be taken ſometimes for the reall Church alone, as when we ſay, The Presbytery ruleth the Church: ſometimes for the repreſentative alone, as when we ſay, Tell the Church: and evermore, ratione ſubjectae materiae.

3. Learne, that the word Power, which here is nothing elſe, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 poteſtas, authoritas, &c. ſignifieth not; 1. Any Naturall Faculty or power in the Predicament of Quality. 2. Or any Habitude, either Naturall, purchaſed by our induſtry, or 3. Supernaturall, infuſed into the ſoule, by Gods bounty. 1. For the Power of Ruling, whether it be Directive, Imperative, or Executive, belongeth not to us by birth, as naturall powers; nor can we purchaſe it by our owne induſtry alone, as we doe Naturall Habitudes: nor is it evermore ſupernaturall or infuſed by God, as we ſee in the Civill Power amongſt Pagans; yea it is very probable, that ſome Preachers may have an Eccleſiaſticall Power, who have no Supernaturall, but only their aturall gifts. 2. And a man before he be called to a charge in the State, or Church, may have all the naturall powers or faculties of his ſoule; and all the naturall, or ſupernaturall habitudes or abilities that he hath after his calling; and yet not have that power to judge, command, and puniſh, which he hath after his calling; it hath no reall, but only an intelligible being, which is not to be, but to be underſtood, conceived, or intelligible; and therefore it is no vvork of nature, but of reaſon: and the maine reaſon of this is; 1. Becauſe the being of this povver, which is not potentia, but poteſtas, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 & authoritas; as alſo that of the charge or Office to which it belongeth, depends upon a meere aſſent of the underſtanding, and deſtination of the will, in thoſe who chooſe the perſon or perſons to this charge and power, and of him who is ſo choſen. Now the aſſent of the underſtanding and deſtination of the vvill, (ſince they are immanent actions, and no wayes tranſient) cannot produce any reall or permanent effect out of themſelves: And yet however it be no reall faculty, habitude or ability, yet both can it poſe, and indeed it doth preſuppoſe ſome reall being: for in puniſhing of Malefactours it poſeth ſometimes a very reall eff ct, as that of burning and hanging of perſons; and before it be, it preſuppoſeth the naturall faculties of the ſoule, ſome naturall habitudes or abilities therein, as that of juriſprudence, in Civill Magiſtrates and Iudges: ſometimes ſome ſupernaturall habitudes alſo, as that of divine faith. Eccleſiaſticall charges, as in Apoſtles, Prophets, Evangeliſts, and Paſtors. 2. Becauſe a man in receiving of ſuch a Povver, poteſtas or charge, findes no reall changement in himſelfe, as in receiving of a new reall being, or quality.

No more can it formally conſiſt in the reall being, qualities, or effects, that the charge or this power produceth; for they are all poſterior to it.

So it may be defined a worke of reaſon, or a morall being, whereby he who is ſufficiently called, by ſufficient aſſent and deſtination of the Will of thoſe who call him, and conſent of his own, and endowed with ſufficient abilities, may juſtly exerciſe ſuch acts as they intend by ſuch a calling. I call it, 1. a work of Reaſon, &c. to the excluſion of the works of Nature. 2. I ſay, He who is called. Here you have, 1. the Subject of this power, viz. He. 2. The efficient cauſe thereof, ſomewhat obſcurely expreſſed, by ſufficient Calling; and afterward, 3. more diſtinctly, by the aſſent and deſtination of the will of thoſe who call him, and conſent of the perſon called. 4. Endowed, &c. Here is expreſſed the fundamentum remotum of this charge, whereby he is enabled to the acts of this power. 5. May juſtly exerciſe, &c. Here is the finis, or act of this power, wherein we have to obſerve, that this act may be conſidered, 1. in its naturalitie; 2. In its habitualitie or facultie; 3. In its moralitie; 4. In its particular legalitie. The firſt is from the naturall faculties of the Soule; The ſecond, from the habitudes or abilities thereof; The third is from morall habitudes in the Will: The fourth from this poteſtas; the naturall facultie maketh it an act; the habitudes or abilities, an habituall act, or eaſily produced by the ſoul, if it be meerly naturall: (but if it be a ſupernaturall act, quoad ſubſtantiam, then there muſt be ſome ſupernatural habitude, that ſupplieth the place both of the deficient facultie, and habitude or abilitie) the vertue of juſtice in the will, i. a juſt act: but this morall power, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , maketh it a legall and publique act, for what before his calling he could not doe, but illegally, (howſoever he had abilities enough) now after his calling, he can doe legally. Item, this morall power induceth a morall obligation to obedience, which all his naturall powers, all his naturall and ſupernaturall habitudes, and all his particular morall vertues and juſtice, could not doe without it.

This morall power is either private or particular, as the Paternall, Maritall, (if it be meerly morall) and deſpoticall, in domeſticall and ſuch like ſocieties, whereof we ſpeak not; Or publique, as that of the Secular Magiſtrate, and Eccleſiaſticall Iudge: and evermore it produceth an obligation unto obedience in thoſe that are ſubject thereunto: So the power of the Civill Magiſtrate binds the Subject to Civill, and that of Eccleſiaſticall perſons, the people to Eccleſiaſticall or ſpirituall obedience; That of the Husband, the Wife, to conjugall; that of the Father, the Sonne, to filiall; and that of the Lord, the ſervant, to ſervile obedience or ſervice.

This power, as it is in Church-Officers, is either Directive or Executive, and this either imperative, or ſtrictly executive: Or if you like better of a Trichotomie, it is either Directive, Imperative, or Executive. The directive power of the Church, is that whereby ſhe ſheweth us what is to be believed or done; which is done by Teaching, Eccleſiaſticall judgements, Lawes, and the interpretation thereof, whereby we are directed and taught. The Imperative power is, whereby ſhe commands what is to be done: as, Hoc fac: which the Doctors of the Laws ordinarily expreſſe, by jubeo, impero, mando; and ſome Kings, by this; For it is our will and pleaſure. The Executive power is, whereby Eccleſiaſticall judgements are put in execution; which is done by binding and looſing, in ſome wayes anſwerable to diſtributive Iuſtice, remunerative and coercive.

Now to befriend yet more this Mans underſtanding, and to ſhew the Chriſtian Reader how fairly I deale with him, and all thoſe of his party, not hiding my ſelfe, as they ordinarily doe, I give another note very neceſſary in this matter, which I hope ſhall diſcover a great part of theſe mens cavils and fraudulent ſophiſtications: and it is this: viz. That the power circa Spiritualia & Eccleſiaſtica, about Spirituall and Eccleſiaſticall matters, is either intrinſecall to the Church, i. e. not only about the Church, but alſo in the Church; as that of Church officers, which is only in the Church or Church officers, in quality of Church and Church officers; as the power to preach, to excommunicate, &c. for no other but Eccleſiaſticall perſons can preach, or excommunicate; Neither can the Civill Magiſtrate, or any other, exerciſe ſuch acts. Or Extrinſecall, i. e. about the Church, but not in the Church, in quality of a Church; as when the Civill Magiſtrate maketh Lawes concerning the Church, in confirming or ratifying her lawes, in making them to be received as well in the State as in the Church; So Juſtinian declared, that according to the Evangelicall doctrine and Apoſtolicall diſcipline, all men ſhould be called Chriſtians; otherwayes that they ſhould be declared diſtracted and infamous perſons: and that they that were puniſhed ſpiritually by the Church, ſhould afterwards be puniſhed civilly, by the civil Magiſtrate: as we may ſee in the firſt book of the Codex, tit. de ſumma Trinitate, tit. de ſacroſanctis Eccleſiis, tit. de Epiſc. & Cler. & Orphanotroph. And through all the firſt thirteen Titles of that book, and elſwhere in the Civill Lawes. But this power to judge, command, and puniſh, is not Eccleſiaſticall, but Civill.

We have alſo the expreſſe commandement of God, to puniſh the Idolater, Heretick, or falſe Prophet, and dreamer of dreames, be he never ſo neare to us, wife, brother, ſonne, friend, &c. Deut. 13.1. And the reaſon is, becauſe He hath ſpoken to turne you away from the Lord your God, v. 5.10. So, whoſoever ſeduceth us from the Lord our God, as Hereticks, are to ſuffer, if they be pertinacious; Yea, whole Cities are to be deſtroyed for this ſin, ver. 15. See Exod. 22.20. Deut. 17.2.

Yea, it was not ſo much as permitted to the people of God to make any Covenant, or mariage with Idolatrous people, for feare of turning them away from Gods ſervice, Deut. 7.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Exod. 34.11.15. Ezra 9.10. Nehem. 9. And this was ſignified by a prohibition, not to let their cattell ſo much as gender with a divers kind, not to ſow their ground with mingled ſeed, nor to wear garments mingled with linnen and wollen, Levit. 19. as Zepperus in Explanatione legum Moſaicarum forenſium, l. 4. c. 2. expounds it.

We nave the Romane lawes, in the firſt Book of the Code of Juſtinian, through all the firſt 14 or 15 Titles, and elſwhere, to this very Head.

So we have ſolemn Covenants in Scripture, to obſerve the Law of God, and conſequently the firſt Commandement, and ſo to deſtroy Hereſie and Schiſmes, which are contrary to it: As (1) that of Moſes, pronouncing ſundry benedictions to the keepers, and curſes to the tranſgreſſors thereof, Deut. 27. & 28. (2) Of Ioſhua, 23. & 24. (3) Of Aſa, 2 Chro. 15.12. (4) Of Joaſh, 2 Chro 23.16. (5) Of Joſiah, 2 Chro. 34.30. (6) Of Ezra, c. 10.3. (7) Of Nehemiah. chap. 9. v. 28. and 10.1. to the 30. They make a ſure Covenant and write it; and enter into a curſe, yea and that with an oath, to walk in Gods law, &c. ſo far were they from tolerating Hereticks and Schiſmaticks, that might turne them away from it, as our Independents goe about to doe. Our own Covenant alſo obligeth the Magiſtrate to puniſh all Hereticks and Schiſmaticks, and the People to aſſiſt him herein: yea, the Independents themſelves, in as much as they have entred into the ſame Covenant, ſtand equally obliged to reform Religion, according to their power. Now God hath given them the power to reforme it, in puniſhing Hereticks and Schiſmaticks, according to their demerits; which if either We, or They doe not, we are forſworne, and God one day will call us to an account.

A. S. But he bringeth no Text of Scripture to prove, that when the Iewes were a free people, and had good Rulers, they then permitted any ſuch uncircumciſed men to live amongſt them. 2. Neither doth this any thing againſt my Argument, which only proveth a Politicall Power in the Civill Magiſtrate, who is Extrinſecall to the Church, whereby he might puniſh Idolaters, falſe Prophets, and Prieſts, for their Idolatries, falſe Doctrine, and Worſhip. 3. If he did it not, he ſinned againſt the Covenant. 4. However ſuch might live amongſt them for ſome time uncircumciſed; yet could they not be Inhabitants, or true Denizens without Circumciſion. 5. Much leſſe was the Religion of uncircumciſed Perſons tolerated amongſt them in the times of good Judges, or Kings, as appearech by all thoſe Texts. 6. But leaſt of all had they power to write Bookes againſt their Religion, as the Independents doe here in face of the Parliament, and the Aſſembly againſt ours. 7. Yea they could not ſo much as take a ſtranger to their Wife, as we read, Ezra chap. 9. and 10. and in the Covenant, Neh. 10. ver. 30. and 13.23, 24, 25. where it is ſaid, that Nehemiah ſmote them for ſuch Marriages, and pluckt off their haire, v. 27, 28. And Ezra, chap. 10. made them to put away their ſtrange Wives, and ſuch as were borne of them. Wherefore then may not the Chriſtian Magiſtrate doe as much?

M. S. 6. Anſw. Nor doe we ever read that ever they attempted any thing againſt any Sectaries, or Schiſmaticks (as A. S. would call them) which yet abounded in great variety, and numbers amongſt them, as Scribes, or Phariſees, or Herodians, or Perſons of any other Sect in the Profeſſion of the Iewiſh Religion, that lived peaceably in their State. Idolatry and Idolaters were, as it ſeemes, the adequate Object of their coercive power in matters of Religion.

A. S. Repl. But we read, that they attempted ſomething againſt falſe Prophets, if death be any attempt againſt them, as all the Texts, cited by me, ſhew evidently. 2. I deny your Conſequence; we read it not, Ergo it was not, for we cannot argue à teſtimonio negativè, yea, not of Scripture, unleſſe it be in things neceſſary to ſalvation, ſuch as are not Hiſtories of particular facts. 3. The cauſe wherefore we read it not is, becauſe under good Iudges or Kings, they were never tolerated: ill Kings would not puniſh them; but their examples are not to be drawne in Conſequence. 4. As for the Scribes, Phariſees, and Herodians, no wonder, if they were not puniſhed. 1. For theſe Sects begun very late, not long before the comming of Chriſt, when the Religion was mightily corrupted, which Chriſt came to reforme. 2. Becauſe the Iewes were not then a free people, neither had they the Civill Power abſolutely in their owne hands. 3. They had no good Rulers. 4. No more were the Sadduces puniſhed, who denyed Gods Providence, the Reſurrection of the Body, the Immortality of the Soule, and all ſpirituall natures, as ſome teſtifie of them; and yet they were more puniſhed by Gods Law, then Idolaters, ſince their errour was greater; ſo ſhould the Herodians have been puniſhed, ſince they tooke Herod to be the Meſſias, and that he ſhould come againe after that he had been ſtrucken by the Angell; and yet they were not puniſhed. 5. The Idolaters were to be puniſhed, and yet they lived in profeſſion of the Iewiſh Religion, for they apoſtatized not. It is falſe, that the Idolatry was the adequate Object of their coercive power, for they alſo were puniſhed, who married ſtrange Women, &c. It is alſo a miſtake in him, to think, Scribe was the name of a Sect, it is not the name of a Sect, but of an Office, or Profeſſion; for one man may be a Scribe, and a Phariſee; a Scribe by his Office, and a Phariſee by his Sect; as you may ſee, Mat. 22.35. Then one of them, viz. of the Phariſees, which was a Lawyer, asked him a queſtion: A Lavvyer, i. e. a Scribe as Mark interprets it, chap. 12.28. And one of the Scribes, whom Matthew calleth one of the Phariſees. 2. Eſdras alſo was a Scribe, and no Phariſee. 3. It is commonly thought by Divines, that there was three ſorts of Scribes, Some about the King, which they prove from 2 Sam. 8.17. Sariah was the Scribe, and 20.25. Sheva vvas Scribe, ſee 2 Kings 12.10. and 22.3. Others were Publick Notaries, as were the Kenites, that came of Hemath, the father of the Houſe of Rechab, 1 Chronicles, 2.25. who had no Heritage with the reſt of the Tribes, ſee Ier. 32.11. where yee ſee an Evidence drawn up by ſuch a Notary, and what was the cuſtome in drawing up of ſuch Evidences. Others were as it were Doctors, or Profeſſors of the Law, whoſe charge was to write the Law, and to expound it in the Temple, and in the Synagogues, wherefore they were called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Lawyers, Matth. 7.29. and 17.10. and 23.13. Mar. 12.28. Luk. 7.30. and 11.46. and wiſe men, Ier. 8.8. 1 Cor. 1.19. None of them all were accounted for Sectaries.

M. S. 7. Anſw. P. 51. Sect. 21. Nor did they, nor were they to inflict any outward puniſhment upon every kind of Idolater, though of the Iewiſh both Nation and Religion; as firſt, not upon covetous Perſons, who yet are a kind of Idolaters: Nor ſecondly, upon thoſe, who yet worſhipped the true God of Iſrael, though with ſome violation of the ſecond Commandement, as when they ſacrificed upon the High Places, &c. But 1. Vpon ſuch only, who apoſtatized from the God of Iſrael; and yet 2. Not upon ſuch ſimply, as ſuch, but as attempting to draw away others of the People unto the ſame Idolatries with them.

A. S. 1. It is an untruth, that they puniſhed not, or at leaſt were not bound to puniſh all Idolatry, properly ſo called, ſince we have produced you formall examples, and Covenants to the contrary; as Exod. 32.27. Deut. 22.11.2. Neither were they Apoſtates, that pleaded for Baal, and yet a ſentence of death was given againſt them conditionally, Iudg. 6.31, or they of whom it is ſpoken. 1 Kings 15.12. 2 Chro. 14.4, 5.3. Neither could the ſmall ones in the 15. chap. ver. 13. yet be Apoſtates, or entice others to Idolatry: and yet in caſe of Idolatry, or of not ſeeking the Lord, they were to dye. 4. Nor read we, that Maachah the Kings Mother, who was puniſhed, was an Apoſtate. 5. Or thoſe that are mentioned in Eſdras, and Nehemiah. 6. Yea when the Kings, or people fell away to Idolatry, we never finde that they apoſtatized, for then they ſhould have been no more Gods people. 7. Only they joyned Idolatry with the ſervice of the true God; yea our Divines in diſputing againſt Papiſts, maintaine the Papiſts are Idolaters, for the adoration of Statues and Images; and that the people of the Iewes were not ſo mad, as to have imagined their Statues or Images to be true Gods: only they adored God in Images and Statues, and the act of their Adoration terminative was related to God, and not to the Image, as that of the Papiſts. And as for your inſtance of Covetous Perſons; it is ridiculous, for covetouſneſſe is not properly Idolatry, ſuch as the Scripture ſpeaketh of in the Texts, which I produce; or ſuch as is comprehended in the ſecond Commandement, and is againſt God; but improperly, ſince it is not formally a breach of the Firſt, but of the Second Table. 2. Not formally and immediatly a ſinne againſt God, but againſt our Neighbour. Nor is the ſacrificing upon the High Places formally, and eſſentially Idolatry. 1. For Idolatry is a ſinne againſt the ſecond Commandement, which is Iuris naturalis & perpetui, but to ſacrifice upon High Places is not formally and eſſentially againſt any Commandement, that is Juris naturalis & perpetui. 2. But only againſt a Poſitive, and temporall commandement of not ſacrificing in the high places; after that the Temple was built, whereunto God tyed the Religious act of ſacrifice. 3. Becauſe the Prohibitive Commandement about ſacrificing upon High Places came long after the Second Commandement about Idolatry, viz. after that the Temple was built. Neither can M. S. bring any Text of Scripture for what he ſaith, viz. that only Apoſtates, or Idolaters, who enticed others to Idolatry, were to be puniſhed. 2. Howbeit they be to be puniſhed, yet others are not to be excluded from puniſhment. I pray the Reader to conſider, how tender-hearted this man is towards Idolaters and falſe Prophets; he pleadeth for them, as if he had a will to be one of them himſelfe: Neither in our Religion uſe we the rigour of this Law, againſt ſuch as are not pertinacious, or who will repent of their ſinne: Our Churches deſire not the death of a ſinner, but of the ſinne; not of the Hereticke or Schiſmatick, but of the Schiſme and Hereſie. We diſtinguiſh betwixt Hereſie, and Hereſie; Schiſme, and Schiſme; for ſome are of more, ſome of leſſe dangerous conſequence: Item betwixt Hereticks, and Hereticks; Schiſmaticks, and Schiſmaticks; for ſome are Ring-leaders, ſome miſled: ſome more, ſome leſſe pertinacious and malicious, &c. and every one of them are to be puniſh't according to the quality of the Hereſie and Heretick, of the Schiſme and Schiſmatick. Sometimes alſo the Circumſtances of Times, Places, and Perſons are to be conſidered. And we are to doe what we may, and not what we may not:

M. S. His eighth Anſwer (as if what he had ſaid were only to exerciſe his quick ſpirit, and to ſhew how cunningly he can elude ſtrong Arguments) is, That there are two reaſons why the Kings of Judah might be inveſted by God with a larger power in matters of Religion, then Kings and Magiſtrates under the Goſpel: 1. Becauſe their Kings were types of Chriſt, which ours are not: 2. And their People of the ſpirituall Church of Chriſt, and their Land of the Heavenly inheritance of that Church, which wee cannot claime.

A. S. Anſw. 1. To be a type of Chriſt, is not a ſufficient ground of a Politicall power over the Church, or about the Church: For 1. then the Prieſts, and ſome Prophets, as Jonas, ſhould have had it: Yea, Adam, Iſaac, yea ſome other thing, as the Tree of Life, the firſt born of the Flock offered in Sacrifice by Abel, the Paſchall Lambe, the brazen Serpent, all the Victimes of the Old Teſtament, the Ark and the Propitiatory: for they were all types of Chriſt.

2. Becauſe it hath no influence upon Civill Authority.

3. Becauſe it could not repreſent any Civill authority in Chriſt, ſince his Kingdome was not of this World.

4. It may be doubted how they were types of Chriſt, whether in reſpect of their Civill authority over the Church, or over the State, or otherwiſe.

5. It may be doubted if they were all types of Chriſt; as Athalia, Manaſſeh, Ammon, who deſtroyed Gods ſervice, and the order of the Church; item, Herod, who perſecuted Chriſt, was ſure no type of Chriſt, and yet was King.

6. If ſo, then the King of Egypt, of Syria, of the Philiſtims, yea the Romans, who domineered over them, were types of Chriſt. At leaſt, the Kings of Iſrael were not types of Chriſt, ſince they were all apoſtatized from the Ceremoniall Law that ordained all the types: for a type, whether it be a thing, a perſon, perſons, action, effect, or event, it muſt ſignifie ſomething to come. 2. It muſt ſignifie, by Gods inſtitution or ordinance; and therefore neither was the Nazareate, or all the Nazarites types of Chriſt, as ſome Divines hold: 1. Becauſe the Nazareate was not a ceremony ordained by God, but voluntarily vowed. 2. Becauſe it prefigurated not Chriſt to come, or his benefits: and therefore, ſay they, Chriſt drank wine, and touched the dead: only they vowed it to bring under their fleſh, and for a pious exerciſe.

7. Howbeit they had been types of Chriſt in regard of their authority about the Church, yet will it not follow, that Chriſtian Princes cannot have it: for that which was typicall might be taken away, and that which was politicall may remaine.

8. And I put the caſe, that the Iewes had received Chriſt, as abſolutely they might have done, who can doubt but their Politicall Government might have continued, and their Kings ruled as well the Church externally, as they did before his comming, ſince Chriſts Kingdome was not of this World, and that he came not to aboliſh or to diminiſh the power of Kings, but to ſave their ſoules: they were no wayes loſers by Chriſts comming, but rather gainers. He might as well have ſaid, they had a Civill power about the Church, becauſe they had their noſes betwixt their eyes. Many were types of Chriſt, that had not this authority about the Church; and many had this authority about the Church, who were not types of Chriſt: Ergo, this reaſon of his is falſe, and ridiculous.

No more were the people of the Iewes types of the Chriſtian Church, in reſpect of the Civill, but of the Spirituall and Eccleſiaſticall Government by Church-officers, and the People ſubject thereunto. So alſo was their Land a type of the Celeſtiall Hieruſalem, not as it conteined the State, but the Church; otherwiſe it ſhould have been a type of Heaven, before that the people of God had any right to it. And finally, types are not ordained by the Politicall or Morall Law, as Magiſtrates, and their Authority, (at leaſt, qua tales) but only by the Ceremoniall Law. True it is, that God may ſerve himſelfe of a thing inſtituted by the Morall Law to be a type, but he muſt make it a type by ſome ſubſequent Ceremoniall Law.

What he ſaith againſt all this, p. 52. §.23. that good Kings never oppreſſed godly perſons, when they were for a while tender in conſcience, it is not to the purpoſe. We only ſay here, that they may puniſh Idolaters, Seducers, Hereticks, and Sectaries; who are never ſuch, till they be ſufficiently convicted, and after that remain pertinacious: But no wayes good people, under the notion of good people, but ſo far forth as they doe amiſſe: And what reaſon, if he who heretofore by the judgement of Charity was thought a good man, if he become an Heretick, or a Murtherer, ſhould not be puniſhed according to Law, ſince the Magiſtrate puniſheth him not for his good, but for his ill?

§. 24. He ſaith, that I muſt prove that the Kings of Iudah had ſuch a power by a Morall law, which is of a perpetuall obligation and engagement upon other Nations.

A.S. Anſw. It ſuffices, that I have proved it by a Politicall Law; and that the ſame reaſon obliges Chriſtian Princes, v • z. B. cauſe they will turne thee from the Lord thy God, Deut. 13.5.10. •• Thus Politicall law is grounded upon the fifth Commandement, which is Iuris naturalis. It muſt be ſo, ſince it is grounded in naturall reaſon. 4. And our Reaſons (God willing) hereafter ſhall make it appeare. 5. In the mean time, take for an example Nebuchadnezzar, who, ſince he was no le •• , could not doe it in vertue of any Politicall law of the Iewes, for he was no Subject of the Kingdome of Iuda: only he could doe it in vertue of the Morall, or ſome Politicall law grounded on the Morall, or the law of Nature.

M. S. It was no more Morall, then that of the ſtaying of the inhabitants of the idolatrous City, and the cattell thereof, &c.

M.S. then, p. 33. §. 2. argueth, 1. thus: By ſuch an umpirage and deciſion as this, between the Civill Magiſtrate, and himſelfe, viz. A.S. with his fellow Presbyters, hath he not made the one Judex, and the other Carnifex: the one, i. e. the Civill Magiſtrate, muſt give the ſentence; the other muſt doe execution.

Anſw. A.S. 1. There is no deciſion at all between the Civill Magiſtrate, and A. S. for A. S. is but a private man, neither Magiſtrate, nor Church-Officer. 2. Neither are the Presbyters his fellow-Presbyters, ſince he is no Presbyter: Theſe then, in the beginning, are manifeſt untruths. 3. Neither can this deciſion in granting an Intrinſecall povver, both directive and executive, to the Church; and an Extrinſecall to the Civill Magiſtrate, (viz. which is extrinſecall in reſpect of Eccleſiaſticall povver, but intrinſecall to Civill povver) make the Church or Eccleſiaſticall Aſſembly a Judge, and the Parliament or Civill Magiſtrate a Hangman (to remember his moſt humble reſpects unto the King, Parliament, and all the Iudges of this Kingdome) For the Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies (as it is the common opinion of all our Divines) cannot judge of the Civill Magiſtrate his duty. 2. Neither have they ever been ſo fooliſh, as M. S. moſt paſſionately and impudently calumniateth them here, to command him any thing. 3. They acknowledge moſt willingly, that the Church, being materially a part of the State, is ſubject to Civill Government. 4. That the Church, which is the Kingdome of Chriſt, hath no Civill power, ſince it is not of this World, Joh. 18.26. 5. That the Civill Magiſtrate commanding and compelling ſuch as be refractory and diſobedient to the Church, muſt not ſee with the Churches eyes, but with his own Civill or Politicall eyes. 6. And that in ſo doing he obeyeth not the Church, or any Eccleſiaſticall power, but God, whoſe power he exerciſeth in the State, as the Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies doe exerciſe Chriſts power in the Church. 7. Yea more, that ſometimes the Civill Magiſtrate may not puniſh thoſe who are diſobedient to the Church, viz. if thereupon may follow the undoing of the State, &c. 8. For the ſame reaſon, it is moſt untrue, that the one giveth out the ſentence, and the other muſt doe execution. 9. And moreover, becauſe they are two ſeverall Iudicatories, they are both independent one upon another, howſoever both divers wayes ſubject one to another: for the Civill Magiſtrate is ſubject in a ſpirituall way to the Church; He muſt learne Gods will by the Miniſters of the Church, who are Gods Ambaſſadours, ſent unto him: He muſt be ſubject unto Eccleſiaſticall Cenſures, as we ſee by the Examples of the Kings in the Old Teſtament, and Theodoſius the Emperour in the New. So the Church againe is ſubject not in a Spirituall, but in a Civill way, to the Government of the Civill Magiſtrate, as all Proteſtants, and Miniſters themſelves confeſſe, and plead for it againſt the Romane Clergie, in favour of the Civill Magiſtrate. 10. The Civill Magiſtrate hath power, not to receive into the State all that which the Church judgeth fitting: He may irreſiſtably hinder it, if he will. 11. If he be Carnifex, becauſe that he commands it to be put in execution, he ſhould be Carnifex, when ever he ſhould command his own judgements to be put in execution 12. So ſhould Independents be Carnifices, when either the Civill Magiſtrate or the Church commands them to doe their duty. 13. The Carnifex or Executioner pronounceth not a ſentence as the Magiſtrate.

M. S. Obj. 2. pag. 33. The Civill Magiſtrate is much beholding to the Presbyter, for giving him a Conſecrated ſword to fight the Presbiterian battels; and for perſwading of him to pull out his own eyes, upon this preſumption, that he ſhall ſee better with his.

A. S. As able as this man is in jeering, and calumniating, as unable is he in arguing againſt this truth, eſpecially if he have no better arguments in his Budget by way of Reſerve, then what he brings here, all he ſaith is utterly falſe. 1. The Presbyterians have none but ſpirituall battels to fight; 2 Cor. 10.3, 4. the weapons of their warfare are not carnall. 2. They doe not warre after the fleſh; neither wraſtle they againſt fleſh and bloud, but againſt the Rulers of the darkneſſe of this world, againſt ſpirituall wickedneſſe in High Places; their ſword is the ſword of the ſpirit, Eph. 6.12. And therefore they cannot, nor pretend they to give him this ſpirituall ſword; they cannot quit it: much leſſe can they give him the materiall ſword which is none of theirs to give, for he hath it of God; he is the Miniſter of God, Rom. 13.4. avenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evill. 2. It is falſe, that the Presbyterians perſwade him to pull out his ovvn eyes, or to ſee vvith theirs. 1. For they teach him to learne the Goſpell, by reading the Word, and hearing it Preached by the Miniſters thereof, according to Gods Word, and not by every Cobler, as amongſt Independents in exerciſing their gifts. 2. And afterwards to ſee and judge by his owne eyes. 3. They ſay and Preach that it is a great ſin in him, if he judge with any other then his owne eyes. 4. He muſt judge according to the Lawes of the State; otherwiſe he doth not the part of a Iudge. 5. Yea if his judgement diſſent from the judgement of the Law, we know well enough he ought to quit both his owne judgement, and that of the Church, and to judge againſt his owne private conſcience according to the Law, and his publick conſcience which he is bound to have, as a publick perſon, conforme to Law; for he ſitteth not upon the Tribunall as a private, but as a publick Perſon, not as Iames or Charles, but as King Iames, or King Charles. So in this there is no policy, as this malignant ſpirit calumniateth. I omit here his deepe policy in comparing the Civill Magiſtrate, 1. King, Parliament, &c. with a Dogge. 2. And the Presbytery with an Ape: whether this be not prophanation, and impiety at leaſt, and that in a pretty high degree, I ſubmit to the judgement of thoſe whom it ſo nearely concerneth, if they be Apes I wonder you will call them Brethren. VVhat brother Ape, and ſo Apes your ſelves, according to your Tenet: ſo let the Concluſion hold for you; but we deny the Antecedent, in ſo far forth as applyed to Presbyterians.

M. S. Obj. 3. Surely the frame and conſtitution of Presbyterie is exactly calculated for the Meridian of this preſent World: And indeed A. S. himſelfe is ſomewhat ingenuous, in acknowledging, that this Government hath little or no relation unto, or compliance with the World, which is to come; profeſſing, p. 13. the externall peace of the Church to be the adequate end thereof. The Argument will be thus:

That Government, whoſe adequate end is the externall peace of the Church, hath no compliance with the world to come, but is calculated for the Meridian of this world:

But Presbyterian Government is a Government, whoſe adequate end is the Externall peace of the Church, as A. S. confeſſeth, p. 13. Ergo: The Presbyterian Government hath no compliance, &c.

A.S. To be ſhort here; Note, when I ſay, that the peace of the Church is the adequate end of Church-Government; 1. That by the Church-Government, I meane not the Church, according to her eſſentiall, but to her accidentall or viſible forme: 2. And conſequently, that by Government I meane not the internall Government, which belongeth to her, in reſpect of her eſſentiall, but the externall, which belongeth to her, by reaſon of her accidentall or viſible forme: the firſt is proper to Chriſt, or God in Chriſt, who only hath a domination over our ſoules. But the ſecond he exerciſeth by the Miniſtery of men. 3. That by the peace of the Church, I meane not a worldly, but a ſpirituall peace or quietneſſe, voyd of Eccleſiaſticall trouble, by corruption of Doctrine, Diſcipline, or manners; for in the midſt of wordly troubles and perſecutions, this peace may be had; neither can there one word of all this be denyed, ſince our diſpute here is only about the viſible Church. 4. That by the word end I mean't not, 1. Finem ultimum ſimpliciter, ſed in ſuo genere, i. e. not the ultimate end abſolutely, but in its owne kind; nor 2. Finem operantis Artificis, or operis; but Artis & Operationis; not the end of the Agent, of the Artiſt, or of his worke; but of the Art or Habitude, whereby he operateth, and of his Operation. Nor 3. the externall end of Government, ſuch as is the World to come, or eternall life; but the internall end, which is her peace and quietneſſe; which however it be an externall accident of the Churches Eſſence, yet it is the intrinſecall end of her externall Government. Nor, 4. the common end of Government, which is the end of other things alſo, as, the World to come; which is the end of our Faith, Charity, of all Chriſtian vertues, of Diſcipline and Government alſo, but the proper and particular end thereof. 5. Non finem obtinendum ſolum, but, producendum. And I could not, nor ſhould have taken it otherwiſe, as this man moſt impertinently would have me to doe: for things are defined, notified, and diſtinguiſhed by their internall, proper, ultimate ends in ſuo genere, and that are to be wrought; and not by their extrinſecall, common, abſolutely ultimate ends, &c. as the Philoſophers doe teach us.

So I anſwer, that the Propoſition is falſe; for Church-Government may have the Externall peace of the Church for its adequate, Intrinſecall, proper, ultimate end, in ſno genere, and for the end of Government and Diſcipline, which is finis producendus; And the World to come, for its Extrinſecall, common, abſolutely ultimate end; for the end that is to be obteined, and end of the Agent, and of his worke.

And if it be objected, that the adequate end of Church-Government ſhould containe in it ſelfe all its ends, and conſequently the life to come. I anſwer, that that is moſt falſe, for it containeth only its partiall ends. 2. If it be the Internall end, it containeth not the Externall end thereof: If it be the proper end, it cannot containe the common end, but the common end containeth it: neither is it needfull that it containe the mediate and ultimate ends, or the ultimate abſolutely, and the ultimate in its own kind or ſort; for only it containeth in it the partiall ends, ſuch as are not ſubordinate, as the mediate and ultimate end, or as the ultimate abſolutely, and in its own kind or ſort: And the reaſon of it is this; becauſe, as partes and compartes, ſo partiall ends are coordinate and oppoſed one to another, and not ſubordinate, as the mediate and ultimate end, or as the ultimate abſolutely, and in its own kind, as the Externall peace of the Church, and the VVorld to come.

Object. 4. The ſum of M.S. his diſcourſe, p. 33. §. 5. and p. 34. commeth to this; If the civill Magiſtrate hath not a Directive power in the Church, but the Church-Aſſemblies have it alone; then the Church-Aſſembly muſt have the gift of Infallibility.

A.S. This is a Papiſticall Argument, whereby the Ieſuites prove, that the Romiſh Church cannot erre: But I anſwer him, and Papiſts both.

Anſ. 1. I deny this connexum: for a Directive power may be, where there is no infallibility. 2. The Independents arrogate to their Congregationall Churches and Presbyteries, a Directive power, without any gift of infallibility. 3. They grant a Directive power unto the Civill Magiſtrate, whom they grant to be fallible. 4. And howbeit the Civill Magiſtrate be fallible, yet they will not grant, that the Presbyterie may, or ſhould iudge over him; no more can the Civill Magiſtrate judge over the Presbyterie, however it be fallible. 5. For by the ſame reaſon, any man might judge them both, ſince they are both fallible. 6. Howbeit any Iudge, either Secular or Eccleſiaſticall, be fallible, yet muſt they be obeyed, till judicially they be convicted of error; otherwiſe controverſies ſhould never be ended, ſince wee have no infallible Iudge or Iudgement in this life, unleſſe God extraordinarily ſhould reveale it to us.

Object. 5. After ſuch ſtuffe, as we have ſeen, M. S. p. 34. §. 2. gueſſes what I meane by a Directive power, and brings three acceptions of it, but all ſhort of what I meane: The firſt is, that it may ſignifie a liberty or power of conſidering, adviſing, and propoſing of what may be expedient to be done in matters of Religion, and for the good of the Church, which he would have to belong to the Parliament, and all others. 2. An Authoritative power, to conclude, ſay, and ſet down what ſhall, muſt, or ought to be done (againſt all contradiction) in matters of Religion: and this he grants to God alone; and addeth; If the Presbyterians demand ſuch a Directive power, let them ask the Crown, Throne, and Kingdome of Chriſt alſo. To this, A. S. ſaith, that all men may grant it to be true, if they claimed any ſoveraigne, Royall authoritative power: But if they claime only a Miniſteriall power, it is as great a ſacrilege to deny them it, as blaſphemy in them to arrogate the other, ſince they are Gods Miniſters and Ambaſſadors for Chriſt. 3. A prudentiall faculty or ability to direct, order, or preſcribe, whether to a mans ſelfe, or to others, what in a way of reaſon, humane conjecture, or probability, is beſt and fitteſt to be done, followed, or imbraced in matters of Religion: and this he grants to the Parliament, to many private Members of particular Churches, and to Presbyteries and Synods alſo, howſoever with a reſtriction.

But in all theſe his Conjectures, he hath no waies gueſſed at my mind: for by a Directive power, however I meane a prudentiall Prudence, yet meane I not a private prudentiall Prudence, which may be found in Midwives, Maidſervants, and VVater-men; for in granting ſuch a Power to the Parliament and Eccleſiaſticall Senates, he grants them no more, then to the meaneſt of the people; but I meane an authoritative publick, and Eccleſiaſticall prudentiall power, not Soveraign, Imperiall, Royall, or Deſpoticall, or Magiſteriall; but Miniſteriall, ſuch as may belong to Miniſters, and Ambaſſadours of Chriſt: And as I have ſaid, it is not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 whereof Ariſtotle ſpeaketh in the Category of Quality, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , no naturall power, no naturall or ſupernaturall Habitude; but Poteſtas or Morall Power depending upon will, and not upon Nature, or that is the work of will, and not of Nature.

M. S. Ob. 16. p. 37. §. 2. They who are Party, cannot be their Parties Judge, ſince they are all equals, Et par in parem non habet imperium; and to be both Iudge, and Party in one cauſe, cannot be granted to thoſe, that have no authoritative power one over another, as A.S. himſelfe affirmes. But the Aſſembly are thoſe, who are Party to the Independents, and nothing elſe, but their equals, Ergo the Aſſembly cannot be their Judges.

A. S. Anſ. A Party cannot judge a Party; I diſtinguiſh, for either this Party is only pretended, and ſo I deny the Major; or reall; and then this reall Party either compeareth in ſome perſonall, or reall actions of his owne alone; or in ſome cauſe of publick concernment: if he compeare under the firſt notion, the Major is true, but the Minor is falſe; for the Members of the Aſſembly compeare not in the Aſſembly for any perſonall or reall action of their owne alone, or of particular concernment: if he compeareth under the ſecond notion, the Major is falſe, unleſſe yee have ſufficient cauſe to forſake him for Iudge. 2. Item, If it be a Party, that hath no power over the Party in ſuch a cauſe, the Major is true, but the Minor is falſe; for the Aſſembly in matters of Diſcipline hath power over all the Independents in England, viz. to condemne their Tenets according to Gods VVord: If it be a party, that hath power over the Party in ſuch a cauſe, as a Iudge, the Major is falſe, and ſo it was reaſoned, and this your Tenet judged, and condemned in the Arminians, as I hope, it ſhall be in this Arminian and the Independents, in this Aſſembly. 3. It is falſe that parties are equals, when the one hath power over another; or when the one, that is pretended to be party, judgeth not in a matter concerning himſelfe, but the publick. 4. For if that ſhould hold, the parties of the Independent Churches might reject the judgement of whole Churches, yea of all the Churches of the world, pretending them to be parties. 5. Yea for the ſame reaſon they might reject the Iudgement of the Parliament. 6. This Argument proveth not the queſtion, viz. that the Parliament hath an intrinſecall, directive power in matters of Religion, or an Eccleſiaſticall power, to judge in matters of Religion. 7. It is a very proud and Independent expreſſion of yours, when you ſay, that the Synod and all the Churches in the Chriſtian world are but the Apologiſts equals; you will finde them, I hope in God, their Judges; and yet they are put in authority by the Parliament, to repreſent the whole Church of England, which is more then ſuch an inconſiderable number of Independents.

M. S. Ob. 17. p. 37. §. 2. If all Churches vvere equall, (as for ought I know, or for any thing A.S. alledgeth to the contrary, they are) there can be neither ſuperiours, nor inferiours, and conſequently no obedience or diſobedience: But the firſt is true.

A. S. Anſ. 1. This proveth not that the Parliament hath any intrinſecall povver in the Church; much leſſe any directive intrinſecall povver. 2. Only it pretendeth to prove an Independent Povver in the Church, which taketh away their directive povver of the Civill Magiſtrate, and the Parliament; for if their Churches depend not of any ſuperiour, how can they depend upon the Parliament, or any other Civill Magiſtrate? I deny the Aſſumption, viz. that all Churches are equall; but he proveth it, becauſe they are ſuch for ought he knoweth, or that A. S. alleadgeth to the contrary. Anſvv. 1. This is, but to confeſſe your ignorance. 2. I deny the Conſequence, for it may be otherwiſe, howbeit he be ignorant of it. 3. Neither is his knowledge the meaſure of divine, or naturall verity, but to be meaſured by them. 4. Howbeit A. S. ſhould ſay nothing to the contrary, yet the contrary may be; for A. S. hath not ſaid all things, that may be ſaid upon this, or any other ſubject: and there be thouſands, who can ſay more, and better then he; yea, many have ſaid more and better. 5. It is an untruth alſo, that he hath ſaid nothing to the contrary, for he might have ſeene ſomething to the contrary in his Obſervations, and in his Anſwers to a Libell; and if that be not enough, he hath more in this Booke. 6. When he ſaith that A. S. argueth ſo, it is an untruth; for neither hath A. S. the Aſſumption, nor the Concluſion, in the 38. page of his Obſervations cited by him, for he deſtroyeth the Conſequent to deſtroy the Antecedent: whereas M. S. poſeth the Antecedent to infer the Conſequent.

M. S. Ob. 18. If Iuſtice conſiſteth not in an Arithmeticall, but Geometricall proportion, then is there no reaſon, that peremptoriouſneſſe of Vote, how Arithmetically ſoever priviledged, but weight and worth of Arguments ſhould carry it againſt them. But the firſt is true, Ergo the ſecond alſo.

A. S. Anſvv. This Argument with its peremptorious cenſure of a pretended peremptoriouſneſſe of Votes, Arithmetically priviledged, ſeemeth to cenſure the Parliament, which ordained, that that ſhould be offered unto them, as the Iudgement of the Aſſembly, vvhich the major part aſſented unto. i. e. that, that was judged by Plurality of Votes. 2. If by peremptoriouſneſſe of Vote, he meaneth Plurality of Votes, I deny the conſequence or connexion; for when things are fully ballanced by reaſon, in any Aſſembly, it is more probable, that that is moſt true, that is carried by plurality of votes, and that Geometricall proportion, wherein conſiſteth diſtributive Iuſtice, may be more eaſily found out by Plurarity of votes, then by fewer votes; otherwiſe it were a folly to vote any thing; for wherefore vote they any thing in any Aſſemblies, but that it may be judged by plurality of votes? 3. And the Apoſtle willeth, that the ſpirit of Prophets be ſubject to the Prophets: Neither is it credible, that the Major part will ſubmit unto the leſſer part. 4. And we would willingly know of you, Sir, how things are ordinarily carried in your Aſſemblies? whether things being debated, and every mans Reaſons heard, the Major part ſubmitteth to the leſſer, or the leſſer to the Major? or whether that is thought truth, that the Major or Minor part Voteth? 5. If by peremptoriouſneſſe of votes, you mean a bold and imperious carrying of things by plurality of votes, without reaſon, I ſhall readily grant you ſuch Aſſemblies are unlawfull; neither is there any ſuch eſtabliſhed amongſt us; neither hath the Parliament eſtabliſhed any ſuch Eccleſiaſticall Aſſembly here; neither doth the Aſſembly arrogate unto it ſelfe any ſuch unjuſt power: if this Argument hold, it ſhall beate downe as well the proceedings of the Parliament; and all Civill Iudicatories, wherein things are carried by Plurality of votes, as thoſe of the Aſſembly: wherefore all the Civill Powers in the world will doe well to take notice of this peremptorious cenſure of them all; for if it ſtand, they muſt fall and doe homage to the Independent Churches. Beſides this, I know not what he meaneth by Arithmetically priviledged; for it is no terme either in Divinity, or in Lawes, or in Philoſophy, for any thing I know: Neither heard I ever before of any Arithmeticall priviledge.

Obj. 19. M. S. What is granted to every other man in the Kingdome, cannot be denyed to the Parliament.

But a calling to judge between, the Apologiſts, and their Brethren, yea, and ſomewhat more then a calling a ſpeciall and weighty neceſſity to doe it (though not after the ſame manner, in reſpect of the conſequence of their judgement) is granted to every other man in the Kingdome. Ergo a calling to Iudge, &c. cannot be denyed to the Parliament.

A. S. Anſw. Howbeit I might ſay much to the firſt Propoſition, 1. yet I deny the Aſſumption, if it be taken abſolutely: Or rather 2. to evite his cavillations, I diſtinguiſh it: if by the word calling he meane a publick and particular calling, ſuch as have the Officers, and Miniſters, or Rulers of the Church; it is falſe; for no man hath ſuch a calling, but he who is called, as Aaron: if He meane a private or common calling. I grant him all the Argument, but it is nothing to the purpoſe; for by ſuch a calling they cannot judge in Publicke or in Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies. 3. I diſtinguiſh the word judge, for either it ſignifies an Officiall, Publicke, Miniſteriall, and authoritative judgement; or a private common judgement of diſcretion, ſuch as belongeth to women, and all Chriſtians: if the firſt, the Minor is falſe; for what neceſſity can lye upon every private man, yea, Water-men, Coblers, and Oyſter-women to goe to the Aſſembly, and judge between the Apologiſts and them? If ſo, the Parliament hath done them wrong, in not calling of them, or rather in excluding them from ſo noble and neceſſary acts of their calling. And here I muſt pray the Parliament to conſider, whether this Doctrine of his in this point be not ſeditious, and ſufficient to excitate the ignorant people to challenge ſuch a pretended calling and liberty, or licentiouſneſſe of judgement? If every one be a Iudge to Rule, who ſhall be ruled? If every one command, who ſhall obey? how then hath the Apoſtle diſtinguiſhed Rulers from others? If the ſocond, we grant him all the Argument; but that concluſion in that ſence is not the queſtion, that is controverſed between us.

But 20. Arg. M. S. ſeemes to prove the Aſſumption, if it be not a new Argument: Would A. S. have even the meaneſt of men to ſing obedience and ſubmiſſion to the Aſſembly, without their underſtanding?

A.S. I retort the Argument: 1. Will M.S. have even the meaneſt of men to ſing obedience and ſubmiſſion to the King, Parliament, or any Civill Magiſtrate, without their underſtanding? 2. Would M. S. have even the meaneſt to ſing obedience to the Independent Churches, without their underſtanding? 3. The Church muſt uſe all poſſible meanes to informe ſuch as pretend ignorance, or conſcience: having ſufficiently convicted them, ſhe muſt proceed againſt them as contumacious, and inflict upon them ſuch ſpirituall puniſhments, as their ſinnes may deſerve. 4. In ſuch a c •• e, not only the meaneſt, but alſo the greateſt muſt ſing obedience paſſi • è, 〈◊〉 ſuff •• ing the Churches proceedings againſt them; pormittendo, tolerando, no • 〈◊〉 ; in permitting the Church to proceed againſt them, in tolera ••• nor judgement, in not reſiſting it: for it is an old ſaying of a very wiſe Scoick: Tolerand • ſunt, quae emendari non poſſunt: ſince particular perſons have no publike vocation or power to oppoſe the Church, activé, they muſt ſuffer; yet they may reſiſt in not obeying activè, as in confeſſing an untruth, in caſe the Charch urge them thereunto: Or, in a word, they muſt obey, in caſe they be not made Actors in things againſt their Conſcience; for it is no ſinne to ſuffer what we cannot mend; but to doe what we ſhould not doe, or omit what we ſhould doe, and may doe.

Object. 21. If the meaneſt of men have not a calling to judge betwixt the Aſſembly, and the Independents, then they muſt ſing obedience and ſubmiſſion to the Aſſembly, without their underſtanding. But the Conſequent is falſe, Ergo, ſo is the Antecedent alſo.

A.S. Anſw. I deny the Conſequence of the firſt Propoſition: for to ſing obedience to the Aſſembly, it is not needfull, that one be Iudge betwixt them and the Independents; but, that they know whether the Iudgement of the Aſſembly be juſt, or not, or rather, whether their Obedience be juſt, or not: for the Aſſembly, and they who have power to judge, may judge juſtly; and he who is judged, juſtly diſobey: as, if a man ſhould legally, in foro Externo, be convicted of Hereſie, or any other crime, the fact being proved by falſe witneſſes, and he afterwards condemned to acknowledge an Hereſie or crime; both the judgement ſhould be juſt, for the Iudges judged juſtly, juxta allegata & probata; but the Obedience to ſuch a judgement ſhould be unjuſt, and his diſobedience juſt; for he ſhould ſinne grievouſly againſt God, and give offence to his Neighbour, in acknowledging an Hereſie, or a filthy crime, where there is none at all. 2. By a calling to judge, either he underſtands a publike and particular calling to judge authoritativè, in conſulting in Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies of matters of Religion, and deciding them, and ſo inducing an obligation unto obedience; or a common and private calling, out of Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies, by himſelfe alone, or in private with a friend, to judge by a judgement of diſcretion, which induceth no bond or obligation to obedience. If by a Calling he meane the firſt, the firſt Propoſition is falſe; neither will all the Independents, Arminians, Anabaptiſts, and Socinians ever be able to prove it. If the ſecond, all the Argument may be granted, viz. That the meaneſt of men have a common calling to judge by judgement of Diſcretion, (which induceth no obligation) betwixt the Synod, and the Independents: but that is not the Queſtion in debate. 3. I diſtinguiſh the word obedience and ſubmiſſion; for either this obedience is activè, when we are commanded by our Superiours, to be Agents or Actors in any thing, as to bow before an Idol, or Religiouſly to adore Altars, the Bread and Wine at the Lords Table, &c. Or permiſſivè, when I am not commanded to be an Actor, or to doe any thing, but to permit it, not hinder it, or not oppoſe it, if I doe it not my ſelf; as when men are exhorted, or commanded to aſſiſt the poore; if I will not aſſiſt them, I am bound not to oppoſe the Command, or to hinder others from doing it: ſo, if a Miniſter preach not according to my palate, whatever be my private judgment of him, as if he preach too ſublimely, too ſpeculatively, leſſe methodically, &c. yet muſt I let him alone, I may not oppoſe or croſſe him, becauſe that I have no publike calling to cenſure or hinder him. If obedience be taken in the firſt way, the firſt Propoſition is falſe; for every man in obeying actively, or when he is an Actor, muſt know whether he doth well, or ill, at leaſt by a particular judgement: if in the ſecond, it is true, that men are bound ſometimes to ſing a permiſſive obedience, without their underſtanding, becauſe in ſo doing, they doe nothing themſelves, but permit other men to doe; as when there is a Miniſter called by the Church to preach, it may be, that ſome ordinary Mechanick will judge his Sermons to be too ſublime, more ſpeculative then practicall, happily alſo he will think them not methodicall: in ſuch a caſe the Mechanick hath no power to hinder the Preacher from preaching, or preaching ſo; he muſt obey in permitting, and not oppoſing him in preaching; for what is unſavory to his palate, is ſavory to anothers. 4. If this Argument hold, it ſhall preſſe no leſſe the Parliament, then the Aſſembly: for I put the caſe that the Aſſembly judge, and that all the Aſſembly and Independents goe one way, and the Parliament another, which, I truſt in God, ſhall never happen: I frame the Argument thus:

If the meaneſt of men have not a calling to judge betwixt the Parliament and the Aſſembly, then they muſt ſing obedience and ſubmiſſion to the Parliament, without their underſtanding. But the Conſequent is falſe; Ergo, And ſo your Independents ſhall neither obey Parliament nor Aſſembly. And the Parliament would doe well to note this.

5. I ſay more, that ſometimes Subjects are bound to obey their Rulers, when they know not diſtinctly the equity of the Command: for, put the caſe a Prince undertake a Warre againſt his nei •• bour-Prince, every Cobler knoweth not the true cauſe of the Warre, or 〈◊〉 it be juſt, or not; for he 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 cannot penetrate into his Princes ſecret Counſells, and yet if the Prince lay Aſſizes upon the people, or preſſe Souldiers, they muſt, in all this, obey, howbeit they know not the ſecrets of his Counſels, yea, howbeit they ſuſpect the Warre to be unjuſt, they muſt obey; for it is not expedient, that every Independent Cobler be admitted into the Counſell of State; or if that be not granted, that preſently he reſiſt his Prince, and raiſe a Rebellion in the Kingdome.

6. I pray this man to tell me, whether in New England amongſt the Independents, every man be not bound to obey what is judged in their Aſſemblies, however he be of a contrary judgement?

7. And whether it be Morally poſſible, that every man be of the ſame judgment, in things that are reſolved, or to be reſolved in all Civill or Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies? And if not, what can be the force of this Argument?

What here he addeth, The glory of a Synod lyes not ſo much in the force of their Concluſions, as of their premiſes, is impertinent; for the force of the premiſes and concluſions are not to be oppoſed one to the other, but to be compoſed one to another; for the concluſion followeth neceſſarily of its premiſſes: Things are ſufficiently diſcuſſed in the Aſſembly, and their Concluſions evidently enough inferred out of their premiſſes: but this is an incurable ſickneſſe in theſe men, that they never thinke any Concluſion well inferred, unleſſe it be for themſelves.

Obj. 22. He telleth us afterwards his judgement, that the concluſions of the Aſſembly ſhould not be ſwallowed, without shewing, &c. which the Parliament and Aſſembly will both grant him.

Obj. 23. M. S. In his Sect. 12. he bringeth in quality of an Argument, as it ſeemeth, an Anſwer unto one of mine, taken ab exemplo, or a ſimili, which I have anſwered, and afterwards, Sect. 16. he hath an Argument, the ſumme whereof is this.

Obj. 24. Chriſt hath not diveſted himſelfe, nor made a delegation of ſuch a directive power in matters of Religion, as A. S. would ſequeſter for the honour of the Presbyterie: Ergo he will not acknowledge it.

A. S. Anſvv. 1. I deny the Conſequence: for to acknowledge ſuch a Miniſteriall power, as we grant unto the Miniſters of the Aſſembly, or our Preſbyteries, it is not needfull, that Chriſt diveſt himſelfe of it, or make a delegation, but a donation of it; for Chriſt was never veſted with ſuch a Miniſteriall and ſubordinate power, for he is Lord and ſupreame Judge in the Church, and therefore could never diveſt himſelfe of it. 2. If he meane the ſupreame power proper to Chriſt, we neither deſire him to beleeve, nor beleeve we, that Chriſt hath diveſted, or could diveſt himſelfe of it, to give it to the Church, for he kept to himſelfe, his owne ſupreame or Royall Power; but gave unto his Miniſters ſubalterne, and Miniſteriall power, which derogateth no waies from his Royall power, ſince this is ſubordinate unto that. 3. However he takes it, this Argument is captious, and is nothing elſe but a plain petitio principii, and proving the ſame thing by the ſame, or a Concluſion by a Premiſſe, as uncertaine as it ſelfe.

After this petty Argument he maketh his Teſtament, reſolving himſelfe to dye a Martyr, amongſt good men, whom he hath moſt highly offended, and who profeſſe, that they compell no man to profeſſe any truth, much leſſe untruth, againſt the light of their Conſcience; how ridiculous a Martyr is this? They profeſſe that they may undergoe a voluntary exile, for feare of perſecution: if you, ſir, feare any ſuch thing, you may be gone, according to the Principles of your owne Divinity. And then he telleth us, that he will allow any directive power of man, ſo it be not compulſory unto men by any externall violence, whether directly or indirectly, to ſubſcribe againſt their judgements and conſciences to it.

A. S. Anſw. 1. Our Presbyteries attribute not to themſelves any directive power, that is compulſory unto men by externall violence, to ſubſcribe againſt their judgements. 2. But if a few men differ in their judgements from all the reſt of the Church, or will needs bring in new Religions, or novelties, againſt the common Tenets of the Church: then indeed they will caſt them out of the Church, or excommunicate them according to their demerits, neither is it equitable that they abide in a Church, or enjoy a Church conſociation, who will not ſubmit unto her Iudgement and Diſcipline. Neither will his Quinque Eccleſian Miniſters admit unto, or receive any man into their Church, who differs in judgement from them, or who will not ſubmit unto their judgement: But howbeit the Church compell you not to ſubſcribe; yet the Civill Magiſtrate, after ſufficient conviction, may compell you to ſubſcribe, or to be gone; for after ſufficient conviction, Morally, it is, and ſhould be ſuppoſed, that yee know the Truth, or ſhould know it; or if yee know it not, that nothing can have hindred you, but your owne pertinaciouſneſſe, which cannot excuſe, but rather now accuſes, and aggravates your ſinne, ſince one ſinne, formally, and per ſe, cannot excuſe another; Neither have our Churches ever gone further, as may appeare by our Confeſſions of Faith, and Covenants of the Churches of Scotland, France, the Netherlands, Geneva, &c.

M. S. hath ſome more poore Reaſons in his 2. Chap. about the executive power of the Civill Magiſtrate in matters of Religion; Here he imployeth neare upon foure pages in quarto, in a very ſmall Print, about things that are nothing at all to the purpoſe. 1. In threatning the Parliament with Gods moſt heavy judgements, in caſe they meddle themſelves with any executive, or coercive power, againſt his new canonized Independent Saints; He ſuppoſeth them 1. to be Saints. 2. Thoſe little ones, Matth. 18.6. He telleth them, is were better a Milſtone vvere hanged about their necke, then to meddle vvith one of theſe little ones; and that becauſe the Holy Ghoſt propheſieth of the putting dovvn of all rule, and all authority, and povver by Chriſt; for he muſt reign till he hath put all his enemies under his feet, 1 Cor. 15.24, 25. this argumentation will hold, if ye ſuppoſe the Independents to be Chriſts little Saints, and the King and Parliament to be his Enemies, in caſe they meddle with them, in hindring them to ſet up their Sect: but to the contrary. Gods Saints, as themſelves, in caſe they ſuffer not Presbyterians, or any others, no more then the Independents doe in New England: ſo the Independents ſhall reigne over us all. 2. In gueſſing what I meane by the word Church, whether a Church in folio, or in decimo ſexto? I have fully expounded it, howbeit not in ſo choſen new Divinity termes, in folio, and decimo ſexto. So I come to the reſt of his Reaſons.

M. S. If a Claſſis ſhall cite or excommunicate a Member of a Church, againſt the judgement and conſent of the Elders of that Church, let all the World judge, whether that be not an Act of Externall power without the Church.

A. S. This Argument is ridiculous. 1. For it proveth not that which is in queſtion, viz. That the Civill Magiſtrate hath an Eccleſiaſticall or Intrinſecall power in the Church. 2. Onely it proveth, that the Church hath an Authority, that in ſome reſpect may be called Extrinſecall. 3. But to take away this Equivocation, and many others, and to explain more fully this queſtion, note again, 1. That the Church may be conſidered, either according to its Reall and Naturall, or according to its Morall being. 2. That the Church according to its Morall being (I ſpeak of the Repreſentative) is either Particular of one Pariſh or Congregation, or more Generall, as a Claſſicall or Synodall Aſſembly. 3. Note, that the particular Church, may be conſidered either Abſolutely, and in it ſelf alone, without any reference to a Claſſe or a Synod, whereof it is a part; or Relatively with a reference to the more Generall Church, viz. a Claſſis or Synod, whereof it is a part, or in quality, and under the notion of a part, in ſo far forth, as by ſome formall or virtuall Aſſent, it hath once Covenanted to be a part of ſuch a Claſſis or Synod, and Stipulated to ſend its Commiſſioners to ſuch Claſſicall or Synodall Meetings. 1. If then we conſider Citation or Excommunication with reference to the Church, either more Generall or Particular, according to its Naturall being, it may be Extrinſecall to them both; for the Act of Citation or Excommunication is not really produced or pronounced, according to its Naturall being, by the Church conſidered under the notion of its Reall being, but by one man, as all wiſe men will grant. 2. If they be taken morally according to their Morall being, grounded on ſome Covenant, then the Acts of Excommunication and Citation are not Extrinſecall to the more Generall Church, ſince they are exerciſed by Her power and conſent. 3. If they be conſidered with reference to the Particular Church, then if the Particular Church be conſidered Abſolutely, they may be Extrinſecall unto Her, ſince neither Excommunication nor Citation are exerciſed by Her Abſolutely, at leaſt Ordinarily. 4. If we conſider a Particular Church in reference to the more Generall Church, viz. under the notion of a part of the more Generall Church; then we may conſider Her either, 1. According to Her firſt Conſent and Covenant, Reall or Virtuall, whereby She joyned together in one Conſociation with many other Particular Churches, to make up together one Claſſe or Synod; the which Conſent preceded the Act of Citation or Excommunication; and whereby the Claſſe or Synod received Power to cite or excommunicate particular Perſons: Or 2. according to Her Conſent, in ſending Her Commiſſioners to the Claſſe or Synod: Or 3. according to Her ſubſequent or concomitant Diſſent to the Act of Excommunication or Citation. 4. If then She be conſidered according to Her firſt Covenant and conſent, or in the ſecond, i. e. in ſending Her Commiſſioners, the Act of Citation and Excommunication is voluntary, and Intrinſecall to that Particular Church, notwithſtanding Her ſubſequent or concomitant Diſſent; for that Act of Citation and Excommunication is done in vertue of ſuch precedent Conſents, which are Her Deeds, and very Legall. 5. If the Particular Church be conſidered according to Her ſubſequent or concomitant Diſſent, theſe Acts are involuntary, and Extrinſecall to that Particular Church: But ſuch a Diſſent is not properly and formally an Eccleſiaſticall Act, ſince it is not ruled by any Eccleſiaſticall Rule of Diſcipline, but by private intereſt, or paſſion, which muſt ever give place to the Weal of the whole Church; for as Naturall bodies may be conſidered either Abſolutely, or under the notion of a Part, which is for the whole; and in the firſt notion, they have their Particular Inclinations and Motions, whereby they decline whatſoever is hurtfull unto them, as when the hand flyeth from a blow of a Sword; but under the ſecond, they are not led by their own particular, but by the generall Inclination and Intereſt of the whole, ſince parts are not ſo much for themſelves, as for the whole; and ſo it neglecteth its own particular good or intereſt, for the weal or intereſt of the whole; as when the hand for fear leaſt the head ſhould be cut off, whereof might enſue the deſtruction of the whole man, expoſeth it ſelf to the danger in receiving the blow it ſelf, to ſave the whole: So in Politicall or Eccleſiaſticall Conſociations, particular Towns, or Churches, may be carried by their own Intereſts to ſome particular Diſſent in ſome Caſes; but if they move Regularly, ſometimes againſt their own Intereſts, they muſt Conſent againſt themſelves, according to the generall Inclination of the whole Conſociated body, or Church Claſſicall, Synodall, &c. 6. If this Argument hold, it will conclude, 1. Againſt that which is done by Plurality of Votes in their particular Congregations; For that which is concluded, is againſt the Conſent of the Minor part. 2. Againſt that which is done in their Synods, by their Meſſengers, if they conclude againſt, or without the Conſent of the Churches, whereof they are Meſſengers: And 3. Againſt the Parliament, if they conclude any thing againſt the particular Conſent of particular Towns; for they Conſent not thereunto; And ſo what they conclude or do againſt them ſhall not be done by Conſent of the Kingdom; And ſo this man ſhall deſtroy the Parliament, and the pretended Order of Independents, as well as that of Proteſtant Presbyteries.

But M. S. telleth us, that ſo the Claſſis is like to the Magiſtrate, who is a Biſhop without, and about the Church.

Anſw. 1. I deny your Simile; for the Magiſtrates Power and Act, being onely Politicall and Civill, has no Internall reference to Citation or Excommunication, in quality of Eccleſiaſticall Acts, as that of the Church, and Church Officers, which is Eccleſiaſticall; and this your Quinqu' Eccleſian Miniſters acknowledge themſelves, when they tell us, that the Civill Power is of another nature then the Eccleſiaſticall.

Obj. But if the Civill Magiſtrate have this Externall coactive power, they muſt all have it, as well Pagans as Chriſtians: But ſo it is not; for A.S. will not grant it to Pagans, Ergo, none of them have it.

Anſw. The Aſſumption is falſe, for I grant it to them all, but not in the ſame manner; To a Pagan only in actu ſignato, but to a true Chriſtian in actu exercito. I expound it in my Annotations upon the Apologeticall Narration.

M. S. ſcratches at this diſtinction, 1. as not good; for, ſaith he, I never heard of any thing belonging to a Perſon in actu exercito, but that belonged to him, and that per prius in actu ſignato: He, to whom the principle or power of acting doth not belong, cannot ſtand ingaged for the exerciſe of acting ſuch a power.

A. S. Sir, If you heard it not, others, yea of the beſt ſort, and ableſt, both Divines and Philoſophers, may have heard it; for we have learned in the Category of Subſtantia, that Subſtantiae primae maximè propriè Subſtantiae dicuntur: whereupon they ground this other Maxime, Prima Subſtantia magis eſt Subſtantia quam Secunda: and they ſay, that it is magis Subſtantia in actu exercito, ſed non in ſignato; ſed contra, ſecunda eſt magis ſubſtantia quam Prima in actu ſignato; as all the Philoſophers, who ſerve themſelves with this diſtinction, in the explication of that propriety of Subſtance, declare in that place. 2. It is alſo an error in you, to think, that in actu ſignato, and exercito, is nothing elſe but actu & potentia. 3. Put the caſe it be ſo, and that whatever belongeth to any thing in actu ſignato, belongeth to it in actu exercito, what is that to the purpoſe? is not that enough to found a diſtinction upon? Wherever there is prius and poſterius, is there not there ſome diſtinction, at leaſt formall, or modall, if not reall? 4. Yea, put the caſe, the one part were really included in the other; yet ſhould there ever be diſtinctio includentis, & incluſi. 5. And howſoever it be, that what belongeth to a perſon in actu exercito, belongeth to him in actu ſignato; yet what belongeth to a Thing in actu ſignato, belongeth not to it in actu exercito. Neither ſaid I, that whatever belongeth to any thing in actu exercito, belongeth not to it alſo in actu ſignato. Where ſaid I it, I pray you? or if I ſaid it not, wherefore beg you here a needleſſe quarrell with me about it?

2. M. S. deſires to know, wherefore a power about the Church, and for the Church, ſhould not belong actually, and in effect, in actu exercito, and jure in re, as well to a Magiſtrate not yet truly Chriſtian, as to him that is ſuch, i. e as well to a Pagan, as a Chriſtian.

A.S. Anſw. 1. Becauſe being not yet a Chriſtian, he is not a member of the Chriſtian Church. 2. Becauſe a Pagan, qua talis, knoweth not the Principles of Chriſtian Religion, and conſequently wants the Directive power, without the which he can never well, or juſtly uſe the Imperative or Executive power. 3. Becauſe without the knowledge of our Religion, he can neither direct, nor act any thing about the Church, or for the Church, but by conjecture, or gueſſing at it. 4. Becauſe God never ordained any ſuch Externall power for Pagans about the Church. 5. To end my anſwer to this Argument: Where learned M. S. to deſire him that denieth any thing, to prove his negation? Nonne Affirmantis eſt probare? The Scripture conteineth not formall rules or teſtimonies of meere Negations, or of things that are not, but of Affirmations, and things that are. Now M.S. that affirmeth a thing to be, might more eaſily have found authorities for it in Scripture, (if any ſuch had been) then we, for things that are not: It is enough for me to ſay, that the Scripture, that conteineth all things needfull to ſalvation, conteineth no Extrinſecall power, in actu exercito, for Civill Magiſtrates, that are not Chriſtians.

M.S. But hath not then an Heathen, or Heterodox Magiſtrate power to doe good to the Church?

A.S. Anſ. 1. The Heathen Magiſtrate hath a Naturall, but not a Morall publique power, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to doe good to the Church. 2. Or if he hath it, he hath it not in actu exercito, as I have already proved. 3. Or if he hath it ſo, he hath it not to doe good to the Church, in quality of a Church; for neither can he know, or love the Church, in quality of a Church, but of men, or members of the State: for the Church, in quality of a Church, is no wayes the object of his Knowledge, or Will. He may doe it, as an Aſſe, that carrieth the corne to the Mill; or as Caiaphas, who judged, that one man muſt dye for the People; but knew not what he ſaid. He cannot doe it by any power Intrinſecall to the Church, as M.S. pretends: And howbeit I ſhould grant unto a Iew, or a Pagan, a Civill power to doe good to the Church, both in actu ſignato, and exercito: yet from thence cannot be concluded an Intrinſecall or Eccleſiaſticall power belonging to a Iew, a Pagan, or to an Antichriſtian to rule the Church Internally.

M. S. p. 48. §. 13. of this Chapter, durſt not anſwer A.S. what he meaneth by the Civill Magiſtrate, upon whom he would ſeem to beſtow ſuch a power; but in ſtead of Anſwer, racketeth it back to him with jeering and babling: But I anſwer him, 1. that Quaeſtio Quaeſtionem non ſolvit, one Queſtion ſatisfieth not another. 2. I anſwer, that the Magiſtrate, who I beleeve ſhould have ſuch a power in actu exercito, muſt be ſuch, as is not a profeſſed Enemy to the true Religion, at leaſt, in quality of a Magiſtrate, or in his Lawes.

And ſo it is falſe, that M.S. ſaith of the King; for, in quality of King, he hath profeſſed Presbyterian Diſcipline in Scotland, in as much as he confirmed it by his Authority: ſo hath he done in England, in favour of the French, Dutch, Italian, and Spaniſh Churches: ſo did King James, by his Divines, approve the Presbyterian Diſcipline, at the Synod of Dort. So M. S. ſees how much he hath deceived himſelfe, in looking for 20 Diſtinctions of me, to anſwer him to this Queſtion. We anſwer him candidè, in all ſimplicity, and feare not to declare to the World what we hold, as the Sectaries doe.

M.S. p. 49. §. 15. Was it not lawfull for them, i. e. unchriſtian Kings, to interpoſe with their Authority, that the Churches of Chriſt in their Dominations, might lead a quiet and peaceable life, in all Godlineſſe and honeſtie? If not, then was that exhortation, 1 Tim. 2.2. to be laid up in Lavender for ſome hundreds of yeers, after it was given; or elſe the benefit and bleſſing, the obtaining whereof by prayer, is made the ground of the exhortation, muſt have been made over in the intentions of thoſe that had ſo prayed, unto their poſterities after many generations.

A.S. 1. This Argument proveth not, that any Magiſtrate, either Chriſtian, or other, hath any Intrinſecall power in the Church, either Directive or Executive. 2. It proveth not, that an unchriſtian Magiſtrate hath any power in actu exercito, in the Church. 3. As for that Text, 1 Tim. 2.2. the ſenſe of the Text is, that we ſhould pray for the converſion of Kings to the Goſpel: which appeareth evidently by the Apoſtles reaſon, v. 3. & 4. For (ſaith he) this is good and acceptable in the ſight of God, v. 4. who will have all men ſaved, and come unto the knowledge of the truth. And another reaſon, v. 6. For Chriſt gave himſelfe for all men. And another, v. 7. Becauſe the Apoſtle is a Preacher of the Goſpel to all men. Now theſe words, That we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlineſſe and Piety, expreſſe finem intentum, ſed non eventum; not the Event, but the End intended by the Chriſtians who prayed; for they obteined not, in thoſe times, a quiet or a peaceable life, under the Heathen Kings. 2. Neither prayed they here, that any Nero ſhould have had the Government of the Church in his hand; for they obeyed him not, neither in Doctrine, nor in Diſcipline.

M.S. p. 50. §. 17. doth nothing, but repeat what he hath ſaid, viz. That the Civill Magiſtrate, in taking away Superſtition and Hereſie, had need of ſome other ſecurity, then the Synod can give him.

A.S. The Civill Magiſtrate, as a Chriſtian man, muſt learne Gods will, by all the meanes that God hath appointed him, viz. 1. By reading of Scriptures; 2. Comparing one Scripture with another; 3. Conferring in private about Scriptures, & of any difficulties he hath, with other Chriſtians, of whom he may learn any thing; 4. Hearing of Sermons; 5. As a Magiſtrate, he muſt have a Politicall prudence, and knowledge of Scriptures to direct him in judging about Superſtition, Hereſie, and matters of Religion; 6. He muſt ſerve himſelfe of prayer, and all the reſt of the meanes that God hath ordained him; 7. Neither ſay we, that he muſt be directed by a Synod alone. This is one of the meanes that God hath ordained him in his Providence, but not all, as this M. S. falſely would perſwade the Reader, if he be not altogether impertinent.

2. Concerning the Subordination of Eccleſiaſticall Judicatories, it is to be obſerved, 1. That an Eccleſiaſticall Judicatory is nothing elſe but a certain number of men, gathered together, and endowed with an Authoritative power, according to Gods will, to judge of Church buſineſſe, for Gods glory, and the Weal of the Church, or in a word, the Repreſentative Church of one Pariſh, Claſſe, Province, Nation, or of all the World. 2. That Subordination in Eccleſiaſticall Judicatories, is a Relation of Order, betwixt a Superiour, and an Inferiour Judicatory, or Repreſentative Church, whereby the Iudgement and Authority of the Inferiour, depends upon the Iudgement, and Authority of the Superiour: Such we conceive to be betwixt Presbyteries and Claſſes, Claſſes and Provinciall, Provinciall and Nationall, Nationall and Oecumenicall Synods.

3. Here it would be noted, That this Subordination is grounded upon the Authoritative power of Superiour Iudicatories, over their Inferiours, or Subordinated; and therefore here is to be noted, firſt, That this Power of the Church is not Naturall, that floweth from the Nature, or Eſſence of the Subject, ſuch as are the Faculties of the Soul; nor Habituall, or an Habitude either Naturally acquired by Cuſtome, or Supernaturally infuſed by Grace; for men may have all the Naturall Faculties of the Soul, and many Naturall, and Supernaturall Habitudes; yea, all thoſe that are neceſſary for this Authoritative power, and yet not have it, as any one may eaſily ſee in many learned and godly Divines, who are not Miniſters of the Church, and conſequently have no Authoritative power in the Church: But it is a Morall power (ordinarily called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or poteſtas) whereby in vertue of Gods Ordinance, the Superiour Church hath power over the Inferiours, or other Churches ſubordinated unto Her, to rectifie their Iudgements in caſe of Aberration, or to enjoyn them any thing according to Gods holy Ordinance. So when particular Churches judge any thing amiſſe either in Doctrine or Diſcipline, a Claſſe or a Provinciall Synod may judge of that Iudgement, and in caſe it finde it have need, may in the Name of God, command it to reform its Iudgement; and in caſe of diſobedience, command the people not to obey their Paſtors or Presbyteries commands; or if there be any thing, that concerneth the Weal of all the Churches in the Kingdom, the Nationall Synod hath an Authoritative power, to judge it, and enjoyn it upon the Churches in the Name of God; ſo may a Provinciall Church do in things concerning all the Churches of a Province. I call an Authoritative power, that which may command, and in vertue of its command, enjoyn an obligation of Obedience upon all thoſe that are ſubject thereunto; and in caſe of Diſobedience, inflict Spirituall puniſhments, according to the quality of the Diſobedience, viz. Simple Cenſure, the leſſer or greater Excommunication.

If ye inquire further, what is this Morall power, or wherein it conſiſts; I anſwer, It is no Reall, but a Morall being; it is no Reall quality in the Subject that hath it, and conſequently it is no Reall or Naturall power; but as 〈◊〉 were a Naturall power; for as our Naturall powers and faculties do flow from the Eſſence of the Subject, or from our Eſſentiall Forms; ſo doth this Morall power flow from the conſent and will of them who give it, and his will, who conſents to accept it; and this conſent producing ſuch a Morall power or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is no leſſe forma internè vel externè denominans, & efficaciter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 producens, quàm forma eſſentialis is forma informans potentiam naturalem a ſe, & in ſe vel in ſubjecto profundens. And as naturall powers are for the Weal of their Subjects, in accompliſhing and perfecting of them in their operations, convenient to their nature; ſo its this Morall power for the Weal of its Morall Subject, or of the conſociation in perfecting it in its operations, convenient to its Morall being, Domeſticall, Politicall or Eccleſiaſticall, in Nature or in Grace. Wherefore Ameſius, and ſundry Independents, that follow his opinion, are mightily miſtaken, whileſt they think it floweth from the Eſſence of the Church. 1. For it hath not its being from the Eſſence of the Church, but ex inſtituto divino. 2. Becauſe it is not produced neceſſarily, as Naturall proprieties, but freely and willingly, not as depending upon Nature, but upon Will. 3. If it did flow from the Eſſence of the Church, God could not change it; And yet howſoever this Morall power hath no Reall being in it ſelf; yet may it be called Reall; 1. In conſideration of its Cauſe, viz. Of the Reall deſtination of the Will, from which its produced. 2. Of its Foundation, viz. Becauſe it preſuppoſeth ſome Reall qualities in him, or thoſe, who have it, viz. Naturall faculties, and ſome naturall or ſupernaturall Abilities to exerciſe it. 3. Of its Effects that are Reall; for howſoever the power of a Magiſtrate be not a Reall quality, yet it is able to produce very Reall Effects in Subjects, in remunerating ſuch as deſerve well of the State, and in puniſhing Delinquents, as by impriſoning their perſons, or cutting off their Heads, if the crime be of that nature.

Again it muſt be obſerved, That this Morall power is, 1. either meerly Directive, which onely ſheweth what is to be done, or Imperative, that cannot onely ſhew, or diſcern what is to be done; but alſo commands, and in vertue of ſuch a command, bindes thoſe that are ſubject to ſuch a Power to Obedience, and in caſe of Diſobedience, inflicts condign puniſhments. 2. That this Morall power is either Civill or Eccleſiaſticall; the firſt belongs to the Civill Magiſtrate, the ſecond to Eccleſiaſticall perſons. 3. That Power is either Imperiall, Royall, or Magiſteriall, ſuch as Emperours, Kings, or Lords, have over their Subjects, as that of the Civill Magiſtrate; or Miniſteriall, ſuch as State-Miniſters have under their Maſters, or Lords, as that of Ambaſſadors, Purſevants, &c.

Finally it muſt be obſerved, That as Power, ſo puniſhments inflicted by Power, are either Civill or Eccleſiaſticall; Civill puniſhments are ſuch as are inflicted by the Civil Magiſtrate, and are often times corporall, as Mutilation, Stigmatizing, and Death, &c. ſometimes Pecuniary mulcts, ſometimes Infamy, &c. Eccleſiaſticall puniſhments are altogether Spirituall, conſiſting of Cenſures, Suſpenſion from the Lords Table, and Excommunication.

Theſe things being preſuppoſed, By the word Church here muſt be meant, the viſible Militant Church, and principally the Repreſentative Church, in Presbyteries, Claſſes, Synods. 2. By the word Subordination, muſt be meant a Subordination of Power and Judgement. 3. By Power muſt be meant a Morall, Eccleſiaſticall, Imperative, and Miniſteriall Power in Iudging, Commanding, and Inflicting of Spirituall puniſhments onely, and not an Imperiall, Magiſteriall, or Royall Power, whereby the Church may command in a domineering way, or compell mens bodies, or puniſh them by inflicting any Corporall puniſhment on them, or impoſing any Pecuniary mulcts; as the Independents moſt craftily go about to perſwade the World.

The Independents then deny, That there is any Church furniſhed with any Authoritative or Imperative Power, ſave onely the Pariſhionall, or to ſpeak in their own Terms, the Congregationall Church. And therefore they renounce all Claſſicall and Synodicall Churches; or if they do acknowledge them, they allow them no Authoritative or Imperative, but a Conſultative Power onely, or a Power to counſell one of their little Congregations (compounded happily of ſeven or eight perſons) what they think fitteſt to be done; ſo that this petty Congregation may either accept or reject their Counſell, at their own likings and pleaſure: ſo as in concluſion, they acknowledge no Authoritative, or Imperative Eccleſiaſticall power, above that of their little Congregations; for they maintain, that every Church, be it never ſo ſmall, yea, though it be compoſed but of ſeven or eight perſons (be it never ſo Erroneous and Hereticall) is altogether Independent in its Iudgement, upon all the Iudgements of all the Churches of the World, be they never ſo Iuſt and Orthodox; and conſequently, that what ever they teach, how Heretically ſoever; and what ever they do, be it never ſo wicked, that all the Orthodox Churches in the World, have no Authority of God to Cenſure, or to Excommunicate, or ſo much, as to command them, other wayes then any one private man might do an other, i. e. By way of Counſell, which they may either follow or reject at their pleaſure.

The Orthodox and Reformed Churches, eſpecially of Scotland, France, the Netherlands, &c. on the other part hold, That there is and ought to be Subordination amongſt Eccleſiaſticall Judicatories, viz. That Nationall Synods are above Provinciall Synods; theſe above Claſſes, and Claſſes above Presbyteries or Seſſions; and that the Superiour Judicatories have a Miniſteriall Authoritative or Imperative, but no Magiſteriall, Deſpoticall, or Imperiall, Authoritative power over the Inferiour, that are ſubordinate unto them. Item, That they may inflict upon Inferiour Churches, in caſe of Diſobedience, Spirituall, though no Corporall puniſhments, or Pecuniary mulcts, or ſuch like Civil puniſhments.

BUt before I prove my Concluſion, I muſt pray the Reader to re-marke, in paſſing the falſchood and manifold cavillations whereby this M.S. ſaluteth him in the entry of this Queſtion; for this is his ſafeſt way for the preſent, howbeit it cannot but prove damnable in the end; 1. He ſaith, that Presbyterians agree not about the Author of this ſubordination of Eccleſiaſticall Judicatories, and Presbyterian Government, whether it be juris Divini, or Humani: As if ſome of them eſteemed it to be juris Divini; others, juris Humani, Eccleſiaſtici; others, juris Naturalis; others, partim juris Divini, partim Naturalis, aut mixti. 2. He ſaith, that A.S. contradicteth himſelfe in the ſame manner. For refutation whereof, I need not but to propound our Opinion, which is thus: 1. All the Presbyterian Diſcipline, and ſpecially ſubordination of Eccleſiaſticall Iudicatories, quoad Eſſentialia, aut Subſtantialia, in its Eſſentiall parts, is juris Divini, aut Naturalis, i. e. authoriſed by Gods Divine Law, or by the Law of Nature. 2. Presbyterian Diſcipline, quoad accidentalia, & circumſtantialia, i. e. in its accidentall or circumſtantiall parts, it may be juris Humani. Neither believe I, that there is any great diſpute amongſt us, and the Independents, about theſe Poſitions, unleſſe M.S. make it. Neither know I what can anger him in all this, ſave only this, that we give him no ſubject of quarrelling us; It may be, and it ſeemeth, that he finds fault with the firſt Propoſition, wherein I ſay, it is either juris Divini, aut Naturalis: And, that he will have no Doctrine of Faith, or Diſcipline, that is juris Naturalis, i. e. grounded on the light of Nature. But, 1. What if the Scripture preſuppoſe the truth of ſome Principles, known by Nature; dare he reject them? 2. Some of them are as certaine as any Article of Faith; as, for example, this; The one part of a Contradiction is true, and the other falſe: and this, Twiſe ten are twenty. And yet none of them hath any formall Patent from Gods Word. 3. If God be as well the Author of Naturall, as of Divine truth, wherefore will ye reject Naturall truth? 4. All men are bound to beleeve all Naturall truths, when they are ſufficiently manifeſted unto them; or at leaſt, not to diſſent from them, becauſe we muſt not lye, as we are taught by the 9. Commandement, which not only forbiddeth us to misbelieve or contradict any Supernaturall, but alſo all Naturall truths ſufficiently manifeſted unto us. 5. But what reaſon hath this M.S. to reject Naturall truths, when there is nothing in Scripture to the contrary? 6. Yea, by the Law of Nature, I am bound to be ruled by them, in caſe the Scripture reveale me nothing above Nature: yea, I am not bound to goe above them, but in the caſes, that Scripture revealeth unto me. 7. What Law we were bound unto in the Old Teſtament, and is not abrogated in the New, that Law are we bound to follow, as a rule of direction in the New, yea, in Church-Diſcipline: But the Law of Nature is a Law, whereunto we were bound in the Old Teſtament, and is not abrogated in the New; Ergo, The Law of Nature is a Law, that we are bound to follow as a rule of direction in the New Teſtament, yea, in Church-Diſcipline. 8. It is holden amongſt Proteſtants for an indubitable and ſupernaturall truth, that Chriſts body cannot be in two places at one time; which neither M.S. nor all the Independent wit in the world is able to prove, unleſſe they ſuppoſe this Principle of Nature, viz. One individuall Body actually exiſtent, cannot at one time be in divers totall places] to be true: For the Scripture poſeth it not formally, but preſuppoſeth it to be true.

Now I pray you, M.S. ſhew me, wherein any Presbyterians contradict theſe Aſſertions, that I have laid down: you name none, and therefore I am not bound to anſwer. Only you ſay, I contradict my ſelfe. But wherein? Becauſe (ſaith M.S.) I ſay, p. 27. §. 3.

Anſw. In my ſecond Propoſition, he putteth Patterne for Patent. 2. Here in all theſe Propoſitions there is no contradiction, neither ſheweth M.S. wherein it conſiſteth here. It may be partim juris Divini, and partim Humani, 1. In reſpect of its divers parts, whereof ſome may be revealed in Scripture, and ſome proved by Naturall reaſon. 2. In reſpect of the ſame parts, which may be both known by Nature, and by Divine revelation, or ſome ſupervenient Divine Ordinance. So Divines hold, that we know God to be, both by Naturall Knowledge, and Supernaturall Revelation. 3. In ſo far forth, as that which is juris Naturalis, is alſo juris Divini, when jus Divinum ſuppoſeth jus Naturale: for in ſuch a caſe, jus Naturale becommeth Divinum, not Thetically, but Hypothetically; not by any formall Divine Poſition, but by ſome Divine reall Suppoſition; as I ſhew it cleerly in that paſſage of my Book, that he citeth, p. 36.

Theſe three laſt Propoſitions contradict not the reſt; For in the 4. Propoſition, p. 48. of my Book, I ſpeak not of the ground of Eccleſiaſticall Diſcipline, nor of it all; only I ſay, that it is not in Church-Miniſters power to transferre the Eccleſiaſticall power unto the Civill Magiſtrate: Which contradicteth not the firſt three.

In the 5. Only Gods Word, &c. But, 1. Gods Word, there, muſt not be taken ſtrictly, for that which is Gods Word formally, in terminis, & Theticè; but in a more large ſignification, 1. For Gods Word, formally, or by conſequence: 2. In terminis, aut in ſenſu: 3. Theticè, aut Hypotheticè, by ſome Poſition, or Suppoſition.

3. If ye take Gods Word in the laſt ſenſe, then Diſcipline, or Government muſt be taken for Diſcipline in its eſſentiall and principall integrant parts, and not in all its accidentall and circumſtantiall parts: Neither is it needfull, that we have any particular rules from Scripture, for every circumſtance of Doctrine or Diſcipline: As for example, That Sermons ſhould be on ſuch or ſuch Week-dayes; ſo long, viz. an houre, or two houres long; in the morning, or afternoon; That Eccleſiaſticall Senates ſhould ſit once a day, once a week, or once a moneth.

In the 6. Propoſition, 1. Diſcipline there, muſt be taken for Diſcipline quoad Eſſentialia, Subſtantialia, & Neceſſaria; and not quoad Accidentalia, Circumſtantialia, Contigentia, & Indifferentia; as appeareth by my words in the laſt part thereof, New Eccleſiaſticall Lawes in things indifferent, &c. 2. Holy Scripture muſt be taken in a large ſignification, as I have already declared: for ſo only is it taken by our Doctors, when we prove againſt the Papiſts, that it is the only Rule of Faith.

In the 2. Poſition, when I ſay, Subordination needeth not, &c. the word needeth muſt not be taken for neceſſarium abſolutè, or quoad eſſe; but, ſecundum quid, & ad bene eſſe; not to its being, but to its well-being: for howbeit Chriſt had not given us any patent of Subordination in Eccleſiaſticall Judicatories, in the Goſpel; yet the Law of Nature, and the Scripture of the Old Teſtament had been ſufficient to direct us therein, and had bound the Church of the New Teſtament to the Presbyterian Government: And this, M. S. acknowledgeth himſelfe, (howbeit not without ſome Comedian jeeres, more ordinary with him then any apparent Reaſon) and confeſſeth, that the words following in the 3. Propoſition, declare it.

But put the caſe, that Presbyterians differed (as he ſaith) whether it be juris Divini, Naturalis, aut Humani: as they differ not, for any thing I know, or have read: Yet they agree in this, That it is Juris. Confeſſe this, and ye may live in a Fraternall communion with us, for the Difference, viz. If one ſay, it is juris Divini; another, Naturalis; another, Eccleſiaſtici; will not breed a Schiſme; for it is not a Diſpute de re, ſed de modo rei, to know whether it proceedeth from God, as Author of the Law of Nature, or of Grace, by a Naturall, or a Poſitive Law: Much leſſe materiall is it to know, whether it be in Scripture explicitè, or implicitè; formaliter, aut per conſequentiam; in terminis, aut in ſenſu, et conſequenter; Theticè, or Hypotheticè.

SEcondly I ſay,Concluſ. that betwixt the Churches of God, there ſhould be ſome Subordination in authority, i. e. ſuch, as wherein the judgements of inferior Churches, and their proceedings may be ſubject unto the judgement of the Superiour Church, whereunto they are Subordinate: And this may be proved ſufficiently from all the Teſtimonies of Scripture, aleadged for the former Concluſion; For if there be a Church more then a particular Congregationall, viz. Provinciall, or Nationall, out of all doubt, the particular Congregations muſt be ſubject to them, 1. becauſe a part is ſubject unto the whole, as the hand unto the whole body; nam pars magis ſui totius quam ſui; item, becauſe the part is for the whole, as a medium for its end: now the Mediums muſt be ſubject unto their Ends, and not the Ends unto their Mediums; and Media commenſurantur finibus, non fines Mediis; neither ſhape we the horſe back for the ſaddle, but the ſaddle for the horſe his back; ſo the government of particular Churches muſt not be ſhaped or framed according to their particular exigencies and conveniencies alone, but according to that of the whole Provinciall, Nationall, and Univerſall Militant Church here upon Earth, in ſuch a manner, that it hinder it not.

2. Particularly, it may be proved from the Cuſtome of the Old Teſtament, which is not abrogated in the New; for therein the Iudgements of Synagogicall Aſſemblies were ſubject unto that of the middle Sanedrim; and that of the middle, to that of the Supreme: or if there were onely two, that of the leſſer Sanedrim unto that of the great one; as has been proved by Mr. Rutherford, Gilliſpy, Hearl, &c. Art. 1. and 2.

3. The Repreſentative Church, or firſt Generall Councell, at Jeruſalem, had Power and Authority over all the Churches of the world; ſince it gave them a Miniſter, viz. Mathias: Ergo, All other Churches in their Iudgements and Power of creating ſuch a Miniſter, were ſubject unto it.

Object. If it be ſaid, That it was an extraordinary Councell, 1. Becauſe it was indicted and convocated by Chriſt; 2. Becauſe it was compounded of extraordinary Perſons; 3. Becauſe the Perſons received extraordinary gifts there; 4. Becauſe, it was in the birth and beginning of the Church.

Reply. The Scripture ſaith not, That it was Extraordinary. As for the the Proofs; I anſwer to the firſt, 1. That howbeit it was indicted and convocated by Chriſt, yet was it not indicted and convocated in an extraordinary way. 2. That a Councell may be extraordinarily indicted and convocated, and yet be ordinary in its proceedings. 3. That the Indiction and Convocation of a Councell is Extrinſecall, and Antecedent to a Councell; becauſe that it is before that the Councell be; and therefore cannot make it Intrinſecally extraordinary when it is exiſtent: So, Adam was made in an extraordinary way of Earth, and by creation; and Eva of Adams Rib; and yet they were not extraordinary perſons, in their nature, exiſtence, conſervation, or accidents. 4. Neither read we, that it was convocated in an extraordinary way. 5. Neither can it be extraordinary, becauſe it was convocated by Chriſt; for by the ſame reaſon, all that ever Chriſt did to men, ſhould have been extraordinary.

To the ſecond, I have already anſwered.

To the third, I anſwer, 1. That the extraordinary gifts were perſonall only, and belonged unto the materiall parts of the Councell, and not to the form thereof; and therefore could not make it formally extraordinary, in quality of a Councell; for formall denominations are not taken from the matter, but from the form; ſo, if there be ſix or ſeven Eccleſiaſticall perſons aſſembled to dinetogether, we call it not an Eccleſiaſtical Aſſembly. 2. I anſwer, That theſe extra ordinary gifts were ſubſequent unto the Councell, or at leaſt to that Eccleſiaſticall proceeding, in the election of Mathias; Now that, which is ſubſequent to any thing, cannot denominate it formally, or at leaſt in the time precedent; when the Subject precedeth ſuch a ſubſequent Adjunct or Circumſtance. See more concerning this Argument heretofore.

To the fourth, I anſwer, 1. That all that, which was in the birth and infancie of the Church, was not Extraordinary; for by that reaſon, the Preaching of the Goſpel, and the Adminiſtration of the Sacraments ſhould have been Extraordinary. 2. Things, that are Ordinary, muſt have a beginning. 3. And howſoever, at their beginning, they be Extraordinary in reſpect of time, becauſe, before their beginning, they were not Ordinary, but out of the precedent order; yet they are Ordinary, in reſpect of Gods Ordinance or Law, which is ordinatio rationis, that ſhould be ordinary in Gods Church.

Object. If it be yet ſaid, That Mathias was an Extraordinary Miniſter, and his Vocation Extraordinary.

I anſwer, That all that is true; and yet, in this Extraordinary Vocation, there was ſomething Ordinary, viz. The Nomination, and Election, or Admittance of him to be a Miniſter of the Church, according to the Independents opinion, otherwayes their Argument ſhould be very impertinent, in proving from hence, the power of the people, in chooſing their Miniſters. That which there was Extraordinary, was not done by the Councell, and therefore could not make the Councell Extraordinary.

As much may be ſaid of that Councell, that created ſeven Deacons for many Churches.

5. But principally we will urge that buſineſſe of Antioch, in that difference betwixt St. Paul and Barnabas, on the one part, and ſome Phariſees converted to the Chriſtian Faith, on the other. Hereupon it was reſolved that Paul and Barnabas ſhould go up to Jernſalem, unto the Apoſtles and Elders, about that queſtion, v. 2. they were ſent by the Church of Antioch, v. 3. they were received by the Church, and by the Apoſtles and Elders of the Church at Jeruſalem, v. 4 the Aſſembly being gathered at Jeruſalem, the Cauſe was heard, v. 4.5. conſidered, v. 6. diſcuſſed, v. 7. voyced, v. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 judged, v. 22. the Iudgement, or Decree of the Councell or Aſſembly, ſent to Antioch, from the 22. v. to the 30. read, and obeyed by the Church at Antioch, &c. v. 31. Here is the Church of Antioch, judged by a ſuperiour Church, at Ieruſalem; an Appeal, formed or interjected, from the one to the other; received by the other; judged and obeyed: And therefore it cannot be denyed, but there was ſome Subordination betwixt theſe two Churches, and that the one had authority over the other.

To this Argument ſome anſwer, 1. That if it prove any thing, it can only conclude an Appeal from one Pariſh Church, or particular Congregation unto another, ſince the Church of Antioch, and of Hieruſalem, were no other then Pariſh Churches.

Rep. 1. This Anſwer cannot hold, 1. Becauſe no ſuch thing can probably be collected out of this Text, or of any other in Scripture; and therefore it may be as eaſily rejected by us, as it is alleadged by them. 2. Becauſe hardly can it be proved, that in thoſe times Churches were divided into Pariſhes. 3. Becauſe an Appeale cannot be from one Pariſh or Congregationall Church unto another, ſince their authority is equall; but only from an inferior to a ſuperior Church or Judicatory. 4. Becauſe if it was from one particular Congregation to another, then that Congregation, from which it was appealed, was not compleat in its Judgement, but had need of ſome Extrinſecall power, which is againſt the Tenets of Independents themſelves. 5. Becauſe if we might appeale from one particular Congregation to another, how much more from a particular Congregation unto a Synod, wherein the Spirit of God, and eſpecially that of Prophecie doth more abound. 6. Becauſe the Apoſtles in Hieruſalem were not members of any particular Church. 7. Becauſe, if the Aſſembly at Hieruſalem had been a particular or Congregationall Church, it could not have given out a Decree, which ſhould have bound ſo many Churches to obedience, viz. thoſe of Antioch, Syria, and Cilicia, v. 23.

2. It may be otherwayes anſwered, That it was an Appeale, but not to any Ordinary, but an Extraordinary Church, viz. to that of the Apoſtles; and that for theſe Reaſons. 1. Becauſe it was Extraordinarily gathered; 2. By Extraordinary perſons; 3. It was compounded of Extraordinary perſons, viz. the Apoſtles; 4. Becauſe this Appeale was to the Apoſtles, who were infallible and Extraordinary Miniſters; 5. Becauſe it was in the birth, and beginning of the Goſpel.

Rep. 2. This Anſwer cannot hold, 1. Becauſe the Scripture declareth not, that this Church or Aſſembly was Extraordinary. 2. Neither is it a ſatisfactory Anſwer, whenever we bring paſſages of Scripture to prove our Opinion, that they anſwer us, that they are of Extraordinary things, and practiſes; unleſſe the Scripture •• clare them to be ſuch, or that they go beyond the generall Rules commanded in Scripture. 3. Becauſe here the proceedings are conforme to thoſe, that we have in other Scriptures, as in the Old Teſtament &c. As for the Reaſons; to the firſt I anſwer, that it cannot be proved, that it was extraordinarily gathered. 2. And howbeit it had been extraordinarily gathered, yet the proceedings therein might have been, and were ordinary. 3. Becauſe the gathering or indicting of an Aſſembly is Extrinſecall unto an Aſſembly, and antecedent to it, and therefore cannot make it Intrinſecally extraordinary in its proceedings. 4. It is onely circumſtantiall, which cannot make it extraordinary, quoad ſubſtantiam, ſed quoad modum, and that modus alſo is Extrinſecall; and not ſo much a manner of being of the Aſſembly, as of him, or them, who indict, or gather it.

To the 2. Extraordinary Perſons, who gather an Aſſembly, are not ſufficient to make an Aſſembly extraordinary. 1. For then all the Churches gathered by the Apoſtles had been extraordinary, which is moſt falſe. 2. If they made it extraordinary, they muſt have imparted unto it ſome extraordinary quality, which they did not, or at leaſt, which appeareth not from Scripture; and ſo it muſt be holden as if it were not; for Scripture is onely a Rule to us in that which it ſayeth, and not in that which it ſayeth not.

To the 3. Becauſe it was compounded of extraordinary Perſons, viz. Apoſtles.

This anſwer ſatisfieth not the Argument. 1. It is ridiculous to call all extraordinary, that maketh againſt them. 2. Becauſe it was not compounded of the Apoſtles alone, but alſo of the Elders, verſ. 2.3. 3. Becauſe not onely the Apoſtles, but alſo the Elders judged the buſineſſe, v. 2.3. 4. Howbeit this Appeale was to the Apoſtles, yet was it not to them in quality of Apoſtles, neither are we bound to beleeve it, ſince the Scripture hath no ſuch thing of it. 5. If it had been to the Apoſtles, in quality of Apoſtles, or men, who were infallible, then could they not have appealed from Paul at Antioch, to the Apoſtles at Hieruſalem, ſince he was as infallible at Antioch, as they all at Jeruſalem. 6. The judgement of the Elders had been ſuperfluous; for the judgement of the Apoſtles alone, and their Letter alone, had ſufficed as Canonicall Scripture, to direct them at Antioch in their Proceedings: What needed they adde a fallible judgement to that, that was infallible, or mans judgement to Gods? and yet they contented not themſelves with that of the Apoſtles alone. 7. If this Aſſembly at Jeruſalem had been extraordinary, and infallible, becauſe it was compounded of extraordinary Perſons, viz. of Apoſtles. Ergo. ſo was that of Antioch, becauſe there was St. Paul an Apoſtle. 8. By the ſame reaſon, it muſt have been ordinary and fallible, becauſe it was compounded of ordinary and fallible perſons, viz. the Elders. 9. If the Apoſtles had been there in quality of Apoſtles, and infallible Miniſters, what needed they ſo long to conſult and diſpute in the Aſſembly, v. 10? A ſimple Deciſion, without any Conſultation might have ſufficed; for Diſputes and Conſultatio •• amongſt men, are not of things, which they hold altogether certain, and out of doubt, but of things uncertain and doubtfull. 10. I deny the Conſequence, viz. That if a Councell or Aſſembly be compounded of extraordinary Perſons, Ergo, it is extraordinary; for by the ſame reaſon, if there were ſeven, or eight Apoſtles dineing or ſleeping together, it ſhould be an extraordinary and Apoſtolicall dinner or ſleeping. 11. Neither are all things, that are done by extraordinary Perſons, extraordinary; for the Apoſtles did eate, drinke, and ſleepe, neither yet was that Extraordinary Eating, Drinking, or Sleeeping, but ordinary, as in other men. 12. Becauſe the Apoſtles were materiall parts, or members of the Aſſembly; their gifts, as infallibility and offices were perſonall, and denominated themſelves onely, and not every Aſſembly, wherein they were, or might be, for as the Forme that denominateth their perſons, belongeth onely to them, ſo doth the denomination proceeding from it. 13. Becauſe the parts of Aſſemblyes and Conſociations, may have contrary Formes and denominations, ſecundum entiatem, as we ſee in Republicks; for the whole Republick may be rich and potent, and the members thereof very poore, becauſe of the great Tributes they pay to the State, and the Statepoor; and the members or Subjects rich; becauſe of the Subjects great Trading and profit, and their ſmall Contributions to the State; So in the Church, in an Eccleſiaſticall Aſſembly of Prophets, as that of Achab, there may be one Prophet infallible, yea, if there had been 400. yet that Councell had been; as it was, fallible, becauſe of the Plurality of the votes of the falſe Prophets; ſo an Army of 40000000. of Pigmees and Dwarfs is a great Army, and every one of them a little man.

To the 3. I have already anſwered.

To the 4. Anſw. 1. It was not to the Apoſtles, in quality of Apoſtles, as I have proved it. 2. Becauſe it was alſo to the Elders. 3. I deny the conſequence; for by the ſame reaſon it ſhould be ordinary, ſince it was to the Elders, who were ordinary Miniſters.

To the 5. 1. I deny the conſequence, for all things that were in the begining of the Church were not extraordinary, ſince many of them continue now as ordinary. 2. Becauſe if it be extraordinary, becauſe it was in the beginning of the Church, Ergo, all that we have in Chriſtian Religion muſt be Extraordinary, ſince there is no thing in it, but it had a Beginning: ſo Faith, Juſtification, the Sacraments and all the Ordinary Miniſters of the Church ſhould be extraordinary, ſince they have a beginning with the Church. 3. Howbeit it was Extraordinary in reſpect of Time, as all things at their firſt Beginning, yet was it not Extraordinary in reſpect of Gods Law, which ordains it to be ordinary.

Anſw. 3. This Argument may be other wayes eluded, in ſaying, that this buſineſſe was not judged at Hieruſalem by way of Appeale, but by way of Councell, not by Judges, but by Friends, and Brethren.

If it be anſwered, That this Argument only proveth a greater Reall, but not a greater Repreſentative Church.

I reply, That directly only it proveth a greater Reall, viz. an Ʋniverſall Militant Church; but yet, by conſequence, it proveth alſo a Repreſentative Church of the ſame extent; for every Reall Church may be repreſented in its Commiſſioners, or Meſſengers (as ye call them) that meet in a Synod.

If it be yet anſwered, that this may prove a greater Repreſentative Church, but not endowed with any Authoritative power.

I reply, It is a power of Iudging, which muſt be Authoritative, and cannot be meerly Conſultative, ſuch as is that of every Tinker, who may give counſell to a Church; and that of one Church, which hath power to give counſell to a thouſand, yea, to ten thouſand, repreſented in a Synod; for particular Churches, being parts of the whole Provinciall, Nationall, or Univerſall Militant Church, muſt be ſubject to the whole; for it is a Maxime in Philoſophie, that Totum non ſubjicitur parti, ſed pars toti; Item, Totum non regitur motu partis, ſed Pars Totius: And they diſtinguiſh between the Univerſall, and Particular Inclination of things, and tell us, That a part doth ſometimes quit its Particular Inclination, to be ruled according to the Inclination of the whole; as when water, which according to its Particular Inclination deſcends, yet to avoid the vacuum (whereof might enſue the overthrow of the world) againſt its Particular Inclination, but according to its Univerſall Inclination, as it is for the Totall, it aſcends: And ſo it is, or ſhould be in Politicall, and all Spirituall Conſociations; for the parts cannot be conſerved, but in the whole. The Politicians alſo tell us, that Lex paerticularis cedit generali; ſo Laws, that concern Particular Caſes or Conſociations, muſt give place to the generall Law of more generall Caſes, and Conſociations; for the generall good of Conſociations, is to be preferred before the Particular good of Particular Perſons, or Particular Conſociations.

15. All the Churches here upon Earth make up one Republike, tyed together by Faith, Charity, and other Particular Chriſtian vertues; as that in Heaven another: Now it is a Maxime in Politicks, Salus Reipub. ſuprema Lex eſto. Ergo, There muſt be one Law, common to this whole Chriſtian Republike: If ſo, Ergo, There muſt be ſome viſible Iudges to judge according to this Law, otherwayes in vain ſhould we have it; Now this viſible Iudge can be no other, but a Synod; For if ye ſay, it is Chriſt, then we cannot be legally Iudged, according to this Law, till the day of Iudgement, when Chriſt ſhall Iudge the quick and the dead; which is moſt ridiculous.

16. C. C. acknowledgeth, That by Baptiſm we are made Members of the Univerſall Militant Church, and conſequently Subjects of ſome Chriſtian Republike: Ergo, There are ſome Iudges to judge ſuch Subjects: But thoſe Iudges are not in one Particular Church; for by Baptiſm, as he ſayeth, They are not admitted to the ſocietie of any Particular Church. Ergo, They muſt be judged by ſome greater Repreſentative Church, which muſt be either Claſſicall, Provinciall, Nationall, or Oecumenicall.

17. It is a generall Rule of S. Paul in matter of Church Government, That the Spirits of Prophets be ſubject to Prophets, 1 Cor. 14 32. Which cannot at all, or at leaſt cannot eaſily, and commodiouſly be obtained in the Independent Oppoſition, or Coordination, as in ſome Subordination of Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies or Iudicatories; for when all are equall, there is no ſubjection of one to another.

18. This Doctrine of Subordination of Inferiour Eccleſiaſticall Iudicatories to their Superiours, with a Coordination of Inferiour Iudicatories, or Eccleſiaſticall Aſſemblies amongſt themſelves, is moſt convenient to the nature of the Sacraments, in receiving unto them all ſuch, as are our Brethren in Chriſt; whereas a meer Oppoſition, Independency, or at moſt a Coordination of Churches, founded on a meer will and charitie, without any Law, is repugnant to it, in ſo far forth, as it debarreth from them ſuch as are worthy to be received.

19. The Apoſtle commands, That all things be done decently, and in order, 1 Cor. 14.40. And telleth us, That God is not the Author of Confuſion, but of Peace, Verſ. 33. Now, where there is no Subordination of Eccleſiaſticall Judicatories; When none of them is ſubject one to another, but they are all equall; when one Church, be ſhe never ſo corrupted in life and Doctrine, hath as great Authority over all the Churches of the World, repreſented together in a Synod, be they never ſo ſound in their life and Doctrine, as they all have over her, What can be done decently and in order? I adjure you all, tell me in Conſcience, Whether ye think that God can be the Author of any ſuch order, or rather of ſo abominable a confuſion.

20. I could ſhew, how that this Subordination is moſt convenient, and the contrary Independency, Oppoſition, or Coordination of Churches founded on mans meer will, is moſt repugnant, 1. unto the perfection, that appeareth in all Gods Works, both in thoſe of Nature, and of Grace: 2. To Gods Truth and Wiſdom, in giving no better means for redreſſing of Offences. 3. To his Iuſtice, in making of Laws, that cannot ſuppreſſe Hereſies, and all ſort of wickedneſſe in diſordered Churches. 4. To his Mercy, that in furniſhing us ſo graciouſly ſo many means, and helps to Salvation, he ſhould have given us this Independent Anarchy, to croſſe them all, yea, to lead us irreſiſtibly to Hell. 5. To his Providence, in providing of means, ſo diſproportionate, and incommenſurated for ſo excellent an end, viz. for the peace of the Church; means more fit to trouble, then to procure her peace, and to put all the Churches of God in confuſion, rather then in order.

21. Is it credible, that God ſhould have given his Son to death, to purchaſe us an Order, whereby all Churches might live in Peace and Unity, and yet make them to quit all Sacramentall Communion one with another, having no common Confeſſion of Faith, nor any common plat-forme of Eccleſiaſticall Government among them?