IN your Speech at the Opening of the preſent Seſſion, your Excellency expreſs'd your Diſpleaſure at ſome late Proceedings of the Town of Boſton, and other principal Towns in the Province. And in another Speech to both Houſes we have your repeated Exceptions at the ſame Proceedings as being "unwarrantable," and of a dangerous Nature and Tendency; "againſt which you thought yourſelf bound to call upon us to join with you in bearing a proper Teſtimony." This Houſe have not diſcovered any Principles advanced by the Town of Boſton, that are unwarrantable by the Conſtitution; nor does it appear to us that they have "invited every other Town and Diſtrict in the Province to adopt their Principles." We are fully convinced that it is our Duty to bear our Teſtimony againſt "Innovations of a dangerous Nature and Tendency:" But is clearly our Opinion, that it is the indiſputable Right of all or any of his Majeſty's Subjects in this Province, regularly and orderly to meet together to ſtate the Grievances they labor under; and to propoſe and unite in ſuch conſtitutional Meaſures as they ſhall judge neceſſary or proper to obtain Redreſs. This Right has been frequently exerciſed by his Majeſty's Subjects within the Realm; and we do not recollect an Inſtance, ſince the happy Revolution, when the two Houſes of Parliament have been called upon to diſcountenance or bear their Teſtimony againſt it, in a Speech from the Throne.

Your Excellency is pleaſed to take Notice of ſome things which we "alledge" in our Anſwer to your firſt Speech; and the Obſervation you make, we muſt confeſs, is as natural and as undeniably true, as any one that could have been made, that "if our Foundation ſhall fail us in every Part of it, the Fabrick we have rais'd upon it, muſt certainly fall." You think, this Foundation will fail us; but we wiſh your Excellency has condeſended to a Conſideration of what we have "a • duced in Support of our Principles." We might then perhaps have had ſome things offered for our Conviction, more than bare Affirmations; which, we muſt beg to be excuſed if we ſay, are far from being ſufficient, though they came with your Excellency's Authority, for which however we have a due Regard.

Your Excellency ſays that "as Engliſh Subjects and agreeable to the Doctrine of the Feudal Tenure all our Lands are held mediately or immediately of the Crown." We truſt your Excellency does not mean to introduce the Feudal Syſtem in it's Perfection; which to uſe the Words of one of our greateſt Hiſtorians, was "a State of perpetual War, Anarchy and Confuſion; calculated ſolely for Defence againſt the Aſſaults of any foreign Power, but in it's Proviſion for the interior Order and Tranquility of Society extremely defective." "A Conſtitution ſo contradictory to all the Principles that govern Mankind, could never be brought about but by foreign Conqueſt or native Uſurpation:" And a very celebrated Writer calls it "that moſt iniquitous and abſurd Form of Government by which human Nature was ſo ſhamefully degraded." This Syſtem of Iniquity by a ſtrange Kind of Fatality, "though originally form'd for an Encampment and for Military Purpoſes only, ſpread over a great Part of Europe:" and to ſerve the Purpoſes of Oppreſſion and Tyranny "was adopted by Princes and wrought into their Civil Conſtitutions;" and aided by the Canon Law, calculated by the Roman Pontiff, to exalt himſelf above all that is called God, it prevailed to the almoſt utter Extinction of Knowledge, Virtue, Religion and Liberty from that Part of the Earth. But from the Time of the Reformation, in Proportion as Knowledge, which then darted its Rays upon the benighted World, increas'd and ſpread among the People, they grew impatient under this heavy Yoke: And the moſt virtuous and ſenſible among them, to whoſe Stedfaſtneſs we in this diſtant Age and Climate are greatly indebted, were determined to get rid of it: And tho' they have in a great Meaſure ſubdued it's Power and Influence in England, they have never yet totally eradicated its Principles.

Upon theſe Principles the King claimed an abſolute Right to and a perfect Eſtate in all the Lands within his Dominions; but how he came by this abſolute Right and perfect Eſtate is a Myſtery which we have never ſeen unravelled, nor 〈◊〉 our Buſineſs or Deſign at preſent to enquire. • e granted Parts of Parcels of it to his Friends the Great Men, and they granted leſſer Parcels to their Tenants: All therefore derived their Right and held their Lands, upon theſe Principles, mediately or immediately of the King; which Mr. Blackſtone however calls "in Reality a meey Fiction of our Engliſh Tenures."

By what Right in Nature and Reaſon the Chriſtian Princes in Europe claimed the Lands of Heathen People, upon a Diſcovery made by any of their Subjects, is equally myſterious: Such however was the Doctrine univerſally prevailing when the Lands in America were diſcovered; but as the People of England upon thoſe Principles held all the Lands they poſſeſſed by Grants from the King, and the King had never granted the Lands in America to them, it is certain they could have no Sort of Claim to them: Upon the Principles advanced, the Lordſhip and Dominion like that of the Lands in England, was in the King ſolely: and a Right from thence accrued to him of diſpoſing ſuch Territories under ſuch Tenure and for ſuch Servies to be performed, as the King or Lord thought proper. But how the Grantees became Subjects of England, that is the Supreme Authority of the Parliament, your Excellency has not explained to us. We conceive that upon the Feudal Principles all Power is in the King; they afford us no Idea of Parliament. "The Lord was in early Times the Legiſlator and Judge over all his Feudatories," ſays Judge Blackſtone. By the Struggles for Liberty in England from the Days of King John to the laſt happy Revolution, the Conſtitution has been gradually changing for the better; and upon the more rational Principles that all Men by Nature are in a State of Equality in Reſpect of Juriſdiction and Dominion, Power in England has been more equally divided. And thus alſo in America, though we hold our Lands agreeably to the Feudal Principles of the King; yet our Predeceſſors wiſely took care to enter into Compact with the King that Power here ſhould alſo be equally divided agreeable to the original fundamental Principles of the Engliſh Conſtitution, declared in Magna Charter, and other Laws and Statutes of England, made to confirm them.

Your Excellency ſays, "you can by no Means concede to us that it is now or was when the Plantations were firſt granted the Prerogative of the Kings of England to conſtitute a Number of new Governments altogether independent of the Sovereign Authority of the Engliſh Empire." By the Feudal Principles upon which you ſay "all the Grants which have been made of America are founded" "the Conſtitutions of the Emperor have the Force of Law." If our Government be conſidered as merely Feudatory, we are ſubject to the King's abſolute Will, and there is no Room for the Authority of Parliament, as the Sovereign Authority of the Britiſh Empire. Upon theſe Principles, what could hinder the King's conſtituting a Number of independent Governments in America? That King Charles the Firſt did actually ſet up a Government in this Colony▪ conceding to it Powers of making and executing Laws, without any Reſervation to the Engliſh Parliament, of Authority to make future Laws binding therein, is a Fact which your Excellency has not diſproved if you have denied it. Nor have you ſhewn that the Parliament or Nation objected to it, from whence we have inferred that it was an acknowledged Right. And we cannot conceive, why the King has not the ſame Right to alienate and diſpoſe of Countries acquired by the Diſcovery of his Subjects, as he has to "reſtore upon a Treaty of Peace Countries which have been acquired in War," carried on at the Charge of the Nation; or to "ſell and deliver up any Part of his Dominions to a foreign Prince or State, againſt the General Senſe of the Nation" which is "an Act of Power" or Prerogative which your Excellency allows. You tell us that "when any New Countries are diſcovered by Engliſh Subjects, according to the general Law and Uſage of Nations, they become Part of the State." The Law of Nations is or ought to be founded on the Law or Reaſon. It was the Saying of Sir Edwin Sandis, in the great Caſe of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England, which is applicable to our preſent Purpoſe, that "there being no Precedent for this Caſe in the Law, the Law is deficient; and the Law being deficient, Recourſe is to be had to Cuſtom; and Cuſtom being inſufficient, we muſt recur to natural Reaſon," the greateſt of all Authorities, which he adds "is the Law of Nations." The Opinions therefore, and Determinations of the greateſt Sages and Judges of the Law in the Exchequer Chamber ought not to be conſidered as deciſive or binding in our preſent Controverſy with your Excellency, any further than they are conſonant to natural Reaſon. If however we were to recur to ſuch Opinions and Determinations we ſhould find very great Authorities in our Favour, to ſhow that the Statutes of England are not binding on thoſe who are not repreſented in Parliament there. The Opinion of Lord Coke that Ireland was bound by Statutes of England wherein they were named, if compared with his other Writings, appears manifeſtly to be grounded upon a Suppoſition, that Ireland had by an Act of their own, in the Reign of King John, conſented to be thus bound, and upon any other Suppoſition this Opinion would be againſt Reaſon; for Conſent only gives human Laws their Force. We beg Leave, upon what your Excellency has obſerved of the Colony becoming a Part of the State, to ſubjoin the Opinions of ſeveral learned Civilians, as quoted by a very able Lawyer in this Country; "Colonies, ſays Puffendorf, are ſettled in different Methods. For either the Colony continues a Part of the Common Wealth it was ſet out from; or elſe is obliged to pay a dutiful Regard to the Mother Common Wealth, and to be in Readineſs to defend and vindicate its Honor, and ſo is united by a Sort of unequal Confederacy; or laſtly, is erected into a ſeperate Common Wealth and aſſumes the ſame Rights, with the State it deſcended from." And King Tullius, as quoted by the ſame learned Author from Grotius, ſays "We look upon it to be neither Truth nor Juſtice that Mother Cities ought of Neceſſity and by the Law of Nature to rule over the Colonies."

Your Excellency has miſinterpreted what we have ſaid, "that no Country by the Common Law, was ſubject to the Laws or the Parliament but the Realm of England," and are pleaſed to tell us that we have expreſſed ourſelves "Incautiouſly." We beg Leave to recite the Words of the Judges of England in the before mentioned Caſe to our Purpoſe. "If a King go out of England with a Company of his Servants, Allegiance remain • th among his Subjects and Servants, altho' he be out of his Realm whereto his Laws are confined," We did not mean to ſay, as your Excellency would ſuppoſe, that "the Common Law preſcribes Limits to the Extent of the Legiſlative Power," though we ſhall always affirm it to be true of the Law of Reaſon and natural Equity. Your Excellency thinks you have made it appear, that the Colony of Maſſachuſetts-Bay is holden as feudatory of the Imperial Crown of England;" and therefore you ſay, "to uſe the Words of a very great Authority in a Caſe in ſome Reſpects analogous to it," being feudatory it neceſſarily follows, that it is under the Government of the King's Laws." Your Excellency has not named this Authority: but we conceive his Meaning muſt be, that being Feudatory, it is under the Government of the King's Law • abſolutely; for as we have before ſaid the Feudal Syſtem admits of no Idea of the Authority of Parliament, and this would have been the Caſe of the Colony but for the Compact with the King in the Charter.

Your Excellency ſays, that "Perſons thus holding under the Crown of England remain or become Subjects of England;" by which we ſuppoſe your Excellency to mean, ſubject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament "to all Intents and Purpoſes as fully as if any of the Royal Manors, &c. within the Realm had been Granted to them upon the like Tenure." We apprehend with Submiſſion, your Excellency is Miſtaken in ſuppoſing that our Allegiance is due to the Crown of England. Every Man ſwears Allegiance for himſelf to his own King in his Natural Perſon. "Every Subject is preſumed by Law to be Sworn to the King, which is to his Natural Perſon," ſays Lord Coke. Rep. on Calvins Caſe. "The Allegiance is due to his Natural Body." And he ſays "in the Reign of Edward II. the Spencers, the Father and the Son, to cover the Treaſon hatched in their Hearts, invented this damnable and damned Opinion, that Homage and Oath of Allegiance was more by Reaſon of the King's Crown, that is of his politick Capacity, than by Reaſon of the Perſon of the King; upon which Opinion they infer'd execrable and deteſtable Conſequents." The Judges of England, all but one, in the Caſe of the Union between Scotland and England, declared that "Allegiance fol • oweth the natural Perſon not the politick;" and "to prove the Allegiance to be tied to the Body natural of the King, and not to the Body politick, the Lord Coke cited the Phraſes of diverſe Statutes, mentioning our natural liege Sovereign."—If then the Homage and Allegiance is not to the Body politick of the King, then it is not to him as the Head or any Part of that Legiſlative Authority, which your Excellency ſays "is equally extenſive with the Authority of the Crown throughout every Part of the Dominion;" and your Excellency's Obſervations thereupon muſt fail. The ſame Judges mention the Allegiance of a Subject to the Kings of England who is out of the Reach and Extent of the Laws of England; which is perfectly reconcil • able with the Principles of our Anceſtors quoted before from your Excellency's Hiſtory, but upon your Excellency's Principles appears to us to be an Abſurdity. The Judges, ſpeaking of a Subject, ſay, "although his Birth was out of the Bounds of the Kingdom of England, and out of the Reach and Extent of the Laws of England, yet if it were within the Allegiance of the King of England, &c. Normandy, Acquitain, Gaſcoign, and other Places within the Limits of France, and conſequently out of the Realm or Bounds of the Kingdom of England, were in Subjection to the Kings of England. And the Judges ſay, "Rex et Regnum be not ſo Relatives, as a King can be King but of one Kingdom, which clearly hold • th not but that his Kingly Power extending to divers Nations and Kingdoms, all owe him equal Subjection and are equally born to the Benefit of his Protection, and altho' he is to govern them by their diſtinct Laws, yet any one of the People coming into the other is to have the Benefit of the Laws whereſoever he cometh." So they are not to be deemed Aliens, as your Excellency in your Speech ſuppoſes in any of the Dominions; all which accords with the Principles our Anceſtors held. "And he is to bea • the Burden of Taxes of the Place where he cometh, but living in one or for his Livelihood in one, he is not to be taxed in the other, becauſe Laws ordain Taxes, Impoſitions and Charges as a Diſcipline of Subjection particularized to every particular Nation;" Nothing we think can be more clear to our Purpoſe than this Deciſion, of Judges, perhaps as learned as ever adorned the Engliſh Nation; or in Favor of America in her preſent Controverſy with the Mother State.

Your Excellency ſays, that by our not • iſtinguiſhing between the Crown of England and the Kings and Queens of England in their perſonal of natural Capacities, we have been led into a fundamental Error." Upon this very Diſtinction we have availed ourſelves. We have ſaid that our Anceſtors conſidered the Land which they took Poſſeſſion of in America as out of the Bounds of the Kingdom of England, and out of the Reach and Extent of the Laws of England; and that the King alſo even in the Act of granting the Charter, conſidered the • errit • ry as not within the Realm; that the King had an abſolute Right in himſelf to diſpoſe of the Lands, and that this was not diſputed by the Nation; nor could the Lands on any ſolid Grounds be claimed by the Nation, and therefore our Anceſtors received the Lands by Grant from the King▪ and at the ſame Time compacted with him and promiſed him Homage and Allegiance, not in his publick or politick but natural Capacity only.—If it be difficult for us to ſhow how the King acquired a Title to this Country in his natural Capacity, or ſeparate from his Relation to his Subjects, which we confeſs, yet we conceive it will be equally difficult for your Excellency to ſhow how the Body Politick and Nation of England acquired it. Our Anceſtors ſuppoſed it was acquired by neither; and therefore they declared, as we have before quoted from your Hiſtory, that ſaving their actual Purchaſe from the Natives, of the Soil, the Dominion, the Lordſhip, and Sovereignty, they had in the Sight of God and Man, no Right and Title to what they poſſ • ſſed. How much clearer • hen in natural Reaſon and Equity muſt our Title be, who hold Eſtates dearly p •• chaſed at the Expence of our own as well as our Anceſtors Labour, and defended by them with • reaſure and Blood.

Your Excellency has been pleaſed to co • firm, rather than deny or confute a Piece of Hiſtory which you ſay we took from an anonimous Pamphlet, and by which you " • ear we have been too eaſily m • ſled." It may be gathered from your own Declaration and other Authorities beſides the 〈◊〉 Pamphlet, that the Houſe of Commons took Exception, not at the King's having made an abſolute Grant of the Territory▪ but at the Claim of an excluſive Right to the Fiſhery on the Banks and Sea Coaſt, by Virtue of the Patent. At this you ſay "the • ouſe of Commons was ala • med, and a B • ll was brought in for allo • ing a free Fiſhery." And upon this Occaſion • our Excellency allows, that "one of the Secretaries of State declared that the Plantations were not annexed to the Crown, and ſo were not within the Juriſdiction of Parliament." If we ſhould concede to what your Excellency ſuppoſes might poſſibly or "perhaps" be the Caſe, that the Secretary made this Declaration "as his own Opinion," the Event ſhowed that it was the Opinion of the King too; for it is not to be accounted for upon any other Principle, that he would have denied his Royal Aſſent to a Bill formed for no other Purpoſe, but to grant his Subjects in England the Privilege of Fiſhing on the Sea Coaſts in America. The Account publiſhed by Sir Ferdinando Gorges himſelf, of the Proceedings of Parliament on this Occaſion, your Excellency thinks will remove all Doubt of the Senſe of the Nation and of the Patentees of this Patent or Charter in 1620. "This Narrative, you ſay, has all the Appearance of Truth and Sincerity," which we do not deny: And to us it carries this Conviction with it, that "what was objected" in Parliament was, the excluſive Claim of Fiſhing only. His imagining that he had ſatisfied the Houſe after divers Attendances, that the Planting a Colony was of much more Conſequence than a ſimple diſorderly Courſe of Fiſhing, is ſufficient for our Conviction. We know that the Nation was at that Time alarmed with Apprehenſions of Monopolies; and if the Patent of New-England was preſented by the two Houſes as a Grievance, it did not ſhow▪ as your Excellency ſuppoſes, "the Senſe they then had of their Authority over this new-acquired Territory," but only their Senſe of the Grievance of a Monopoly of the Sea.

We are happy to hear your Excellency ſay, that "our Remarks upon and Conſtruction of the Words not repugnant to the Laws of England, are much the ſame with thoſe of the Council." It ſerves to confirm us in our Opinion, in what we take to be the moſt important Matter of Difference between your Excellency and the two Houſes. After ſaying, that the Statute of 7th and 8th of William and Mary favors the Conſtruction of the Words as intending ſuch Laws of England as are made more immediately to reſpect us, you tell us, that "the Province Agent Mr. Dummer in his much applauded Defence, ſays that then a Law of the Plantations may be ſaid to be repugnant to a Law made in Great-Britain, when it flatly contradicts it ſo far as the Law made there mentions and relates to the Plantations." This is plain and obvious to common Senſe, and therefore cannot be denied. But if your Excellency will read a Page or two further in that excellent Defence, you will ſee that he mentions this as the Senſe of the Phraſe, as taken from an Act of Parliament, rather than as the Senſe he would chuſe himſelf to put upon it; and he expreſly deſigns to ſhew, in Vindication of the Charter, that in that Senſe of the Words, there never was a Law made in the Plantations repugnant to the Laws of Great-Britain. He gives another Conſtruction much more likely to be the true Intent of the Words; namely, "that the Patentees ſhall not preſume under Colour of their particular Charters to make any Laws inconſiſtent with the Great Charter and other Laws of England, by which the Lives, Liberties, and Properties of Engliſhmen are ſecure • ." This is the Senſe in which our Anceſtors underſtood the Words; and therefore they were unwilling to conform to the Acts of Trade, and diſregarded them till they made Proviſion to give them Force in the Colony by a Law of their own; ſaying, that "the Laws of England did not reach America: And thoſe Acts were an Invaſion of their Rights, Liberties and Properties," becauſe they were not "repreſented in Parliament." The Right of being governed only by Laws which were made by Perſons in whoſe Election they had a Voice, they looked upon as the Foundation of Engliſh Liberties. By the Compact with the King in the Charter, they were to be as free in America, as they would have been if they had remained within the Realm; and therefore they freely aſſerted that they "were to be governed by Laws made by themſelves and by Officers choſen by themſelves." Mr. Dummer ſays, "It ſeems reaſonable enough to think that the Crown," and he might have added our Anceſtors, "intended by this Injunction to provide for all its Subjects, that they might not be oppreſſed by Arbitrary Power—but—being ſtill Subjects, they ſhould be protected by the ſame mild Laws and enjoy the ſame happy Government as if they continued within the Realm." And conſidering the Words of the Charter in this Light, he looks upon them as deſigned to be a Fence againſt Oppreſſion and deſpotic Power. But the Conſtruction which your Excellency puts upon the Words, reduces us to a State of Vaſſallage, and expoſes us to Oppreſſion and deſpotic Power, whenever a Parliament ſhall ſee fit to make Laws for that Purpoſe and put them in Execution.

We flatter ourſelves that from the large Extracts we have made from your Excellency's Hiſtory of the Colony, it appears evidently, that under both Charters it hath been the Senſe of the People and of the Government that they were not under the Juriſdiction of Parliament. We pray you again to recur to thoſe Quotations and our Obſervations upon them: And we wiſh to have your Excellency's judicious Remarks. When we adduced that Hiſtory to prove that the Sentiments of private Perſons of Influence, four or five Years after the Reſtoration, were very different from what your Excellency apprehended them to be when you delivered your Speech, you ſeem to concede to it by • elling us "it was, as you take it, from the Principles imbibed in thoſe Times of Anarchy (preceeding the Reſtoration) that they diſputed the Authority of Parliament;" but you add, "the Government would not venture to diſpute it." We find in the ſame Hiſtory 〈◊〉 Quotation from a Letter of Mr. Stoughton, dated 17 Years after the Reſtoration, mentioning "the Country's not taking Notice of the Acts of Navigation to obſerve them." And it was, as we take it, after that Time, that the Government declared in a Letter to their Agents, that they had not ſubmitted to them; and they ventured to "diſpute" the Juriſdiction, aſſerting that they apprehended the Acts to be an Invaſion of the Rights, Liberties and Properties of the Subjects of his Majeſty in the Colony, they not being repreſented in Parliament; and that "the Laws of England did not reach America." It very little avails in Proof that they conceded to the Supreme Authority of Parliament, their telling the Commiſſioners "that the Act of Navigation had for ſome Years before been obſerved here, that they knew not of its being greatly violated, and that ſuch Laws as appeared to be againſt it were repealed." It may as truly be ſaid now, that the Revenue Acts are obſerved by ſome of the People of this Province; but it cannot be ſaid that the Government and People of this Province have conceded that the Parliament had Authority to make ſuch Acts to be obſerved here. Neither does their Declarations to the Commiſſioners that ſuch Laws as appeared to be againſt the Act of Navigation were repealed, prove their Conceſſion of the Authority of Parliament, by any means ſo much as their making Proviſion for giving Force to an Act of Parliament within this Province, by a deliberate and ſolemn Act or Law of their own, proves the contrary.

You tell us, that "the Government four or five Years before the Charter was vacated more explicitly," that is than by a Converſation with the Commiſſioners, "acknowledged the Authority of Parliament, and voted that their Governor ſhould take the Oath required of him faithfully to do and perform all Matters and Things enjoined him by the Acts of Trade." But does this, may it pleaſe your Excellency, ſhow their explicit Acknowledgment of the Authority of Parliament? Does it not rather ſhow directly the contrary: For, what need could there be for their Vote or Authority to require him to take the Oath already required of him by the • ct of Parliament, unleſs both he and they judged that an Act of Parliament was not of Force ſufficient to bind him to take ſuch Oath? We do not deny, but on the contrary are fully perſuaded that your Excellency's Principles in Government are ſtill of the ſame with what they appear to be in the Hiſtory; for you there ſay, that "the paſſing this Law plainly ſhows the wrong Senſe they had of the Relation they ſtood in to England." But we are from hence convinced that your Excellency when you wrote the Hiſtory was of our Mind in this Reſpect, that our Anceſtors in paſſing the Law diſcovered their Opinion that they were without the Juriſdiction of Parliament: For it was upon this Principle alone that they ſhewed the wrong Senſe they had in your Excellency's Opinion, of the Relation they ſtood in to England.

Your Excellency in your ſecond Speech condeſcends to point out to us the Acts and Doings of the General Aſſembly which relates to Acts of Parliament, which you think "demonſtrates that they have been acknowledged by the Aſſembly or ſubmitted to by the People:" Neither of which in our Opinion ſhows that it was the Senſe of the Nation, and our Predeceſſors when they firſt took Poſſeſſion of this Plantation or Colony by a Grant and Charter from the Crown, that they were to remain ſubject to the ſupreme Authority of the Engliſh Parliament.

Your Excellency ſeems chiefly to rely upon our Anceſtors▪ after the Revolution "proclaiming King William and Queen Mary in the Room o • King James," and taking the Oaths to them, "the Alteration of the Form of Oaths from Time to Time," and finally "the Ebabliſhment of the Form which every one of us has complied with, as the Charter in expreſs Terms requires and makes our Duty." We do not know that it has ever been a Point in Diſpute whether the Kings of England were ipſo facto Kings in and over this Colony or Province. The Compact was made between King Charles the Firſt, his Heirs and Succeſſors, and the Governor and Company, their Heirs and Succeſſors. It is eaſy upon this Principle to account for the Acknowledgment of and Submiſſion to King William and Queen Mary as Succeſſors of Charles the Firſt, in the Room of King James: Beſides it is to be conſidered, that the People in the Colony as well as in England had ſuffered under the TYRANT James, by which he had alike forfeited his Right to reign over both. There had been a Revolution here as well as in England. The Eyes of the People here were upon William and Mary, and the News of their being proclaimed in England was as your Excellency's Hiſtory tells us, "the moſt joyful News ever received in New-England." And if they were not ploclaimed here "by virtue of an Act of the Colony," it was, as we think may be concluded from the Tenor of your Hiſtory; with the general or univerſal Conſent of the People as apparently as if "ſuch Act had paſſed." It is Conſent alone, that makes any human Laws binding; and as a learned Author obſerves, a purely voluntary Submiſſion to an Act, becauſe it is highly in our Favor and for our Benefit, is in all Equity and Juſtice to be 〈◊〉 as not at all proceeding from the Right we include in the Legiſlators, that they thereby obtain an Authority over us, and that ever hereafter we muſt obey them of Duty. We would obſerve that one of the firſt Acts of the General Aſſembly of this Province ſince the preſen • Charter, was an Act requiring the taking the Oaths mentioned in an Act of Parliament, to which you refer us: For what Purpoſe was this Act of the Aſſembly paſſed, if it was the Senſe of the Legiſlators that the Act of Parliament was in Force in the Province. And at the ſame Time another Act was made for the Eſtabliſhment of other Oaths neceſſary to be taken; both which Acts have the Royal Sanction, and are now in Force. Your Excellency ſays, that when the Colony applied to King William for a ſecond Charter, they knew the Oath the King had taken, which was to govern them according to the Statutes in Parliament, and (which your Excellency here omits) the Laws and Cuſtoms of the ſame. By the Laws and Cuſtoms of Parliament, the People of England freely debate and conſent to ſuch Statutes as are made by themſelves or their choſen Repreſen • atives. This is a Law or Cuſtom which all Mankind may juſtly challenge as their inherent Right. According to this Law the King has an undoubted Right to govern us. Your Excellency upon Recollection ſurely will not infer from hence, that it was the Senſe of our Predeceſſors that there was to remain a Supremacy in the Engliſh Parliament, or a full Power and Authority to mak • Laws binding upon us in all Caſes whatever, in that Parliament where we cannot debate and deliberate ▪upon the Neceſſity or Expediency of any Law, and conſequently without our Conſent, and as it may probably happen deſtructive of the firſt Law of Society, the Good of the Whole. You tell us that "after the Aſſumption of all the Powers of Government, by Virtue of the new Charter, an Act paſſed for the reviving for a limited Time all the local Laws of the Maſſachuſetts-Bay and New-Plymouth reſpectively, not repugnant to the Laws of England. And at the ſame Seſſion an Act paſſed eſtabliſhing Naval Officers, that all undue Trading contrary to an Act of Parliament—may be prevented." Among the Acts that were then revived we may reaſonably ſuppoſe was that whereby Proviſion was made to give Force to this Act of Parliament in the Province. The Eſtabliſhment thereof of the Naval Officers w • s to aid the Execution of an Act of Parliament for the Obſervance of which within the Colony the Aſſembly had before made P •• viſion after free Debates with their own Conſent and by their own Act.

The Act of Parliament paſſed in 1741, for putting 〈◊〉 to ſeveral unwarrantable Schemes, mentioned • y your Excellency was deſigned for the ••• eral Good, and if the Validity of it was not diſputed, it cannot be urged as a Conceſſion of the ſupreme Authority, to make Laws binding on us in all Ca • es whatever: But if the Deſign of it was for the general Benefit of the Province, it was in one Reſpect at leaſt greatly complained of by the Perſons more immedia • ely affected by it▪ and to remedy the Inconvenience, the Legiſlative of this Province paſs'd an Act, directly 〈◊〉 with it. Which is the ſtrongeſt evidence, that altho' they may have ſubmitted ſub ſi • entio to ſome • cts of Parliament that they conceived might operate for their Benefit, they did not conceive themſelves bound by any of its Acts which they judged would operate to the Injury even of Individuals.

Your Excellency has not thought proper to attempt to confute the Reaſoning of a learned Writer on the Laws of Nature and Nations, quoted by us on this Occaſion, to ſhew that the Authority of the Legiſlature does not extend ſo far as the Fundamentals of the Conſtitution. We are unhappy in not having your Remarks upon the Reaſoning of that great Man; and until it is confuted, we ſhall remain of the Opinion, that the Fundamentals of the Conſtitution being excepted from the Commiſſion of the Legiſlators, none of the Acts or Doings of the General Aſſembly, however deliberate and ſolemn, could avail to change them, if the People have not in very expreſs Terms given them the Power to do it; and that much leſs ought their Acts and Doings however numerous, which barely refer to Acts of Parliament made expreſly to relate to us, to be taken as an Acknowledgment that we are ſubject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament.

We ſhall ſum up our own ſentiments in the Words of that learned Writer Mr. Hooker, in his Eccleſiaſtical Policy, as quoted by Mr. Locke, "The lawful Power of making Laws to command whole political Societies of Men, belonging ſo properly to the ſame intire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate of what Kind ſoever, to exerciſe the ſame of himſelf, and not from expreſs Commiſſion immediately and perſonally received from God, is no better than mere Tyranny. Laws therefore they are not which publick • pprobation hath not made ſo, for "Laws human of what Kind ſoever are available by Conſent." "Since Men naturally have no full and perfect Power to command whole politick Multitudes of Men, therefore, utterly without our Conſent we could in ſuch Sort be at no Man's Commandment living. And to be commanded we do not conſent, when that Society whereof we be a Part, hath at any Time before conſented." We think your Excellency has not proved, either that the Colony is a Part of the politick Society of England, or that it has ever conſented that the Parliament of England or Great Britain ſhould make Laws binding upon us in all Caſes whatever, whether made expreſly to refer to us or not.

We cannot help before we conclude, expreſſing our great Concern, that your Excellency has thus repeatedly, in a Manner inſiſted upon our free Sentiments on Matters of ſo delicate a Nature, and weighty Importance. The Queſtion appears to us to be no other, than Whether we are the Subjects of abſolute unlimitted Power, or of a free Government formed on the Principles of the Engliſh Conſtitution. If your Excellency's Doctrine be true the People of this Province hold their Lands of the Crown and People of England, and their Lives, Liberties and Properties are at their Diſpoſal▪ and that even by Compact and their own Conſent. They are ſubject to the King as the Head alterius Populi of another People, in whoſe Legiſlative they have no Voice or Intereſt. They are indeed ſaid to have a Conſtitution and a Legiſlative of their own, but your Excellency has explained it into a mere Phantom; limitted, controuled, ſuperceded and nullified at the Will of another. Is this the Conſtitution which ſo charmed our Anceſtors, that as your Excellency has informed us, they kept a Day of ſolemn Thankſgiving to Almighty God when they received it? And were they Men of ſo little Diſcernment, ſuch Children in Underſtanding, as to pleaſe themſelves with the Imagination that they were bleſſed with the ſame Rights and Liberties which natural born Subjects in England enjoyed, when at the ſame Time they had fully conſented to be ruled and ordered by a Legiſlative a Thouſand Leagues diſtant from them, which cannot be ſuppoſed to be ſufficiently acquainted with their Circumſtances, if concerned for their Intereſt, and in which they cannot be in any Senſe repreſented.

I THINK it incumbent on me to make ſome Obſervations, before I put an End to the Seſſion, upon your laſt Meſſages to me on the Subject of your Conſtitutional Dependance upon the Supreme Authority of the Britiſh Dominions. As the Council admit a partial Dependence, and ſuppoſe it to be conſiſtent with the Principles and Nature of Government, I ſhall only endeavour very briefly to ſhew the contrary.

In your firſt Meſſage, Gentlemen of the Council, you made ſome Strictures upon the Nature of the Supreme Authority in Government, both divine and human, the latter of which you determined could not be abſolute and unlimitted. I thought the Di •• inction between divine and human Power not pertinent, and in Anſwer to you, I only remarked, that I had given you no Reaſon to ſuppoſe I in • ended a more abſolute Power in Parliament than what is founded in the Nature of Government, and this, in your ſecond Meſſage, you conſtrue an Acquieſcence in your Reaſons, which it certainly was not. You go on however to explain your Meaning by aſſerting, that "what is uſually denominated the Supre • e Authority of a Nation muſt be limited in its Acts to the Objects that are properly or conſtitutionally Cognizable by it."

Before you thus defined the Nature of Supreme Authority, I wiſh you had conſidered more fully what Objects there can be in a Government which are not cognizable by ſuch Authority. You inſtance in a ſubordinate Power in Government which, whilſt it keeps within its Limits, is not ſubject to the Controul of the ſupreme Power. Is there no Inconſiſtency in ſuppoſing a ſubordinate Power without a Power ſuperior to it? Muſt it not ſo far as it is without Controul be, itſelf, Supreme?

It is eſſential to the Being of Government that a Power ſhould always exiſt which no other Power within ſuch Government can have Right to withſtand or controul: Therefore, when the word Power relates to the Supreme Authority of Government it muſt be underſtood abſolute and unlimited.

If we cannot agree in theſe Principles which no ſenſible Writer upon Government has before denied, and if you are ſtill of Opinion that two Juriſdictions, each of them having a Share in the Supreme Power, are compatible in the ſame State, it can be to no Purpoſe to Reaſon or Argue upon the other Parts of your Meſſage. Its enough to obſerve that this Diſagreement in our Principles will have its Influence upon all the Deductions which are made from them.

I will alſo conſider the laſt Meſſage from you, Gentlemen of the Houſe of Repreſentatives, upon the ſame Subject, in as few words as the Importance of it will admit.

You ſay you have not diſcovered that the Principles advanced by the Town of Boſton are unwarrantable by the Conſtitution. Whether they are or are not▪ will depend upon the Determination of the Point which you are now controverting. Your not having diſcover'd that the other Towns and Diſtricts in the Province, were invited by the Town of Boſton to adopt their Principles, muſt proceed from Inattention. Have not the Doings of that Town been ſent through the Province, accompanied with a circular Letter, "deſiring a free Communication of Sentiments," and, among other Expreſſions of the like Tendency, lamenting the Extinction of Ardor for civil and religious Liberty if it ſhould be the general Voice of the Province, that the Rights as ſtated do not belong to them, and truſting that this cannot be the Caſ • . If this is not inviting to adopt their Principles. I have miſtaken their Senſe and Meaning. The conſequent Doings of ſo many other Towns ſhew that they underſtood them as I have done. I am ſ • re I have no Diſpoſition to repreſent unfavourably the Doings of any Town in the Province.

You aſſert "that it is the indiſputable Right of all or any of His Majeſty's Subjects in this Province regularly and orderly to meet together to ſta • e the Grievances th • y labour under." &c. I never 〈◊〉 it. Does it follow that it is regular and orderly for the Inhabitants of Towns, in their Corporate Cap •• ity, to meet and determine upon Points which the Law gives them no Power to act upon? You have not aſſerted that it is, but you have no declared that it is not, as I thought a Regard to the Peace and Order of the Province made our Duty.

If the Fundamentals of our Government were not diſputed, theſe Irregularities would appear to you in a very ſtrong Light and you would join in diſcountenancing them.

To ſupport your Principle that you hold your Lands and d • rive your Authority of Government from the Kings of England and not from the Crown of England you have very largely handled the Doctrine of Feudal Tenures. I obſerved to you in my laſt Speech that you had been miſled by the Authority of an anonimous Pamphlet. I am now obliged to obſerve that you are again miſled by having a general View of this Doctrine brought before you, as it reſpects States or Governments under abſolute Monarchs, and not as it is connected with or grafted upon the Engliſh Conſtitution▪ I ſhall not therefore ſpend Time in examining the Principles of your Syſtem, it being immaterial to the Point between us whether they are juſt or not. Inſtead thereof I wil • in as brief and clear Terms as I can, lay this Doctrine before you as it relates to the Government o • England.

Let me then obſerve to you▪ that from the Nature 〈◊〉 Government a Suprem • Legiſlative Power muſt always exiſt over all the Parts and all the Affairs of every Dominion—that in abſolute Monarchies the Legiſlative and executive Powers are united in the Prince or Monarch—that in the Engliſh Conſtitution there is, and always has been, a Legiſlative Power diſtinct from the regal or executive Power—that the Feudal Syſtem, in your View of it and without correcting, could not be introduced into the Engliſh Government without changing the Conſtitution from a mixed to an abſolute monarchical Government—that this Syſtem nevertheleſs has been introduced, the Conſtitution of a mixed Government ſtill remaining, and conſequently the Syſtem has been corrected or altered. What this Alteration has been will appear from Hiſtorical Facts. Before the Reign of William the Firſt the Traces of Feudal Tenure are faint, the Evidence of a Legiſlative Power, an Aſſembly or Council of Wiſe Men, diſtinct from the Regal Power is ſtrong and ſufficient. After William had obtained the Crown, the other Nations of Europe being under this Syſtem, & particularly his Dominions in Normandy, and Wars being more frequent & Commerce ſmall, and the Means of furniſhing Money, the Sinews of War, difficult if not impracticable, meerly for the Defence of the Kingdom this Polity was ſo for eſtabliſhed as that all the Landholders were made to contribute, by Military or other Services, to the Defence of the State, and for this Purpoſe, and by a Faction only, the Lands were in Form acknowledged to have been originally in the King and held of him by his Subjects, and by this Form ſubjected to a ſuppoſed juſt Proportion of the Defence and Support of the Kingdom. This • ſtabliſhment appears to have been made, not by an Act of Regal Power alone but by the Authority of the great Council of the Nation or Aſſembly of the Realm, and the Legiſlative Authority ſtill remained, according to its Nature, paramount and above all other Powers in the Dominion, and accordingly from Time to Time the Abuſes of the Feudal Power either in the Sovereign or in ſuch as held under him were corrected by the Supreme Legiſlative, and Magna Charta itſelf was framed and agreed upon, principally if not altogether for this Purpoſe. In ſucceeding Ages, as Commerce and M • ney increaſed and the Means of ſupporting War became more eaſy, theſe Military Services were gradually taken away, either, by Purchaſe or commuting for other Services or certain Rents, ſo that at the Period when America was firſt granted, the Remains were inconſiderable and the Lands of the Kingdom were held, generally, by what is called Socage Tenure or, in other Words, an Acknowledgment of Fidelity to the Sovereign, and a certain Rent which was in Name only, or of Value ſo inconſiderable as not to be demanded. The original Claim in the Sovereign, whether at firſt a Fiction or not, ſo far remained as that all Forfeitures, all Eſcheats▪ all new diſcovered Lands accrued to him▪ unleſs the Supreme Legiſlative ſhould limit the Right to them, or otherwiſe diſpoſe of them. This was the State of Feudal Tenure in England at the Time when the firſt Cha ••• r was granted, and the Difference between your Syſtem and mine will appear by this familiar Inſtance: Louis the 13. of France, I think the ſame Year the Maſſachuſetts Patentees obtained the Grant of that Colony, by a Royal Edict granted to one Hundred Aſſociates the Country of Canada, with Powers of Government and all the Privileges of natural born Subjects of France to all who ſhould go and Inhabit or be Born there, with other very great Powers and Privileges. This, then, appears to be the different State of the People of the two Colonies. Louis, being an abſolute Monarch, the Regal and Legiſlative Power were united in him. The Inhabitants of Canada therefore were ſubject to him and to every ſucceeding King of France as their Supreme Lord who, by Virtue of his uncontroulable Power, might at any Time revoke the Royal Edict at Pleaſure, or diſſolve any Charter whatſoever even though like the famous Edict of Nantes it had been declared irrevocable. Charles, having in him the regal Power only, could Grant no more than was in him, and the Legiſlative Power which was in the Parliament muſt ſtill remain there, and conſequently the Subjects of England continued when in the Colony ſtill ſubject to the regal conſtitutional Power of Charles and the ſupreme Legiſlative Power of Parliament. And, I think, nothing is more certain than that the conſtitutional Reſtraint of the regal Power in Charles prevented the Charter from being revoked and annulled in leſs than Ten Years after the Date of it.

If this brief Account of Feudal Tenure, as it is Part of the Engliſh Conſtitution, be juſt, as I ſhall think it is until I have better Authority than any I have yet ſeen to the contrary, the Fabrick which you have raiſed will ſtill fail of Support, for it wholly depends upon very different Principles, and upon what you hope I do not mean to introduce, viz. the Feudal Syſtem in its Perfection. If this Support fails, there is but little Occaſion for me to remark upon the other Parts of your Meſſage, and I ſhall paſs them over, except ſuch as may tend to make wrong Impreſſions upon any unwary Readers.

You cannot conceive "why the King has not the ſame Right to alienate and diſpoſe of Countries acquired by the Diſcovery of his Subjects as he has to reſtore upon a Treaty of Peace Countries acquired in War carried on at the Charge of the Nation, or to ſell and deliver up any Part of his Dominions againſt the general Senſe of the Nation." I will venture to conjecture a Reaſon. By the Engliſh Conſtitution the ſole Power of making War and Peace is in the King. It often happens that the reſtoring and ceding Acquiſitions made in War is abſolutely neceſſary to the Reeſtabliſhment of Peace, and if the King was • eſtrained from ſuch Reſtorations or Ceſſions an unſucceſsful War might be perpetuated to the Deſtruction of the Kingdom. This Power therefore ſeems neceſſarily to reſult from this Prerogative of the Crown. And for ſelling any Part of the Dominions againſt the general Senſe of the Nation I never ſuppoſed it to be a Part of the Prerogative, but have called it an Act of Power, by which I thought no candid Reader would underſtand any Thing but meer Power.

Your Attempt to ſhew that new diſcovered Countries do not become Part of the State, from the Authority of Pu •• endorff, &c. will fail, becauſe the Inſtance given by him of a Colony erected into a ſeparate Common Wealth plainly appears by the Context to be by the Leave or •• nſent of the Parent State, and it does not appear that the other Caſes were not ſo.

Your Remark upon the Authority I bring to ſhew that the Colony, being feudatory, is under the Government of the King's Laws, is very ſingular. You ſuppoſe it muſt mean the King's Laws abſolutely, or as you explain it, not the Laws of Parliament. Do any of you remember ever to have ſeen the Expreſſion, the King's Laws, meaning the King of England, uſed in any other Senſe than the Laws of the Realm? You ſay I have not named the Authority. The Caſe I refer to is the King againſt Crowle, in the 2d. Vol Burrow's Reports, and for the Authority, which you will find mentioned there, I am not able to name a greater.

I would paſs over in Silence your Attempt to ſhew that Allegiance is due to the natural Perſon and not to the Body Politick of the King, if I had not been well informed that the artificial Reaſoning of Lord Chief Juſtice Coke upon the Doctrine of Allegiance, in the noted Caſe of Calvin▪ as you have recited it, had great Weight with ſome of the Members of the Houſe. But have you recited this Caſe truly? After all the Refinements on this Subject does it appear that they can amount to any Thing more than that Allegiance is not due to the Politick Capacity only? And is it not expreſly ſaid that the natural Perſon of the King is ever accompanied with the Politick Capacity, and the Politick Capacity as it were appropriated to the Natural Capacity? Or have you any clear Idea of Allegiance to a King in his natural Capacity without any Relation to his political Capacity? From this Authority miſunderſtood you infer that I am miſtaken in ſuppoſing your Allegiance to be due to the Crown of England. Without any Refinements, it is plain that it was one Condition, on the Performance whereof the firſt Charter depended, that Allegiance ſhould be borne to King Charles his Heirs and Succeſſors. Wherever therefore the Succeſſion to the Crown ſhall go there Allegiance is to follow. The Condition in the ſecond Charter is the ſame, and this is enough for my Purpoſe, which was to ſhew that in whatever Perſon the Regal Authority ſhall be, there your Allegiance is due. I wiſh you had omitted all you have ſaid upon this Subject, for neither the Reaſoning of Lord Coke, nor the Declarations of the Judges, in any Meaſure tend to the Purpoſe for which you produce them.

Your Aſſertion that Parliament, in regulating the Fiſhery, had nothing in View but to prevent a Monopoly of the Sea, and claimed no Authority over the Plantations or Lands in America, has only your own Authority to ſupport it. It appears from the Debates in Parliament, that it was the Refuſal of the Patentees to ſuffer Fiſh to be dried upon the Land within their Patent, by any Perſon who had not Licence from them, which was complained of as a Grievance, and the Bill was brought in to remove this Grievance: The King might very well refuſe his Aſſent, not becauſe Parliament had no Juriſdiction, but becauſe he did not think fit to join with the Lords and Commons in an Act which invalidated or abridged thoſe Privileges in a Patent of Lands which by his Royal Prerogative he had a Right to grant.

I will make no particular Remarks upon thoſe Parts of your Meſſage which relate to the Senſe the People have had of their Conſtitution, as there can be no End to Diſputes upon Facts which by ſmall Deviations from the true State of them may be made to ſerve one Side or the other.

It is evident that the firſt Settlers of this Colony left▪ England with a juſt Senſe of their Dependance—that the Senſe continued until the Principles of Anarchy in England ſpread in America, and it is conceded that theſe Principles were avowed by many of the Inhabitants here for near twenty Years after they were exploded in England. It is equally certain, that at the Time of the Revolution the People returned to a juſt Senſe of the Supremacy of Parliament, and I think I may very ſa • ely ſay that the oldeſt Perſon in the Province has never heard the Supremacy called in Queſtion until within a few Years paſt.

You again expreſs your Concern that I ſhould thus repeatedly inſiſt upon your giving your free Sentiments on ſo delicate a Subject as the Authority of Parliament. In the Beginning of your Meſſage you 〈◊〉 the Town of Boſton & the other Towns in the P •• vince, which have met together and 〈◊〉 upon the ſame Subject, and 〈◊〉 their P ••••• dings Matter of R • cord and publiſhed them in News-Papers; and yet in the Cloſe of it you aſſ • rt that the Subject is too delicate and of too great Importance for you to conſider. Certain • y then it muſt have been extremely irregular in the Towns to take upon them ſepar •• e • y to determine Points which they had no Authority to determine, and in this Way to influence if not determine the Acts and Doings of their Repreſentatives in General Aſſembly, who cannot have the ſame Freedom of thinking and acting, 〈◊〉 their Conſtituents have determined and reſolved, as they had before.

Gentlemen of the Council and Houſe of Repreſentatives,

I am ſenſible that nice Diſtinctions of civil Rights and legal Conſtitutions are far above the Reach of the Bulk of Mankind to comprehend. There are, however, a few plain fundamental Principles of Government which carry within themſelves ſuch Evidence as cannot be reſiſted, and are no ſooner propoſed than aſſented to—Such as theſe—That in every Government there muſt be ſomewhere a ſupreme uncontroulable Power, an abſolute Authority to decide and determine—That two ſuch Powers cannot coexiſt, but neceſſarily will make two diſtinct States—That in a State of Society we give up Part of our natural Lib • rty in order to •• cure that legal Freedom which it is the great End of Government to maintain and preſerve—That a Right in Individuals or Parts of a Government to judge of the Deciſions of the Supreme Authority and to ſubmit or not ſubmit as they think proper, cannot conſiſt with a State of Government and muſt work the Diſſolution of it. Whilſt theſe Principles had their due Influence we enjoyed all that Freedom and all thoſe other Bleſſings which a State of Government will admit of. Our Connection with our Parent State ſecured theſe Bleſſings to us, and by Means of a nominal Dependence we poſſeſſed as great a Share of real Freedom as the Parent State itſelf upon which we are ſaid to depend.

I have laid before you, Gentlemen, what appeared to me to be the true Conſtitution of the Province, and recommended an Adherence to it becauſe I believed it would reſtore us to and continue us in that happy State in which we flouriſhed ſo long a Courſe of Years.

Certainly it is of the utmoſt Importance to you that theſe Points ſhould be ſettled, for I know of no Maxim in the Law of greater Truth than this. Where the Conſtitution is conteſted and the Laws are vague and uncertain, there, will be the greateſt Slavery.