IT is of the utmoſt importance to a free people, that the juſt limits of their rights be well aſcertained and preſerved: for liberty without limit is licentiouſneſs; and licentiouſneſs is the worſt kind of tyranny, a tyranny of all. To preſerve ourſelves againſt this, and maintain true liberty, a line muſt be drawn between the rights of each; ſo well marked, as that it be known by all, and ſo well guarded, as that it cannot be paſſed by any with impunity. Thus every man will be free; for every man may exerciſe his rights to the extent of their juſt limits, and cannot go beyond thoſe limits and encroach on the rights of others. My right to enjoy implies that no man ſhall diſturb my enjoyment. And it is no reſtraint on my liberty, that in the exerciſe of my rights, I am reſtrained from infringing the rights of others. The rule is So uſe your own rights as not to injure thoſe of others. Invaſion of the rights of others is tyranny, and if this invaſion may be made by every one, it is tyranny of the worſt kind, for in proportion to the number of oppreſſors will be the deſire and opportunity of oppreſſion. The true friend of liberty, therefore, is he who will ſet ſuch ſtrong limits round the rights of every man, that, in the exerciſe of them, no man can interrupt the rights of any other. And they are not friends of liberty, but promoters of licentiouſneſs, tyranny, and oppreſſion, who contend, that every man ought to have an unlimited exerciſe of his own rights, without any regard to the rights of others. I can have no right to injure the rights of another; and if I claim this, I am a tyrant and oppreſſor.

Reputation, character, good name or opinion is a kind of property or poſſeſſion, which every man, who has honeſtly acquired it, has a right to enjoy Penn. Conſt. Art. ix. Sec. 11.—. Like any other poſſeſſion or property, it cannot be taken away from us, but by our own acts. The man who invades the reputation invades the right of another. And not only individuals, but more eſpecially men in public ſtation, branches or departments of the government, the whole adminiſtration, and the principles, conſtitution, or ſyſtem of government, and the principles or ſyſtem of public religion and morals, have a right, for the ſake of the benefits we receive from them, to reputation, good name and opinion; and the invaſion of the reputation of either of thoſe is an invaſion of right, a leſſening of our comfort, and motives to duty.

But Man is indued with faculties of communicating ſentiments, of inveſtigating principles, and of forming opinions and judgments. The exerciſe of thoſe faculties is a ſource of pleaſure and inſtruction. A knowledge, and a juſt judgment of principles, of facts, and of characters, may be uſeful for the improvement of our minds, and the regulation of our conduct. The exerciſe of thoſe faculties of opinion, reaſoning, judgment, and communication is part of our natural rights Ib. Sec. 7.. But the principles of liberty require, that this right, like all our other rights, be limited, ſo that it never infringe the right of reputation. It muſt not repreſent a ſolemn truth or exerciſe of religion, as falſe or ridiculous, an eſtabliſhed and uſeful principle or form of our government, as odious and deteſtable; a regular and ſalutary act or motive of the adminiſtration as unlawful, pernicious, or diſhoneſt; or an upright man as corrupt. For this would be exerciſing our right of opinion or communication, ſo as to infringe the right of reputation, and be violating the principles of liberty and natural right.

The principles of liberty, therefore, the rights of Man, require, that our right of communicating information, as to facts and opinions, be ſo reſtrained, as not to infringe the right of reputation. Unleſs it be ſo reſtrained, there is no liberty; for there is no juſt enjoyment of our rights. And if every man's right of communication be unreſtrained, every man's right of reputation is unguarded; and there is, in this reſpect, univerſal licentiouſneſs, and each man is at the mercy of every man; the moſt precarious and oppreſſive of all ſtates. Therefore the freeſt governments, which have the moſt regarded and cultivated the principles of liberty, as they have ſo deſcribed and limited other rights, that none ſhould infringe any other, have been careful ſo to define and limit the rights of reputation, and of communication of ſentiments, that the right of either ſhould not infringe that of the other.

We communicate our ſentiments by words ſpoken, written, or printed, or by pictures or other ſigns. The reſtraints laid on the exerciſe of this right, ſo as it may not infringe the right of reputation, differ, according to the way in which the right of communication is exerciſed. If the right of reputation of a private citizen be infringed by words ſpoken, no indictment will lie for this injury, which is only a ground for a civil action to recover damages.—"In foro conſcientiae," ſays a learned Author, before the tribunal of conſcience, "it is no excuſe, that the ſlanderous words are true; for if a man have been guilty of any thing, which the law prohibits, he is liable to anſwer for it, in a legal way; but it can anſwer no good purpoſe for a private perſon to accuſe him thereof; there is a degree of cruelty in ſo doing, and it muſt create ill blood. Yet the law does, in compaſſion to man's infirmities, allow it to be a juſtification in an action for words ſpoken, that they are true 4 Bac. Abr. 480.—." But when ſlanderous words are ſpoken of the conſtitution, or adminiſtration, or any of its acts or officers, they are ground for an indictment; as a miſdemeanor, or breach of the duty of a citizen Ib. . The reaſon of this is evident: for, as for an injury affecting an individual, the remedy is by action, ſo for an injury affecting the public, the remedy is by indictment.

With reſpect to Libels, or ſlander expreſſed by words written or printed, or by pictures or other ſigns, and infringing the right of reputation; "they have," ſays the ſame Author, "at all times, and with good reaſon, been puniſhed in a more exemplary manner than ſlanderous words: for having a greater tendency to provoke men to breaches of the peace, quarrels, and murders, they are of much more dangerous conſequence to ſociety. Words which are frequently the effect of a ſudden guſt of paſſion may ſoon be buried in oblivion. But Libels, beſides that the Author is actuated by more deliberate malice, are for the moſt part ſo laſting, as to be ſcarce ever forgiven." Ib.— For this reaſon, a libel affecting the reputation of even a private citizen, is reſtrained by being conſidered as a public offence, and ſubject to an indictment. But whether, on the trial of ſuch indictment, the truth of the libel may be given in evidence, will depend on the nature of the libel.

Juſtice Blackſtone defines libels, "taken in their largeſt ſenſe, to be writings, pictures or the like of an immoral or illegal tendency, and in a more particular ſenſe, any malicious defamations of any perſon, and eſpecially a magiſtrate, made public by either printing, writing, ſigns, or pictures, in order to provoke him to wrath or expoſe him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. It is immaterial, with reſpect to the eſſence of a libel, whether the matter of it be true or falſe; ſince the provocation, and not the falſity, is the thing to be puniſhed criminally. Therefore in a criminal proſecution, the tendency, which all libels have to create animoſities, and to diſturb the public peace, is the whole that the law conſiders 4 Comm. 150, 1..

The conſtitution of our ſtate provides "That the Printing preſses ſhall be free to every perſon who undertakes to examine the proceedings of the legiſlature, or any branch of government: and no law ſhall ever be made to reſtrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely ſpeak, write, and print in any ſubject, being reſponſible for the abuſe of that liberty. In proſecutions for the publication of papers inveſtigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter publiſhed is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence.— And in all indictments for libels, the jury ſhall have a right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other caſes." Conſt. Art. ix. Sec. 7.

From this ſtatement of the law reſpecting libels, the following deductions ſeem evident.

1. This right of free communication of thoughts and opinions is, like all other rights, limited by reſponſibility for its abuſe; and laws to puniſh its abuſe, are not, in a conſtitutional or juſt ſenſe, reſtraints on the liberty of the preſs.

2. The general rule is, that, in indictments for libels, truth cannot be given in evidence.

3. This rule is excluded only from the caſes mentioned in this ſection of the conſtitution, and remains yet applicable to all other caſes.

4. It is only in ſo far as the paper charged as a libel inveſtigates the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter publiſhed is proper for public information, that the truth thereof can be given in evidence. In all other caſes, truth is no juſtification; for it is the provocation which conſtitutes the offence.

5. As grand juries hear evidence only in behalf of the proſecution, and in indictments for libels, as in other caſes, the jury determine the law and the facts under the direction of the court (that is, conforming to this direction in point of law, have a right to give a general verdict) the grand jury, generally ſpeaking, cannot aſcertain whether the libellous matter be true or not; but, if the making or publiſhing of the libel be proved, they will find the bill, and on the trial before the traverſe jury, the court will direct, whether evidence of the truth be admiſſible or not, and whether the matter be libellous or not; and, under the direction of the court, the traverſe jury will determine the law and the facts. If a traverſe jury ſhould determine that a paper is a libel, which is not, and convict a man who has committed no offence, the court has a control over their verdict, by granting a new trial, or arreſting judgment. But if the jury determine that a libel is no libel, and acquit a man really guilty of an offence, the court has no control over this verdict: for a man acquitted of a criminal charge, can never be tried again on the ſame charge.

Such ſeems to be the ſtate of the right of communication of thoughts and opinions, according to the law of Pennſylvania. Any thing may be ſpoken, in terms of decency proper to the ſubject, of the government, an officer, or an individual, provided the ſpeaker can prove it to be true. But all truths are not uſeful or proper for publication, therefore all truths are not to be written, printed, and ſo uttered or publiſhed. And therefore, except in the caſe of papers inveſtigating the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter publiſhed is proper for public information, if any man write, print, utter, or publiſh a libel, he may be indicted, convicted, and puniſhed, whether the libellous matter be true or not.

Congreſs, in its laſt ſeſſion, has paſſed a law 14 July, 1798., enacting, that if any perſons ſhall unlawfully combine together, with intent to oppoſe any meaſure of the government of the United States, or impede the operation of any law of the United States, or to prevent any perſon holding any office under the government of the United States from performing his duty; or ſhall, with ſuch intent, adviſe or attempt to procure any inſurrection, riot, unlawful aſſembly or combination; they ſhall be deemed guilty of a high miſdemeanor, and be puniſhed by a fine, not exceeding five thouſand dollars, and by impriſonment, for not leſs than ſix months, nor more than five years; and may further be holden to ſureties for good behaviour. And it further enacts, that if any perſon ſhall write, print, utter or publiſh, or ſhall cauſe or procure to be written, printed, uttered, or publiſhed, or ſhall knowingly and willingly aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publiſhing, any falſe, ſcandalous, and malicious writing againſt the government of the United States, or either Houſe of Congreſs, or the Preſident of the United States, with intent to defame the ſaid government, or either Houſe of Congreſs, or the Preſident, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or diſrepute; or to excite againſt them or either of them, the hatred of the people of the United States; or to excite unlawful combinations therein, for oppoſing or reſiſting any law of the United States, or any act of the Preſident of the United States done in purſuance of any ſuch law, or of the powers veſted in him by the conſtitution of the United States; or to oppoſe or defeat any ſuch law or acts; or to aid, encourage, or abet any hoſtile deſigns of any foreign nation againſt the United States, their people, or government; ſuch perſon ſhall be puniſhed by a fine, not exceeding two thouſand dollars, and impriſonment, not exceeding two years.

This act, which ſeems to be beſt known by the name of the Sedition Bill, provides, "That if any perſon ſhall be proſecuted under it, for writing or publiſhing any libel, it ſhall be lawful for him, on the trial of the cauſe, to give in evidence, in his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel. And the jury who ſhall try the cauſe ſhall have a right to determine the law and the fact, under the direction of the court, as in other caſes." This clauſe, clearly borrowed from the ſection already quoted of the conſtitution of Pennſylvania, confirms, ſo far as concurrent expreſſions of different perſons on the ſame ſubject can, the conſtruction which I put on that ſection, that the time for giving in evidence the truth of the libellous matter is at the trial of the cauſe by the traverſe jury.

No law ſeems to have been reſiſted in Congreſs with more vehemence and paſſion, by thoſe who oppoſed all the meaſures adopted as meaſures of defence againſt the hoſtile ſpirit of France. And, out of doors, it has been attacked with ſullen rancour, as a death-wound to the progreſs of that deteſtable ſyſtem of ſlander, which has been purſued, with ſuch malignant induſtry, and calamitous ſucceſs, againſt every meaſure of the adminiſtration. And yet, ſtrange as it may ſeem, this law does not create any new offence; for every thing forbidden by it appears to me to have been, before, an offence at common law. The combinations and attempts therein forbidden are miſdemeanors. Any writing of an immoral or illegal tendency is a libel 4 Comm. 150.. And ſlanderous words ſpoken of the government, or its acts or authority, are puniſhable by indictment 4 Bac. 480..

It may be ſaid then, why was this law made? Several reaſons may be given for it.

1. It is no uncommon thing for a legiſlature to make an act declaratory of the common law. At this time, it was peculiarly proper to make ſuch an act, as a ſolemn admonition to wicked or unthinking men to abſtain from practices, which ſpread ſlanders and falſehood, foment diviſions and ſeditions among the citizens, weaken the energy of the government, and, thus rendering the nation defenceleſs, encourage France, by a proſpect of impunity and ſucceſs, to meaſures of aggreſſion and hoſtility.

2. A doubt had been ſuggeſted whether the courts of the United States had cognizance of any offences not expreſsly declared by the conſtitution, or ſome law, or treaty of the United States.—I do not think this doubt well founded. The judicial power of the United States extends to all caſes ariſing under the conſtitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States Conſt. Art. iii. Sec. z: . Hence reſults a juriſdiction to try and puniſh, as miſdemeanors, all acts tending to violate or weaken the authority of the conſtitution, or of any act or meaſure of the government of the United States. For it cannot be ſuppoſed, that ſuch miſdemeanors ſhould paſs unpuniſhed, or that the government of the United States ſhould be obliged to beg protection from the individual ſtates. The doubt however exiſting, it might be thought proper to remove it.

3. It might be thought proper to paſs this law, in order to limit the extent of puniſhment which might be inflicted on the offender; and to give him the advantage of proving the truth of the libel in his defence.

Whatever may have been the motive for making this law, it was oppoſed on two grounds: 1, as unconſtitutional, and, 2, as inexpedient.

1. It was ſaid to be unconſtitutional, becauſe the conſtitution declares, that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the conſtitution, nor prohibited by it to the ſtates, are reſerved to the ſtates reſpectively, or to the people;" U. S. Conſt add. Art. xii. and more expreſsly, that "Congreſs ſhall make no law abridging the freedom of ſpeech or of the preſs. Ib. Art. iii."

The conſtitution, like every other inſtrument, muſt be conſtrued by taking the whole together. Among the powers which the conſtitution delegates to Congreſs is a power "to make all laws, which ſhall be neceſſary and proper for carrying into execution all powers veſted by this conſtitution in the government of the United States, or any department or office thereof U. S. Conſt. Art. i. Sec. 8.." It is evident, that the attempts and writings declared puniſhable by this law, have a direct tendency, differing only in degree from force, to prevent or obſtruct the execution of the powers veſted by the conſtitution in the government of the United States. Therefore a law, declaring that ſuch attempts and writings are puniſhable, is conſtitutional as neceſſary and proper for the execution of the powers of government.

If the clauſe of the conſtitution which prohibits Congreſs from making any law abridging the freedom of ſpeech or of the preſs, is to be conſtrued as prohibiting Congreſs from making any law declaring libels againſt the government, acts, or meaſures of the United States, to be puniſhable; then by the ſame conſtruction of the conſtitution of Pennſylvania, which declares, that no law ſhall ever be made to reſtrain this right, the moſt falſe and malicious libels might be publiſhed, againſt the government, acts, or meaſures of this ſtate (and of courſe of the United States) and the Aſſembly would have no power to make any law, declaring ſuch libels puniſhable; and thus abſolute impunity for them would be eſtabliſhed. This is a conſtructon too abſurd to be received as true. Nor will it juſtify ſuch conſtruction of the conſtitution of the United States to ſay, that it was intended by that conſtitution, that the authority of paſſing laws againſt libels ſhould be left to the individual ſtates: for this would be ſuppoſing that the government of the United States muſt, unleſs the individual ſtates chooſe to afford it, be without defence againſt the moſt dangerous enemy that can attack it, ſlander; againſt which, if unreſtrained, no government can ſupport itſelf. This, therefore, would only remove one abſurdity by another, and ſome other conſtruction of this clauſe of the conſtitution muſt be ſought for.

When the preſs was abuſed by being made a vehicle of flander, governments laid reſtraints on it. Books were to be printed only in certain places, only of a certain nature, and only by licenſe of certain perſons. In England, theſe reſtrictions were impoſed firſt by the authority of the King, part of whoſe prerogative the regulation of printing was conſidered; then by the Star-Chamber, an organ of executive authority; and in the time of the Commonwealth, and after the Reſtoration, and after the Revolution, by the Parliament. The law reſtraining the liberty of the preſs expiring in 1694, was not renewed, and the preſs became free. Hume's England. App. James i, vol. 4. p. 318—4 Comm. 151, 2. For freedom of the preſs conſiſts in this, that any man may, without the conſent of any other, print any book or writing whatever; being, in this, as in all other freedom of action, liable to puniſhment, if he injure an individual or the public.

For thus underſtanding the liberty of the preſs, I ſhall quote the reſpectable authority of Sir William Blackſtone. "Where blaſphemous, immoral, treaſonable, ſchiſmatical, ſeditious, or ſcandalous libels are puniſhed, the liberty of the preſs, properly underſtood, is by no means infringed or violated. The liberty of the preſs is indeed eſſential to the nature of a free ſtate: but this conſiſts in laying no previous reſtraints upon publications, and not in freedom from conſure for criminal matter when publiſhed. Every free man has an undoubted right to lay what ſentiments he pleaſes before the public: to forbid this is to deſtroy the freedom of the preſs: but if he publiſhes what is improper, miſchievous or illegal, he muſt take the conſequence of his own temerity. To ſubject the preſs to the reſtrictive power of a licenſer, as was formerly done, is to ſubject all freedom of ſentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and government. But to puniſh any dangerous or offenſive writing, which, when publiſhed, ſhall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is neceſſary for the preſervation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only ſolid foundation of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals is ſtill left free; the abuſe only of that free will is the ſubject of legal puniſhment.—Neither is any reſtraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private ſentiment is ſtill left; the diſſeminating or making public of bad ſentiments, deſtructive of the ends of ſociety, is the crime which ſociety corrects. A man may be allowed to keep poiſons in his cloſet, but not publicly to vend them as cerdials.—And the only plauſible argument heretofore uſed for the reſtraining of the freedom of the preſs, that it was neceſſary to prevent the daily abuſe of it, will entirely loſe its force, when it is ſhewn (by a ſeaſonable exertion of the laws) that the preſs cannot be abuſed to any bad purpoſe, without incurring a ſuitable puniſhment. So true will it be found, that to cenſure the licentiouſneſs is to maintain the liberty of the preſs 4 Comm. 151 3..

Such is the liberty of the preſs which the people of the ſtates of America, for its greater ſecurity, have made part of their fundamental law. In their ſtate conſtitutions, they provided, that their legiſlatures ſhould not make any law reſtraining the liberty of the preſs, that is, ſhould lay no previous reſtraints on the preſs; or as the Pennſylvania conſtitution expreſſes it, that "every citizen may freely ſpeak, write, and print, on any ſubject, being reſponſible for the abuſe of that liberty Art. ix. Sect. 7.." The ſame principle was afterwards adopted into the Federal conſtitution; and the ſection eſtabliſhing it there is to be conſtrued in the ſame manner. So that the liberty of the preſs is preciſely as ſtated by Sir William Blackſtone, its being free from all previous reſtraints, but, as all other rights or liberties are, ſubject to correction for abuſe.—On this liberty of the preſs in England, Parliament may, at any time, impoſe previous reſtraints; but here a conſtitutional proviſion puts it out of the power of any legiſlature to do ſo.

This law then is no abridgement of the freedom of ſpeech, or of the preſs, and is therefore no infringement of the conſtitution. So far from this, that, as it makes no new offence, it is no alteration of the criminal code, only as it enlarges the bounds of defence, limits the puniſhment, and (if this be an alteration) gives expreſs jurisdiction to the federal courts. It is not injurious either to the conſtitution, or to the liberty of the preſs, but is intended and adapted for the ſupport of both: for it cannot be too often repeated, that "to cenſure the licentiouſneſs is to maintain the liberty of the preſs."

To reſtrain the abuſe of my right, or ſuch an exerciſe of it as ſhall encroach on a right of another, is no reſtraint or abridgement of my right: for I can have no right to leſſen the right of another. And to claim ſuch an unlimited uſe of my right, as to encroach on the right of another is to claim, not liberty, but tyranny; not right, but oppreſſion. "I may freely ſpeak, write, and print, on any ſubject;" but "I am reſponſible for the abuſe of this liberty." Unleſs I may ſpeak, write, and print, my right will not be ſufficiently ſecured; and unleſs I be reſponſible for the abuſe of this liberty, the rights of others would not be ſufficiently ſecured. Therefore to ſecure all, and eſtabliſh true liberty, I muſt be free to ſpeak, write, and print, but be alſo reſponſible for the abuſe of that liberty. This is a ſound principle, and applies to all rights whatever.—It applies to our right of action, as well as to our right of expreſſing our ſentiments in every way. I may ride a horſe, but I muſt not ride over a man. I may walk where I pleaſe, but not on my neighbour's garden. I may uſe my cane, but not to ſtrike any man I meet. Such is the liberty of ſpeech or of the preſs. A law that any printing preſs ſhould be locked up, and the key kept by a certain officer, or that no book ſhould be printed without permiſſion from a certain officer, would be a law abridging the liberty of the preſs. A law, that a man ſhould not ſpeak without permiſſion, ſhould ſpeak only on certain ſubjects, or ſhould have a gag put in his mouth, not to be taken out but by a certain officer, would be an abridgement of the freedom of ſpeech, would be indeed a gagging-law. But becauſe the conſtitution denies the legiſlature any power to make a law like this, or to make any law laying a previous reſtraint on ſpeech or the preſs, to claim therefore a right, from the conſtitution, to ſpeak, write, or print ſedition, impiety, blaſphemy, or any falſehood, however groſs, indecent, and dangerous, is claiming not liberty but licentiouſneſs. Will any one ſay, that my right of freedom of ſpeech entitles me to propagate with impunity any ſlander I pleaſe upon all my neighbours? What character would be ſafe, and what life would be free from miſery, were this liberty of ſpeech to be indulged? There is no ſuch liberty. A liberty to deſtroy reputation would be as injuſt, as a liberty to deſtroy life. Every man is free to ſpeak, but he ſpeaks at his peril, and is anſwerable for all he ſays, if it tend to the injury of another. It is not his opinion of its being proper or true, that will juſtify him.—When he utters it, he is anſwerable for its truth and propriety; and the opinion of a court and jury, not his opinion muſt decide on its truth and propriety. Every repeater of the tale is, in like manner anſwerable as the author. So of libels or written or printed ſlander, with this difference, that, as the provocation by them is more dangerous, they are leſs indulged; and, except in the caſe of matters proper for public information, the proceedings of government, and the official conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, truth is no juſtification. Even in caſes where truth is a juſtification, the truth muſt be made out to the ſatisfaction of a jury.—That the libeller may have thought it true, though it may extenuate, will not juſtify the offence: for no man is to be judge in his own cauſe, and my opinion will not juſtify me in doing an injury to my neighbour, in his reputation, any more than in his perſon or property. Every man, therefore, writes and prints, as he ſpeaks, at his peril; and the publiſher of a libel is anſwerable, in like manner as the author. And both are anſwerable, as in any other offence, to the judgment of a court and jury, by whoſe opinion, and not of the offender, muſt the guilt or innocence of the action be determined. And ſuch reſtriction, if I may ſo call it, or correction of the abuſe, of freedom of ſpeech and of the preſs, is not only perfectly conſiſtent with the principles of civil liberty in general, and with the rules of our conſtitution: but is neceſſary for maintaining the genuine liberty of ſpeech and the preſs. For, of all enemies to liberty, licentiouſneſs is the greateſt.

2. I think, the expediency of this law can be as clearly ſhewn, as its conſtitutionality: and, if ſo, there will be not only duty, but pleaſure in the obedience we yield to it.

Speech, writing, and printing are the great directors of public opinion, and public opinion is the great director of human action. Of ſuch force is public opinion, that, with it on its ſide, the worſt government will ſupport itſelf; and, with it, againſt it, the beſt government will fall.— All governments are ſupported by it; and, without it, can no government be ſupported. What is the force in the power of any government, compared to that of the people governed by it, if the people chooſe to reſiſt? And will they not chooſe to reſiſt, if their opinions be ſet againſt the government, their paſſions rouſed to enthuſiaſm, and an opportunity offered for ſucceſs. And all this may be done by means of clubs, ſocieties, and the preſs.—Give to any ſet of men the command of the preſs, and you give them the command of the country; for you give them the command of public opinion, which commands every thing. Let therefore, clubs, ſocieties, and the printing preſſes attack any government, however free, and however ſtrong, they will infallibly deſtroy it.

It will not be pretended that the old government of France was good, nor denied, that it needed reformation; but, in ſo far as it poſſeſſed ſtrength, and as it was ſupported by the prejudices of the people in its favour, it is a proper inſtance of what I have ſtated. The French revolution was accompliſhed by a gradual operation on public opinion. For many years before, the ſeeds of inſurrection had been buſily ſown in the minds of the people. Clubs, and ſocieties, under various names and pretexts, were eſtabliſhed through the kingdom. The printing preſſes were occupied. Pamphlets and books were diſperſed. New principles were broached, ſupported, and eſtabliſhed. Under the ſanction of philoſophy and reaſon, all prejudices in favour of religion and government were gradually ſapped, to make way for, liberty, equality, and the rights of man; fine words, which, as they were little underſtood, were the more admired. All were men; and prieſts and princes were no more. All reſpect for office ceaſed: and an inſult to a biſhop or a king was no more than an inſult to an equal. Religion was but a ſtate trick, and its author and miniſters but impoſtors. Public opinion, the great pillar of this, as of every other government, being thus withdrawn, the mighty fabric of the monarchy, which, ſupported by public opinion, had ſtood the blaſts of ages, was touched by a ſlight ſhock, and, in a moment crumbled to pieces.

What was the conſequence? Not ſatisfied with reformation, public opinion, directed by clubs and the preſs, was employed to lead the nation to exceſs, anarchy, and ſlavery. The deſperate ſucceſſion of tyrants, which hath ſince ruled France was ſupported by public opinion, directed by clubs and the preſs, till it acquired an enormous armed force. When diſguſted by its cruel and unprincipled oppreſſion, public opinion began to revolt, and the printing preſſes to ſpeak againſt it; even this tyranny, with its vaſt armed force, felt that it could not reſiſt public opinion, and, to ſilence it, ſhut up the preſſes; and now extorts, from an unhappy nation, a ſullen and reluctant ſubmiſſion, by its armed force, and an enſlaved preſs.

The ſame ſeeds of diſſolution were ſown in moſt of the governments of Europe, by the corruption of public opinion effected by a combination of clubs and the preſs. Many have fallen ſacrifices. And nothing but the dreadful example, which the French revolution furniſhed, of the fatal danger of ſubſtituting abſtract principles inſtead of the maxims of experience, could have preſerved many other governments.

One would have thought, that the United States of America, bleſt with the beſt practicable model of republican liberty, which human wiſdom hath yet been able to ſuggeſt, would have eſcaped this greateſt of all plagues, the corruption of public opinion; and that all men would have united in approbation of a ſyſtem of government, which muſt be acknowledged excellent, and of an adminiſtration, which muſt be acknowledged to have been wiſe, enlightened and honeſt. Yet, unfortunately, this plague hath reached us alſo; and our government has been aſſailed with the groſſeſt ſlanders, by many who perhaps believed, and by many who ſurely could not believe, the ſlanders which they uttered. The tongue, the pen, and the preſs; converſations, letters, eſſays, and pamplets, have repreſented our truly republican and balanced conſtitution as a ſyſtem of tyranny; and our upright and wiſe adminiſtration, as miſchievous and corrupt. Our wiſeſt and beſt public officers have had their lives embittered, and have been driven from their ſtations by unceaſing and malignant ſlander. And thus has it been attempted to withdraw, from our excellent government, the only effectual ſupport of any government, public opinion; and thus to withdraw all reverence from ſtation and authority, deprive the conſtitution, the laws, and the adminiſtration, of all reſpect and efficacy, and ſurrender the nation a prey to any invader.

France ſaw our condition, and attacked us: for France attacks a nation only when ſhe has rendered it defenceleſs, by dividing the people from the government, and withdrawing from the government the ſupport of public opinion. In this condition any nation is an eaſy prey. To our complaints ſhe pretended no juſtification, and replied to our reſentment, that ſhe had a party among ourſelves. She reſted on the influence of clubs and the preſs, and on the devotion to her, which they had produced among us.— Some of our preſſes ſeem to have been conſtantly devoted to her views. Many of our citizens, and of our men in public ſtations, ſeem to have favored thoſe meaſures, on which France muſt have depended for ſucceſs againſt us.— And our government was threatened with the loſs of its beſt ſupport, the hearts of its citizens, by means of falſehood, miſrepreſentation, and the vile arts of foreign enemies, and diſcontented, factious, and ſeditious men. In this ſituation, in which no government can long ſtand, and threatened with a war from France, was it not the duty of our government, to diſarm France of that weapon, by which ſhe could moſt effectually injure us, the power of ſpreading flander and ſedition againſt the government, and alienating from it, its true ſupport, the affections of its citizens? It was its duty, and it would have been inexcuſable, if it had omitted this duty. Without ſuppreſſing ſlander and ſedition againſt the government, the ſupport of public opinion cannot be preſerved to it: and without the ſupport to it of public opinion, all other defence againſt France is vain.

On theſe grounds, it appears evident to me, that this law is not only expedient, but neceſſary. And it may be laid down as a general rule, that it will be impoſſible to prevent the corruption of public opinion, or to preſerve any government againſt it; unleſs their be laws to correct the licentiouſneſs of ſpeech and of the preſs. True liberty of ſpeech and of the preſs conſiſts in being free to ſpeak, write, and print, but being, as in the exerciſe of all our other liberties, reſponſible for the abuſe of this liberty. And whether we have abuſed this liberty or not, muſt, like all other queſtions of right, be left to the deciſion of a court and a jury. This is the univerſal teſt, by which the exerciſe of all our rights muſt be tried. Nor is the ſubjection of our right of freedom of ſpeech and of the preſs to this teſt, any more a reſtraint on that right; than the ſubjection of our rights of life and of property to the ſame teſt, is a reſtraint on thoſe rights. By this teſt muſt the exerciſe of all our rights be tried, or no man could enjoy any right whatever. If while our right to life and to property is ſubmitted to this reſtriction, we yet believe we are free, ſhall we think our liberty infringed, by ſubjecting to the ſame reſtriction, our right to ſpeak and print?

This law takes from no man any liberty but a liberty of doing miſchief. And ſo far is it from being true, that this law is any violation of liberty, that, it may be ſafely averred, without ſuch laws, for puniſhing the abuſe of the freedom of ſpeech and of the preſs, liberty cannot be preſerved: every man will be a ſlave to the malignant paſſions of every other, truth and juſtice will be baniſhed, the authority of government deſtroyed, and malice, anarchy, confuſion, and every evil work eſtabliſhed.

Our conſtitution is excellent, our adminiſtration is wiſe and honeſt, and has no intereſt ſeparate from that of the people. On the ſupport of ſuch an adminiſtration of ſuch a government depends our liberty. But, let me repeat, no adminiſtration or government can ſtand againſt the corruption of public opinion; and let me therefore ſolemnly admoniſh you, as you value the peace and liberty of yourſelves and your poſterity, ſeriouſly to reflect on the truth of this. We have ſeen an inſurrection promoted by the corruption of public opinion. An invaſion is invited by it.—How many ſhocks of this kind our government is doomed to ſtand, only the Ruler of the world knows. Let us take warning from our own experience, and the fate of other nations. Let all friends to liberty and order unite in ſuppreſſing ſlander: for, where it prevails, there will be no happineſs, no government. Of all ſlanders thoſe of the preſs are moſt dangerous. Preſſes eſtabliſhed to run down the government are the moſt deſtructive of all treaſons.—This ought to be well conſidered; for every one who encourages ſuch preſſes, or contributes to their ſupport, is a partner in their guilt. Every one who reads their productions with approbation, ſucks in diſeaſe upon his mind; and every one who repeats them to others, ſpreads the infection. What would we think of a ſet of men, who ſhould agree to hire a number of perſons to run through the country, and report falſehoods and ſlanders? Preciſely ſuch, and more dangerous, is the guilt of thoſe who contribute to the ſupport of a ſlanderous Preſs. They are wounding their own and their country's peace, and undermining the government.

But you will ſay, We deſire to hear both ſides, that we may know the truth. My friends, truth has but one ſide: and liſtening to error and falſehood is indeed a ſtrange way to diſcover truth. Take the repreſentations which its friends have made of the conduct of government; have you ever found falſehood in them? Take the contradictory ſtatements made by its enemies—have you ever found truth in them?

You may yet ſay, We have not the means of knowing on which ſide the truth lies; and we, therefore, give no preſerence to any, but hear all. What would you think of a Proteſtant who ſhould ſay thus? The Lutherans and Calviniſts differ in opinion, the Catholics from both, and the Mabometans from them all; I know not on which ſide the truth is; I will, therefore, pay a Lutheran miniſter, a Calviniſt miniſter, a Catholic prieſt, and a Turkiſh dervis; and then, I ſhall be ſure of knowing the truth. Would we think that this man had any regard to truth or religion? Inſtead of acquiring knowledge, would he not confuſe his mind, and loſe ſight of both truth and duty? As in religion, ſo in government, a ſincere enquirer after truth will always find means of diſcovering it. And it is only their enemies, and hypocritical pretenders to ſincerity, who, under pretence of ſearching for truth, wander through the endleſs varieties of error, and affect to think, there is no certainty.

There is hardly any part of government, which, as of religion, has not been miſrepreſented by its enemies. Now, though of all its parts, the people generally have not had an opportunity of being ſully ſatisfied, yet of ſome, they have had this opportunity. And wherever they have had ſuch opportunity, they muſt be ſatisfied, that the conduct of government has been right, and the miſrepreſentations of it falſe and malicious. No part of the conduct of our government has been more miſrepreſented, than its conduct with reſpect to France. Yet, when fairly ſtated, in a way that the greateſt ſlanderers dare not contradict, how honeſt, wiſe, and praiſe-worthy does it ſeem! Ought we not therefore to believe, that, if we underſtood all the reſt, as well as this part, the whole would appear as unexceptionable? This would be our duty between man and man; and it is elſe our duty between citizens and the government.

Another duty, and a mean of information, is to ſearch at the beſt ſources of information. You ought never to believe a ſlander on government, merely becauſe it is ſtated in a newspaper or a pamphlet, or reported by thoſe on whoſe judgment, veracity, and opportunity of knowing, you have not confidence. As if the thing concerned your own houſe or eſtate, or the character of your friend, go to thoſe in whoſe veracity and judgment you would confide in matters of the greateſt importance. For, be aſſured, no matter is of greater importance, than a juſt confidence in government. The men, who endeavour to rob you of this, are the worſt enemies of your peace. If they can ſucceed in robbing your minds of this confidence, they rob you of your liberty; for they deprive government of its authority; and government without authority is anarchy; and anarchy is the worſt tyranny. No crime, therefore, is greater, than that ſlander, which, diminiſhing the people's confidence in the government, diminiſhes their ſecurity, and deſtroys their liberty. And no crime more deſerves the vigilant and ſevere animadverſion of a Grand Jury.